law://eu/cjeu/1983/c-117-83/hd_1_1_2@2026-11-18In its written observations the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany proposes that the first question should be answered in the negative and observes that Article 4 of Regulation No 1071/68 does not deal with the case of a security which has been wrongly released. In its view there are no other relevant provisions of Community law.It proposes that the second question should be answered in the affirmative and on that issue refers to the decisions of the Court of Justice (see the judgment of 21 September 1983 in Joined Cases 205 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor [1983] ECR 2633). The power of the Member States extends not only to the adoption of procedural provisions relating to the recovery of sums wrongly paid but also to the adoption of substantive rules. On that issue the German Government refers to the judgment of 12 June 1980 in Joined Cases 119 and 126/79 Lippische Hauptgenossenschaft [1980] ECR 1863), especially paragraph 10 (at p. 1879) and the Opinion of the Advocate General (at p. 1884).It considers that the principles laid down in those decisions in relation to the recovery of sums wrongly paid may be extended to the case of a deposit wrongly released. The nature of the deposit is no obstacle. The Government also refers to the judgment of 17 December 1970 in Case 11/70 (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fiir Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125), especially paragraph 18 (at. p. 1136) according to which a deposit is merely a guarantee that an undertaking voluntarily assumed will be carried out. The German Government maintains that the deposit in the present case is intended to guarantee not only “any future (pecuniary) right”, as the national court considers, but also observance of Community law which is an integral part of the contract and whose applicability does not lose its raison d'être by reason of the release of the deposit. It is to that end that the fifth recital to Regulation No 1071/68 treats the deposit as a guarantee.Accordingly, the German Government considers that breaches must be taken into account even after release of the deposit, for otherwise there would be disregard of the principles of equal treatment and uniform application of Community law if only breaches discovered during the period of storage were penalized. Thus Community law not only allows, but indeed requires, Member States to reclaim a deposit wrongly released.The German Government proposes that the third question should be answered in the negative. As in its answer to the second question, it observes that the principles of equal treatment and uniform application of Community law do not permit repayment of the amount of the deposit to be left to the discretion of the national intervention agencies. On that issue it refers to the judgment of 6 May 1982 in Joined Cases 146, 192 and 193/81 (BayWa AG v Bundesanstalt fiir landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1982] ECR 1503), in particular paragraph 30 of the decision (at p. 1535).As regards the fourth question the German Government observes that the deposit provided for in Article 4 of Regulation No 1071/68 is intended to ensure that the storer performs his contractual obligations in order that the purpose of the aid for storage, which is an instrument for regulating the market, may be achieved. In its view neither repayment of the aid nor claims for damages are measures sufficient to guard against infringements in this field. If, for example, the storer prematurely sold the beef and veal stored he would not have to pay damages in the absence of quantifiable damage. The deposit is therefore a necessary sanction to prevent speculative transactions in respect of stored meat; see in that respect paragraph 12 of the judgment of 23 February 1983 in Case 66/82 (Fromançais [1983] ECR 395).The German Government observes further that the right secured by the deposit, which may most easily be compared with the right secured by a contractual penalty, is not a sanction of criminal law (see the aforementioned judgment in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft).The German Government proposes that the fifth question should be answered in the negative. It states that the sanction represented by the deposit is not a penal sanction. The principle of proportionality must be observed, however, even in the absence of a penal sanction, and in order to do so it is necessary to consider whether the means adopted are necessary for and commensurate with the purpose to be achieved. On that issue it refers to the judgments of the Court of 11 May 1977 in Joined Cases 99 and 100/76 (De Beste Boter v Bundesanstalt för landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1977] ECR 861, in particular paragraph 11 at p. 872), 29 April 1982 in Case 147/81 (Merkur Fleisch-Import v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus [1982] ECR 1389, in particular paragraph 12 at p. 1397) and the aforementioned judgment in Fromançais (especially paragraph 7 et seq.).The German Government maintians that the deposit is necesary to prevent specu lation in stored beef and veal and according to the aforementioned judgments the argument that the means are disproportionate to the ends is not valid. Furthermore, it must be observed in the present case that breach of the storer's obligations was also at the origin of the criminal conviction of the persons acting on behalf of the plaintiff.The Commission observes at the outset that the drafting of Regulation No 1071/68 was not perfect as regards legal terminology. Although Article 3 (1) (e) and Article 4 thereof speak of a “deposit” the term is at least to some extent incorrect. In the Commission's view the deposit system involves two elements: in making the contract the storer of meat consents to a contractual penalty and the payment thereof is guaranteed by a deposit. From the point of view of the wording only the second element of the system is clearly expressed in the regulation but there is no doubt about the existence of a system of contractual penalties. It is apparent from Article 4 (2) of Regulation No 989/68 of the Council of 15 July 1968 laying down general rules for granting private storage aid for beef and veal (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 264) and Regulation No 1071/68 which refers thereto that the deposit is not intended to ensure repayment of aid wrongly allocated but constitutes an additional sanction in the event that the contractual obligations are not observed. That is the typical function of a contractual penalty in civil law. That being so, the question of the recovery of the deposit does not arise.Although the deposit system in fact implies the storer's consent to a stipulation providing for a contractual penalty, the simple release of the deposit does not mean that the contractual penalty can no longer be claimed. If