21At paragraph 18 of the order, the Court of First Instance held:‘Furthermore, the effect of the amendments and additions pointed out by the applicant for revision was sufficiently clarified at the hearing of 10 December, 1991 in the PVC cases in which the agents of the Commission stated that the procedure adopted in those cases corresponded to regular practice. The applicant for revision was at that hearing and was represented there by the same lawyer as in the procedure which led to the judgment of 17 December 1991. Consequently, before the judgment was delivered, it could have lodged an application for the reopening of the oral procedure, relying on the facts (which it had put forward in its application for revision). It is true that the applicant for revision still did not have, unlike the applicants in Cases T-9/89 to T-15/89 (see the judgments of 10 March 1992 in Case T-9/89 Hüls v Commission [1992] ECR II-499, paragraphs 382 to 385; Case T-10/89 Hoechst v Commission [1992] ECR II-629, paragraphs 372 to 375; Case T-11/89 Shell v Commission, paragraphs 372 to 374; Case T-12/89 Solvay v Commission [1992] ECR II-907, paragraphs 345 to 347; Case T-13/89 ICI v Commission [1992] ECR II-1021, paragraphs 399 to 401; Case T-14/89 Montedipe v Commission [1992] ECR II-1155, paragraphs 389 to 391; and Case T-15/89 Linz v Commission [1992] ECR II-1275, paragraphs 393 to 395), the legal evaluation of the PVC decision which the Court (of First Instance) rendered in its judgment of 27 February 1992. That circumstances does not, however, alter the fact that the applicant for revision was aware of the facts in question before the judgment was delivered (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-403/85 REV Ferrandi v Commission [1991] ECR I-1215, paragraph 13).’
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.