law://eu/cjeu/1983/c-242-83/hd_1_1_2_2@2026-11-17“Article 51 (b) of the Treaty must be interpreted as not authorizing the Council of Ministers to establish a system whereby entitlement to family benefits payable by the State in whose territory the recipient of an invalidity pension resides does not take away the right to higher benefits awarded previously by another Member State or at least to a supplement equal to the difference between the two amounts, thus causing a right to accrue to the recipient which was not created by the legislation of either of the Member States. Consequently, if it were necessary to interpret Article 77 (2) (b) (i) of Regulation No 1408/71 in such a way as to create such a system, that Article would not be valid in the light of Article 51 (b) of the Treaty.”In his observations submitted to the Court, Salvatore Patteri maintains that by transferring his residence to Italy he has not forfeited his entitlement to family benefits previously awarded in Belgium, and that he ought to receive — in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice — the difference between the benefits paid under the Belgian scheme and those paid under the Italian scheme. In his view, Article 77 of Regulation No 1408/71 governs the grant of family benefits as follows :(a) Where the migrant worker is the recipient of a pension from one Member State alone, family benefits are to be granted to him in accordance with the legislation of that State (Article 77 (2) (a));(b) Where the migrant worker is the recipient of pensions from several Member States, family benefits are to be granted to him, in order of priority, in accordance with the legislation of the Member State in which he resides (Article 77 (2) (b) (i)) or, in the alternative, in accordance with the national legislation under which he has completed the longest period of insurance (Article 77 (2) (b) (ii)).To determine which law is applicable and, hence, the institution responsible for payment of the benefits, regard should be had to the situation of the insured person when the event which created the right to the benefits occurred (in this case, award of the invalidity pension). A change of residence merely creates a conflict of laws which must be settled in accordance with the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice (judgments in Case 733/79, Laterza, Case 807/79, Gravina, and Case 320/82, D'Amano), and provisions for that purpose have since been laid down in Decision No 122 of 20 April 1983 of the Administrative Commission of the European Communities on Social Security for Migrant Workers (Official Journal No C 295 of 2. 11. 1983).Moreover, Mr Patteri points out that Article 90 (1) of Regulation No 574/72 provides that, in order to receive benefits under Article 77 or 78 of Regulation No 1408/71, the claimant must submit a claim to the institution of his place of residence, in accordance with the procedure laid down by the legislation administered by that institution. It seems obvious that that formality ought to be completed when the right is recognized. Furthermore, Article 92 of Regulation No 574/72 requires any person to whom benefits are paid under Article 77 or 78 of Regulation No 1408/71 to inform the institution responsible for the payment of such benefits, inter alia, of any transfer of residence leading to the loss of a right to benefits already acquired. Lastly, in Mr Patteri's view, account must be taken of the fact that the question of family benefits granted under the Belgian scheme overlapping with benefits of the same nature payable under some other legislation or rules is governed in Belgian law by Article 60 of the Consolidated Laws as amended by the Royal Decree of 15 July 1982, published in the Moniteur Belge of 20 July 1982, p. 8393.As regards the Fund's claim that the Belgian legislation does not give rise to any entitlement to family allowances for children brought up outside Belgian territory (last paragraph of Article 51 of the Consolidated Laws of 19 December 1939), Mr Patteri points out that a territorial clause of that kind is rendered completely inoperative by Article 51 (b) of the EEC Treaty. He refers to the judgment of the Court of 20 October 1977 in Case 32/77 Giuliani and points out that Article 51 of the Treaty sets out two separate aims. Article 51 (b) secures the payment of social security benefits in the territories of all the Member States — irrespective of the rules on aggregation and apportionment. The conditions as to residence contained in the last paragraph of Article 51 of the Belgian Consolidated Laws is therefore overruled expressly by Article 51 (b) of the EEC Treaty and by implication by Article 10 of Regulation No 1408/71, since the grant of family allowances at the higher rate for invalids provided for under the Belgian legislation is conditional upon qualifying for a pension (Article 56 (2) (1) (b) of the Consolidated Laws). It follows that a migrant worker may freely export to the territory of any other Member State the pension of which he is the recipient, together with related benefits. Finally, Mr Patteri takes the view that the Fund should apply Article 60 of the Belgian