341Second, as regards the applicants' argument that several legislatures and competition authorities in third countries have allowed liner conferences to fix the prices for inland transport services as part of intermodal transport, it is apparent from the file that whilst that is so, it does not seem, to say the least, to be as widespread as the applicants and interveners claim. Thus, far from constituting a unanimous recognition of that pricing practice, the OECD report referred to by the JSA states on the contrary that whilst the United States, Canada, and Australia allow liner conferences to fix the prices for inland transport, Japan and the European Community do not. In any event, it should be borne in mind that national practices, even if common to all the Member States, cannot be allowed to prevail in the application of the competition rules set out in the Treaty (Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission [1984] ECR 19, paragraph 40). A fortiori, therefore, the practices of certain nonmember States cannot dictate the application of Community law. It follows that the fact alleged by the applicants that certain nonmember States allow the members of a liner conference collectively to fix the price of inland transportservices could not, by itself, justify the annulment of the contested decision. At the most, the alleged practices might in an appropriate case be taken into account in assessing the merits of the Commission's findings in the context of examining the various requirements imposed by Article 5 of Regulation No 1017/68 for the grant of individual exemption.
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