it appears that the penalty is in fact applicable because the storer has failed tó meet his obligations under the contract, payment of the corresponding amount may be demanded independently of whether or not the deposit provided to guarantee the payment has been wrongly released. Release of the deposit simply removes the guarantee and not the substantive right which is the subject of the consent given to the stipulation providing for a contractual penalty.In the Commission's view Article 4 (3) of Regulation No 1071/68 must be interpreted as meaning that the amount of the contractual penalty may be claimed if the obligations provided for in the contract are not observed. The first and fourth questions must therefore be answered as follows: Article 4 of Regulation No 1071/68 does not authorize national intervention agencies to recover deposits wrongly released thereunder. Nevertheless, the fact that a deposit has been wrongly released does not prevent the imposition of the contractual penalty incurred under Article 4 (3) of the regulation even after release of the deposit guaranteeing the penalty.With regard to the second and third questions the Commission is of the opinion that national laws permitting the recovery of the deposit cannot be based on Community law. If, on the other hand, such provisions deal with the application of a contractual penalty as outlined above they are not only permissible but mandatory under Community law. There is no discretion in the matter since the amount of the contractual penalty is in any event payable when the contractual obligations are not observed. Discretion would lead to objectively unjustifiable discrimination within the common market (cf. the judgment in the aforesaid BayWa case).The Commission therefore proposes that the second and third questions should be answered as follows: national legislation authorizing the revocation of an irregular decision to release a deposit pursuant to Regulation No 1071/68 and recovery of the amount of the deposit is not compatible with Community law. However, even after release of the deposit the competent intervention agency has a duty to recover the amount of the contractual penalty payable under Regulation No 1071/68.As regards the fifth question the Commission considers that if the Court were to declare Article 4 of Regulation No 1071/68 invalid inasmuch as it provides for a contractual penalty, the judgment would have to apply equally to Article 4 (2) of Regulation No 989/68 of the Council of 15 July 1968 laying down general rules for granting private storage aid for beef and veal.The Commission also notes that the national court does not regard Article 4 a priori as providing for a contractual penalty under civil law, but treats it as a criminal fine and consequently considers it in the light of a number of general principles of criminal law. The Commission does not support that view; it considers that the provision in question must be interpreted in the light of the general legal principles applicable to contractual penalties.The Commission's power to provide for such penalties derives incontestably from Article 8 of Regulation No 805/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on the common organization of the market in beef and veal (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 187) and Article 4 (2) of the aforesaid Regulation No 989/68.The Commission observes that if there were no sanction apart from the recovery of the aid in the event of breach of the contract of storage there would be a great temptation, for example, to remove the goods from storage before the expiry of the period provided for and the Commission would then not have a reliable general view of the market trend; thus the whole policy of storage would be placed in jeopardy. The Commission refers to the aforesaid judgment of 17 December 1970 in Case 11/70 (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft).As regards the specific points put forward by the national court in relation to the legal validity of Article 4 of Regulation No 1071/68 the Commission considers that the argument of breach of the principle in dubio pro reo cannot be accepted for that principle applies only to criminal penalties. As regards obligations of civil law the principle does not apply.The national court's view that the principle nulla poena sine culpa was breached inasmuch as a legal person (the company) was penalized for a wrongful act committed by its representatives is perhaps attributable to the mistaken view that the penalty in the present case is a criminal one. The Commission refers to German law and observes that the legal argument put forward by the national court is not tenable. It is even more obvious that a legal person who contracts a civil obligation must naturally also answer for a contractual penalty incurred because of the conduct of one of its representatives.As regards the alleged infringement of the principle ne bis in idem the Commission points out that the national court is once again in error in treating the contractual penalty of civil law as a criminal penalty. If that were correct it would not be possible to impose two separate penalties for the same offence. However, as between contractual and criminal penalties the principle ne bis in idem does not apply.As for the principle of proportionality the Commission considers that the present case does not in fact require consideration of the proportionality of the provisions contained in Article 4 of Regulation No 1071/68. According to the Commission the plaintiff seriously breached its contractual obligations in two respects and as appears from the criminal conviction it did so intentionally: it did not store fresh meat pursuant to the aforesaid regulation and the meat did not originate in the Community. Nevertheless, the Commission admits that on the authority of the judgment of the Court of 21 June 1979 in Case 240/78 (Atalanta v Produktschap vor Vee en Vlees [1979] ECR 2137) the principle of proportionality must be fully taken into account in any of the Commission's measures, although it is not relevant in the present case. The regulation in question observed that principle since the deposit is proportionately forfeited only where the amount missing from storage exceeds 10%.On the basis of the foregoing the Commission proposes that the fifth question should be answered as follows: consideration of the questions raised has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Article 4 of Regulation No 1071/68 of the Commissioni. Nevertheless, independently of the provisions of Article 4 (3) of Regulation No 1071/68, the second paragraph of Article 4 (2) of Regulation No 989/68 of the Council remains applicable so; that the competent agency may impose a contractual penalty and in consequence declare the deposit forfeit in whole or in part, depending on the seriousness of the breach of the contract.
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