Consolidated Laws and deduct from the amount of family benefits payable under the Belgian scheme the amount of family benefits payable under the Italian scheme. He therefore asks the Court to confirm its decisions in Case 733/79 (Laterza), Case 807/79 (Gravina) and Case 320/82 (D'Amano) and to state, in addition, that to interpret Article 77 in that way is not contrary to Article 51 of the EEC Treaty.The Council of the European Communities has submitted observations affirming the validity of Article 77 (2) (b) (i) of Council Regulation No 1408/71. Referring to the measures mentioned in Article 3 of the EEC Treaty and to the aims of Articles 48 to 51 thereof, the Council considers that the wording of Article 51, together with the fact that it is included in the chapter dealing with the free movement of workers — a fundamental principle of the Community — clearly shows that the adoption of measures in the field of social securtiy is secondary to the need to attain freedom of movement. The Council acknowledges that, apart from the measures necessary to secure the aggregation of all periods that may be taken into account by the various national laws and to enable the migrant worker to receive benefits regardless of his place of residence in the territories of the Member States, no other details are given in Article 51 as to the manner in. which the general objectivé laid down therein should be achieved by the Council. It points out that the aim of Article 51 of the EEC Treaty is the adoption of measures “necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers” and, on the basis of the interpretation given by the Court to Article 51 in Laterza, cited above, the Council considers that that article not only authorized it, but also obliged it, to take measures to safeguard in all circumstances the rights acquired by migrant workers under national law. The Council shares the views expressed by the Court in Rossi and Laterza, cited above, and points out that in Decision No 122 of 20 April 1983 the Administrative Commission of the European Communities on Social Security for Migrant Workers confirmed that view by deciding that it was not permissible for migrant workers' rights under national law to be diminished (Official Journal C 295 of 2. 11. 1983).In conclusion, the Council asks the Court to declare that, in so far as it grants workers rights other than those deriving solely from national law, Article 77 (2) (b) (i) is valid, and to reaffirm its judgment in Case 733/79 (Laterza).The observations lodged by the Commission of the European Communities concentrate, in the first place, on the interpretation to be given to Article 51 of the EEC Treaty, since it appears that the problem of validity which is the subject of the second question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling arises only if Article 51 has the more restrictive scope attributed to it by the Fund. However, the Commission is unable to accept the Fund's interpretation of that article. It states that the scope of Article 51 was established by the Court in its first judgments in the field of social security to the effect that the “establishment of as complete a freedom of movement for workers as possible, which thus forms part of the ‘foundations’ of the Community, therefore constitutes the principal objective of Article 51 and thereby conditions the interpretation of the regulations adopted in implementation of that Article” (judgments of 19. 3. 1964 in Case 75/63, Hoekstra (née Unger), [1964] ECR 177 at p. 184, and 9. 6. 1964 in Case 92/63, Nonnenmacher, [1964] ECR 281 at p. 288). The Commission considers that it was on that basis that the Court formulated one of the basic principles for the interpretation of social security regulations in the light of the aims of Article 51, that is to say the principle that acquired rights should be maintained: “The aim of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained but disregarded if the worker were obliged, in order to avail himself of the freedom of movement which is guaranteed to him, to find himself subjected to the loss of rights already acquired in one of the Member States without having them replaced by at least equivalent benefits” (Case 100/63, Kalsbeek (née van der Veen), [1964] ECR 565 at p. 574).Accordingly, the Commission considers that it is clear that Article 51 may not be reduced — as the Fund claims it can — to a provision which merely provides for the establishment of arrangements for aggregating insurance periods and of arrangements for exporting benefits. In support of this view the Commission refers to Mr Advocate General Reischl's Opinion of 21 February 1979 in Case 139/78 (Cuccioli, [1979] ECR 991 at p. 1003), where it is pointed out that the key factor in interpreting Article 51 is the reference in the first paragraph of that article to “such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers”. The Commission considers that the powers of the Council are defined and circumscribed, likewise in the sphere of social security, by the need to guarantee effective free movement.The Fund's reference to Article 51 (b), that is to say to arrangements to secure the actual