law://eu/cjeu/1983/c-13-83/hd_1_1_3_2_2@2026-11-19The European Parliament, supported by the Commission, contends that, taken as a whole, the measures adopted so far by the Council in regard to transport in no way meet the requirements of the Treaty for a common policy.The two institutions maintain that a legal obligation to introduce a common transport policy is to be inferred both from the wording of the relevant provisions and from the general scheme and aims of the Treaty as set out above. The general obligation is founded on the principle contained in Article 3 (e) of the Treaty. That it is an imperative one is confirmed by the interrelation of the various parts of the Treaty.The pursuit of the objectives listed in Article 3 is indispensable for carrying out the tasks entrusted to the Community.In the Parliament's view a general obligation is also to be inferred from Article 74, which assumes that there is a binding framework of a common policy as a logical and necessary condition for the implementation of individual measures. The establishment of a binding framework is necessary to provide general guidelines and to prevent Community action from leading to uncoordinated and even contradictory results by way of reaction to circumstances of the moment. According to Article 8 (7) of the Treaty the basis of the common policy ought to have been laid down by the end of the transitional period.The Parliament then claims that Article 75 imposes unconditional obligations on the Council to lay down common rules for international transport, the conditions under which nonresident carriers may operate transport services within a Member State and any other appropriate provisions. Article 75 (2) stipulates that the provisions referred to in (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 were to be laid down during the transitional period. The Parliament nevertheless considers that even in the case of Article 75 (1) (c), in respect of which no express time-limit was laid down, the Council ought to adopt the necessary measures within a reasonable period, that is to say within a period which satisfies the expectations of the public with regard to the implementation of a common policy.The Parliament considers that the discretion which the Council enjoys in respect of transport is confined to determining the substance of the measures to be taken and fixing, within the period prescribed, the date of their entry into force. That discretion does not affect the existence of an obligation to act and in any event does not allow the Council to remain inactive in defiance of the requirements of the Treaty.In the Commission's view there is no legal obligation in the Treaty to establish before the end of the transitional period a framework for a common transport policy. Nevertheless, it supports the Parliament's argument that the competent institutions of the Community are legally bound to fulfil the general obligation to introduce such a policy within an appropriate period. The precise content of that obligation must be determined in accordance with the individual provisions of the title on transport.In that respect it adds that the ‘standstill’ obligation in Article 76 which applies until the adoption of the provisions referred to in Article 75 (1) indirectly confirms the existence of special obligations under Article 75. Furthermore, Article 61, according to which freedom to provide services in the field of transport is governed by the provisions of the title relating to transport, indicates that there is an obligation to achieve freedom to provide services in relation to transport by appropriate measures on the basis not only of Article 75 but also of Article 84 (2) of the Treaty.The Commission considers that the general obligation in Article 3 (e) extends not only to transport by road, rail and inland waterway but also to sea and air transport. In its opinion the discretion which the Council enjoys under Article 84 (2) to decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for those sectors relates mainly to the choice of such measures. The obligation to act within an appropriate period arises from the fact that the conditions of competition in sea and air transport make it impossible to integrate those markets solely by applying the general rules of the Treaty. If the wide discretion given to the Council under Article 84 (2) justifies more time being allowed for the adoption of appropriate measures in those areas than for the other means of transport, that time has already expired.As regards the general complaint that the Council has failed to act the Parliament refers to its analysis of the activities of the institutions. First of all, the Council has failed to fulfil its duty to lay down the principles which may form the framework of a common policy, for the few planning decisions taken in the 1960s did not allow the introduction of coherent legislation comparable to that governing, for example, the customs union, competition in the common market or the agricultural sector. Even in areas where the Treaty does not require any fixed framework the Council has adopted programmes of action serving as a basis for its activities. Since 1970, however, it has not developed any specific guidelines of policy in relation to transport.In that respect the Parliament, referring to the judgment in Case 12/82, emphasizes that although the provisions of the Treaty in relation to transport are designed to liberalize trade and to establish a competitive economy within the Community, the very notion of a common policy requires that the Community should also guarantee balanced trade and fair competition (Ministère Public v Trinon [1982] ECR 4089). The absence of a common transport policy has caused serious disturbances in competition and has had adverse repercussions on trade.The general complaint of omission is corroborated by the fact that the Council, in breach of the Treaty, has failed to act on the proposals submitted to it by the Commission. The Parliament refers to the 24 proposals it listed when it called upon the Council to act and in respect of which there is an obligation to act under Article 75 of the Treaty.In support of the Parliament's argument the Commission submits a list of decisions relating to programmes adopted by the Council, accompanied by a detailed review of the results. It states that only 40% of the traffic in carriage of goods between Member States by road transport has been liberalized, whilst transport within the Member States is still reserved for national carriers. As regards harmonization of the conditions of competition there are still no provisions on the taxation, weights or sizes of commercial vehicles. Furthermore, international transport is still impeded by numerous border checks.In the railway sector measures remain to be taken to improve competitive capacity, intensify cooperation between railways and improve their profitability in general.Transport by inland waterway lacks rules on access to the business and on harmonization of social provisions. Moreover, the Council has failed to adopt common rules to eliminate distortion of competition in respect of freight rates resulting from national policies on structural surplus capacity in the sector.The Commission also points out that there is no control of the distribution of the costs of the infrastructure between the various methods of transport and that no legal basis has been adopted for the joint financing of proposed infrastructures with a Community interest or for coordinating national measures with regard thereto.Finally, it points out that insufficient progress has been achieved in relation to sea and air transport and that there is keen resistance by the Council to the exercise by the Community of its powers in external relations regarding transport. Thus the Community is still not a party to the European Agreement on Road Transport nor a member