law://eu/cjeu/1983/c-72-83/hd_1_1_2_1@2026-11-20The plaintiffs in the main action observe first, by way of introduction, that before the entry into force of the contested 1982 Order, approximately 75% of the petroleum products sold by them were purchased from suppliers and refineries established in other Member States. Those -purchases were made at prices prevailing at the time of purchase and their customers obtained the benefit of such competitive purchasing. The plaintiffs are small independent oil companies which depend on their individual capacities to operate on a totally flexible basis on the open market. The contested 1982 Order completely cuts across that freedom of action and places them at a competitive disadvantage in relation to the major multinational companies operating on the Irish market.The plaintiffs in the main action do not contest the INPC's purchase or operation of the Whitegate refinery, nor would they have any objection to the Irish State operating the refinery in a competitive manner without the support of the contested 1982 Order and the regulatory system. However, they do contest the right of the Irish State to compel them to purchase from the Whitegate refinery a substantial proportion of their petroleum oil supplies at prices in excess of those prevailing on the open market and fixed pursuant to the contested 1982 Order. The mandatory purchasing system created by the 1982 Order has as its purpose to ensure that the Whitegate refinery does not operate at a loss, and obliges the customer to subsidize the operation of the refinery.As regards the first question the plaintiffs in the main action are of the opinion that the purchasing requirement constitutes a classic example of a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Articles 30 and 31 of the EEC Treaty. The 1982 Order expressly envisages a restriction on trade in petroleum products and prevents Irish oil importers from importing 35% of their own oil requirements. Since the 1982 Order makes no provision for any derogation from that requirement, there is an express restriction on the free movement of petroleum products-between Ireland and the other Member States.Furthermore, in the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 May 1976 in Case 104/75 (de Peuter [1976] ECR 613) the effect of the contested 1982 Order is to ensure that imported petroleum products (albeit initially in crude oil form) are channelled through the INPC. A system restricting the importing capacity of certain traders whilst granting a monopoly-type importing franchise to another trader must of necessity affect the free movement of the goods in question.As regards the second question, the plaintiffs in the main action emphasize that Article 36 of the EEC Treaty has been given a strict interpretation in the case-law of the Court. In particular, Article 36 covers only matters of a non-economic nature (judgment of 19 December 1961 in Case 7/61 Commissions Italy [1961] ECR 317; judgment of 9 June 1982 in Case 95/81 Commission v Italy [1982] ECR 2187). In that regard, it is important to see the question as concerning the existence of a mandatory requirement to purchase goods at a specified price and not as to whether Ireland should or should not have an oil refinery.The defendants in the main action were not seriously relying upon the concept of “public policy”. In any event, that concept presupposes the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society and in the context of the Community it must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 4.12.1974 in Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337; judgment of 27.10.1977 in Case 30/77 Regina v Boucherau [1977] ECR 1999). The system established by the 1982 Order is, however, essentially economically based since its purpose is to enable the defendants to operate the Whitegate refinery with guaranteed customers for its products and without financial loss. The system is a financial instrument and thus economic in nature and it cannot therefore come within the concept of “public policy” referred to in Article 36. It may be possible to envisage circumstances in which the operation by a Member State of an oil refinery can be justified on the basis of that article. However, there is no basis whatever for justifying the existence of a mandatory purchasing requirement and the allied pricing system.As regards “public security”, it is difficult to conceive of any relationship between that concept and the essentially economic nature of the system in question. Public security denotes the internal security of the State rather than national security in the context of inter-State relations. Even if the concept of public security were deemed to incorporate an element of external security, it would still not encompass the system established by the contested 1982 Order.As it has done in relation to the concept of “public policy”, the Court can give guidance for interpreting the breadth and scope of the concept of “public security” within the meaning of Article 36. “Public security” involves the maintenance of law and order within the State. In certain extreme circumstances, the assistance of the national army may be necessary to enforce security. Hence, there is no connection whatsoever between that concept and a system such as that established by the contested 1982 Order. Only the ownership and operation of the Whitgate refinery by the State can be justified on grounds of public security but not the mandatory purchasing requirement.
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