payment of social benefits to migrant workers, covers only one of the means of action which can be used. In the Commission's view, this emerges from the actual wording of Article 51 [“notamment”, that is to say “in particular”, being included in the French version of the Clause: “to this end, it shall make arrangements, [in particular,] to secure ... dependants”]. Therefore, Regulation No 1408/71, which was issued pursuant to Article 51, includes, alongside provisions concerning the aggregation of insurance periods and the exporting of benefits — matters mentioned in Article 51 — several provisions which are intended to secure the free movement of workers by dealing with the very existence of entitlement to benefits. The Commission provides two examples, one concerning unemployment benefit (judgment of 20. 3. 1979 in Case 139/78, Coccioli, [1979] ECR.991), the other concerning invalidity benefits (Case 181/83, Weber, observations of the Commission). The aggregation of insurance periods (Article 51 (a)) and the exporting of benefits (Article 51 (b)) are not the aims of Article 51 but merely two measures that are necessary to attain its objective, which is the free movement of workers. It follows that there is confusion on the part of the Fund between the aims and the means of attaining those aims. In the Commission's view, Article 51 of the EEC Treaty authorizes the Council to take all necessary measures with a view to securing the effective free movement of workers. It follows from this that a worker may not be disadvantaged by the very exercise of the right of free movement which is guaranteed to him. The reason for which the Court has consistently stressed, since its earliest decisions on social security, that the regulations on social security for migrant workers did not create a common social security scheme but allowed separate systems to continue to exist, giving rise to separate claims against separate institutions, is precisely, in the Commission's view, that it was necessary to ensure that the migrant worker's working record was not seen as an undifferentiated whole, resulting in the loss of rights acquired either under national law alone or under national law supplemented by Community law. The Commission refers to the judgment of 21 October 1975 in Case 24/75 (Petroni, [1975] ECR 1149).As regards the interpretation given to Article 77 (2) (b) (i) of Regulation No 1408/71 in the judgment in Laterza, the Commission considers it to be in keeping with Article 51 of the EEC Treaty. The Court confirmed that the interpretation of Articles 77 to 79 of Regulation No 1408/71 should also be based on Articles 40 to 51 of the EEC Treaty. Thus the Court referred to the principle of acquired rights, according to which the Community rules cannot, in the absence of an express exception consistent with the aims of the EEC Treaty, be applied in such a way as to deprive a migrant worker or his dependants of the benefits of a part of the legislation of a Member State (judgment of 6. 3. 1979 in Case 100/78, Rossi, [1979] EĆR 831, to which the judgment in Laterza, cited above, refers). The Commission points out that, in the case of Rossi, Mr Advocate General Capotorti took the view (at p. 851) that entitlement to the supplementary family allowance had to be recognized independently of the national law in question and that, in accordance with the general principles underlying Article 51 of the EEC Treaty, the Community legislation was indeed the direct source of entitlement to the supplementary allowance. The Court confirmed that this view was well founded by referring in its judgment in Rossi to the claimant's direct rights “ by virtue either of national law alone or of national law supplemented, if necessary, by Community law”. The Commission considers that the character of Article 77 of Regulation No 1408/71 as a conflict-of-laws provision and its validity as such place no obstacle in the way of compliance with the general principles derived from Article 51 of the Treaty by the Court's numerous decisions on the matter, as Mrs Advocate General Rozès noted in her Opinion in Case 320/82 (D'Amario) (judgment of 24. 11. 1983 confirming, once again, the principle that the most favourable benefit should be granted).Finally, the Commission emphasizes that it is certain that Mr Patteri was entitled to Belgian family allowances before he transferred his and his family's residence to Italy on 9 August 1979. Hence it was the very exercise of his right of free movement which caused him to forfeit a benefit that he had acquired under national law alone. In the Commission's view, this is a further reason for interpreting Article 77 (2) (b) (i) in the present instance in conformity with the judgment in Laterza.In conclusion, the Commission considers that it is to be established that Article 51 (3) of the Belgian Consolidated Laws conflicts with the aims pursued by the provisions of Articles 48 to 51 of the EEC Treaty in so far as it is applied to the persons covered by Regulation No 1408/71. The direct applicability of provisions of the EEC Treaty and implementing regulations waiving residence clauses does not release the Member States from the obligation imposed on them by the Treaty to adapt their national law so as to conform with the Community legal order (judgment of 4. 