of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine.The Parliament and the Commission consider that the difficulties which the Council encounters in seeking a solution to complex questions on which there are divergent interests cannot be pleaded to justify the failure to adopt the necessary provisions under the Treaty within the time-limits laid down thereunder. The Treaty gives the Council certain machinery for the resolution of such problems. Under Article 5 of the Treaty and the special provisions of the Treaty relating to the procedure for reaching decisions the Member States are required to facilitate the work of the Council and to endeavour to collaborate as far as possible in order to fulfil the legal obligations imposed by the Treaty. That obligation includes the application of the voting procedures provided for by the Treaty in cases where a consensus cannot be achieved and unanimity is not required.In answer to a question put by the Court the Commission stated that in the exercise of its power to initiate it has from the outset had to take account of the economic, political and legal difficulties which the Member States have pleaded to justify their hesitation. It considers in consequence that the proposals which it has made to the Council under Article 75 (1) (a) and (b) constituted, when they were made, the minimum necessary to ensure an appropriate development of the common transport policy in parallel with developments in the other areas of the common market.The Council (the defendant) denies first of all that the Treaty imposes on it a legal obligation to draw up a binding framework for a common transport policy. Although Article 75 provides that certain measures must be taken to implement Article 74 it does not provide that it is necessary to lay down a binding framework for that policy. The Council considers, moreover, that such a binding framework is not essential in order to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. In view of the changing nature of transport problems there is even a risk, in adopting a general binding plan, of compromising the measures which subsequently have to be taken and placing obstacles in the way of the necessary adjustment to the technical and economic requirements.The Council contends that as regards the introduction of a common transport policy as such the Treaty imposes no legal obligation on the Council sufficiently clear and specific as to its terms and the time within which it is to be done for it to be possible to obtain by means of an action brought under Article 175 a declaration that the Council has infringed the Treaty. It repeats that there is no definition in the Treaty of the notion of a common transport policy.The Council challenges the systematic interpretation put forward by the Parliament and the Commission based on the combined effect of Articles 3 and 74 et seq. of the Treaty. Article 3 does not create an independent obligation to act or a legal basis for specific measures by the Council. Although the provisions of the Treaty governing the various sectors must be interpreted in the light of the aims laid down in Article 3, it is the specific provisions for each sector which determine the institutions' powers of action and their obligations to act. On the basis of that distinction the Court, in its judgment of 11 November 1981 for example, established a connection between Article 67 and Article 3 (c) but then considered solely on the basis of Article 67 et seq. to what extent free movement of capital is effectively prescribed by the Treaty and to what extent the Council has a discretion with regard thereto (Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595 at p. 2613). Adopting such an approach, there is nothing in Article 61, which relates to freedom to provide services in the field of transport, which helps to establish the existence of a general obligation to introduce a common transport policy.The Council then contends that Article 74 neither obliges nor empowers the Council to act. In addition, the title on transport indicates a course to be pursued but it gives neither particulars of the aim to be achieved nor the period within which it should be achieved. A comparison with the provisions of the Treaty relating to the introduction of the common agricultural policy shows clearly the imprecise nature of the provisions on the common transport policy. Moreover, the aforesaid provisions on movement of capital provide an example of an obligation to act accompanied by such a wide discretion that the competent institution, namely the Council, may refrain from adopting measures of liberalization if in its opinion they are not necessary for the functioning of the common market.The Council admits that the provisions of Article 75 (1) (a) and (b) impose an obligation on it to act and that Article 75 (2) stipulates a time-limit, but the obligation is so ill-defined that it leaves the Council a wide discretion which in its opinion precludes an action under Article 175. That observation applies a fortiori in the case of Article 75 (1) (c), for the Treaty does not specify what scope the rules should have or the area to which they should apply. As in the case of the common agricutural policy, the preparation of Community rules on transport requires the assessment of complex economic situations which, according to the established case-law of the Court, demands a wide discretion.The Council denies, moreover, that there is any obligation to act under Article 84 (2) in the fields of sea and air transport. The very wording of the article shows that the Council has a discretion not only to decide how far and by what procedure measures should be adopted, but also to decide whether measures should be adopted at all.As regards the examples of measures whose lack is pleaded in support of the general complaint of failure to act, the Council considers that Article 175 of the Treaty does not enable the Court to determine the scope and particulars of rules which ought to have been adopted by the Council under Article 75 (1) (a) and (b). Just as the Court in an action under Article 173 cannot review the way in which a discretion is actually exercised it cannot in an action for failure to act require that a discretion be exercised.The Council also refers to the difficulties already mentioned which prevent progress in the preparation of a common policy. It refers to certain principles of national administrative law according to which an authority which has a specific obligation is not guilty of any unlawful omission if special circumstances of a technical or political nature, such as a conflict of different political or social interests likely to have serious consequences, prevent fulfilment of the obligation. In the case of an obligation to act which leaves a certain discretion with regard to substance, failure to act is unlawful only if it constitutes a misuse of powers or is ultra vires. The Council adds that the discretion which it has in the exercise of its legislative power has limits even less strict than those which circumscribe the action of a public authority in the administrative field.In its role as mediator between the Community obligations and national interests — the role emphasized by Articles 74 and 75 — the Council must take account of any circumstances likely to hinder or even prevent the implementation of the provisions laid down in Article 75 (1) (a) and (b) and capable of having unforeseeable consequences for the Community. In that respect the Council raises the question how far it is answerable as a Community institution for the political situations in Member States which influence the Council's decisions. As for the argument put forward by the Parliament and Commission regarding the procedure for reaching decisions, it considers that Article 5, which imposes obligations solely on the Member States, is not addressed to the Council.
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