22In paragraph 36 the Court of First Instance noted that, according to settled case-law, a comfort letter constituted neither a decision granting negative clearance nor a decision applying Article 85(3) of the Treaty within the meaning of Articles 2 and 6 of Regulation No 17, the comfort letter not having been adopted in accordance with the provisions of that regulation (see the judgments of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 253/78 and 1/79 to 3/79 Giry and Guerlain and Others [1980] ECR 2327; Case 37/79 Marty [1980] ECR 2481; Case 99/79 Lancôme [1980] ECR 2511; and Case 31/80 L'Oréal [1980] ECR 3775). The Court of First Instance went on to say, in paragraph 37, that the comfort letter was a communication informing the undertaking concerned, namely Schöller, that the Commission considered it inappropriate, in view of the circumstances, to take action regarding the agreements at issue. Finally, the Court of First Instance considered, in paragraph 38, that the Commission had undertaken only a provisional analysis of the market conditions and had reserved the right, in its comfort letter, to reopen the procedure if there was any appreciable change affecting certain matters of law or of fact on which its assessment was based.
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