4. 1974 in Cae 167/73, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, [1974] ECR 359). The Commission therefore takes the view that the Belgian institutions cannot validly apply to Community nationals a national provision that should have been amended.In the Commission's view, the questions should be answered as follows:(1) Article 51 of the EEC Treaty is intended to provide and secure the utmost freedom of movement for workers. That aim would not be attained but disregarded if the worker were obliged, in order to avail himself of the freedom of movement which is guaranteed to him, to suffer the loss of rights acquired either under internal law alone or under internal law supplemented by Community law. Thus, Regulation No 1408/71, in laying down and developing rules for coordinating national laws, must guarantee to workers who move within the Community all the benefits which have accrued to them in the various Member States whilst limiting them to the highest amount of such benefits.(2) Article 77 (2) (b) (i) of Regulation No 1408/71 must be interpreted as meaning that entitlement to family benefits from the State in whose territory the recipient of an invalidity pension resides does not take away the right to higher benefits previously awarded by another Member State. If the amount of family benefits actually received by the worker, in the Member State in which he resides is less than the amount of the benefits provided for by the legislation of the other Member State, he is entitled to a supplement to the benefits from the competent institution of the latter State equal to the difference between the two amounts.(3) Consideration of the questions raised has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71.In its observations submitted to the Court, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany bases its interpretation of Article 77 (2) (b) (i) of Regulation No 1408/71 on the wording of that provision, on the scheme of Chapter 8 thereof and on a comparison between the latter and the scheme of Chapter 7. In the German Government's view, the wording of the provision indicates that entitlement exists only vis-à-vis the State in which the recipient resides and not vis-à-vis another Member State. The other rules set out in Chapter 8 of the Regulation are also formulated so that one Member State only is obliged to grant benefits in respect of pensioners' dependent children or orphans, as the case may be. Chapter 7 of the Regulation is also based on the principle that, in each case, only one Member State is required to grant family benefits and allowances. By virtue of that chapter, the Member State responsible for paying the benefit is, as a matter of principle, the State in which the recipient resides (Article 73 (2)). The drafters of the regulations, therefore, did not infer from Article 51 of the EEC Treaty that the highest benefit invariably has to be granted or that benefits from two Member States may be aggregated. Otherwise, there would have been no need to include Articles 73 (2) and 74 (2) in the Regulation, which provide for the payment of family allowances under the legislation of the State in whose territory the members of the family reside (such benefits are generally lower than those prescribed by the legislation of the State in which the worker is employed).If, under the Belgian legislation, Mr Patteri were entitled to those benefits, that entitlement could be suspended only if corresponding benefits were payable under the legislation of the State of residence. In that case the rule against overlapping benefits would be only partly applied and any difference would have to be granted in the form of a supplement. The Court of Cassation of the Kingdom of Belgium has however, drawn attention to the fact that Article 51 (3) of the Consolidated Laws provides that family allowances are not payable in respect of children brought up outside Belgium. Consequently the German Government considers that the respondent has no entitlement under the relevant Belgian legislation to family allowances. In the German Government's view, the benefits provided for in Article 77 of Regulation No 1408/71 are intended to be used towards the children's maintenance. Since the costs of maintenance vary depending on the cost of living in the State of residence, it seems reasonable from the social point of view that family allowances in respect of children who are resident in Italy should be granted in accordance with the relevant Italian legislation.In conclusion, the German Government considers that, having regard to Community law, no entitlement to Belgian family allowances arises in the present instance.The Government of the Italian Republic expresses doubts in its observations, as to how accurately and strictly the court making the reference has defined the measures that may be laid down by Regulation No 1408/71, namely “such measures as are necessary to secure for migrant workers the actual payment of social security benefits, the said benefits continuing to be governed, as regards the principle and the amount thereof, exclusively by separate bodies of rules giving rise to separate claims against separate institutions”. The Italian Government's view is that the above wording stresses aspects concerned exclusively with means, that is to say substantially with the technique of Community legislation, and not with the aims with which the regulation provided for in Article 51 of the EEC Treaty must strictly conform. The Italian Government considers that although there is no doubt that in the territory of the Community workers' social security is provided for by the various national laws and institutions, which lay down, in complete independence, the premises, conditions and basic rules for determining workers' entitlement to social security benefits, by contrast the function of the Community rules is to coordinate the national systems with a view to securing complete and satisfactory cover for migrant workers. In this regard, it is not sufficient merely to consider Article 51 (a) and (b) of the EEC Treaty, to which the question seems to be confined. The Court's decisions have, in fact, already indicated a broader approach on the basis of the idea that “the regulations in the field of social security for migrant workers have as their basis, their framework and their bounds Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty” (judgment of 21. 10. 1975 in Case 24/75, Petroni, cited above). The provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 should be interpreted by inferring therefrom the basic rules and the effects corresponding to the aims of the Treaty with regard to the free movement of workers; by definition, an interpretation following that procedure cannot give rise to the conclusion that the provision at issue, thus viewed, infringes Article 51 of the Treaty. The Italian Government considers that the Court has on many occasions held it to be incompatible with the principles of the free movement of workers to apply the Community rule so as to cause a worker to forfeit social security benefits to which he has become entitled by virtue of the legislation of a Member State, because he moved within the Community (in exercise of a right guaranteed by the EEC Treaty).In the Italian Government's opinion, the present structure of social security in the Community is such that a worker is wholly and solely subject to the laws governing social security in his country of origin as long as he remains there. But once he moves within the Community, his social security cover automatically becomes a matter of Community law, which, in pursuance of the aims embodied in Articles 48 to 51 of the EEC Treaty, deals with the effects of the free movement of workers on the conditions and procedures laid down for entitlement to social benefits. As a result, Community legislation cannot but play a part, together with the national provisions relevant to each case, in determining the social security status of the migrant worker. It can therefore be said that each specific individual legal situation depends on a combination of national provisions and the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71. The contribution made in that respect by Community legislation consists of certain changes to the effects that the national provisions alone would otherwise have. Those changes may legitimately be all those necessary for the purpose of guaranteeing implementation of the principles of the EEC Treaty which concern the free movement of workers. From that point of view, the last paragraph of Article 51 of the Belgian Consolidated Laws can be taken into account only for the purpose of establishing whether entitlement to migrant workers' benefits exists, to the extent allowed by Regulation No 1408/71. Once that provision of Belgian law attaches certain legal effects to a worker's moving within the Community, it enters the sphere of the Community regulation.According to the Italian Government, it is pointless to plead insurmountable administrative difficulties in implementing the decision in Laterza. That would be tantamount to attaching greater importance to administrative efficiency than to rights firmly based on genuine legal principles underlying the Community legal order.Since there is a logical link between the two questions, in so far as the first introduces the second, the Italian Government proposes the following single answer:“The fact that, by applying one of the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 and, in particular, Article 77 (2) (b) (i) thereof, the competent institution of a Member State is obliged to pay a migrant worker an amount equal to the difference between a benefit provided for under the legislation of that Member State and a benefit of identical name, purpose and nature provided for by the legislation of another Member State does not invalidate the said Regulation No 1408/71 where that obligation is necessary, in relation to the movement of the beneficiary or members of his family within the Community, in order to implement the objectives laid down in Articles 48 to 51 of the EEC Treaty.”
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