law://eu/cjeu/1982/c-222-82/hd_1_1_2_1_2_5@2026-11-16The Development Council considers that there are no grounds for any allegation that those activities are capable of undermining, creating exceptions to or otherwise jeopardizing the common organization of the markets in that sector. Regulation No 1035/72 itself is silent as to publicity save in so far as its encouragement of the creation of producers' organizations implicitly approves the promotional ventures in which such organizations would engage. Furthermore, the activities of the Development Council are part and parcel of the “fair competition” and “specialization” included in the list of objectives of that regulation.Furthermore in other Member States there are State-subsidized bodies which organize publicity campaigns abroad, for example in the United Kingdom, to promote fruit produced in their country.The Development Council submits that the obligation upon growers to register with it in no way conflicts with or affects the common organization and is not capable of infringing either Article 30 or Article 34 of the Treaty. If the case-law of the Court referred to above is taken into account it is impossible to see how that obligation could have, actually or potentially, an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction upon either imports or exports. In the Pigs Marketing Board case the Court held that an obligation to register was unlawful because that obligation formed part and parcel of a national marketing scheme which was manifestly incompatible with the Community rules in so far as it was designed to channel all trade in a product through a national authority.With regard to the Vriend case cited above the Development Council claims that in that case, by contrast with the present case, the obligation to register was such that traders who failed to register and who were not producers, where prohibited from carrying out commercial transactions in any form whatever and that compulsory affiliation to an official supervisory body carried with it the obligation for its members to comply with the rules and general instructions issued by the supervisory body. Furthermore, in the Vriend case the rules in question conferred a trading monopoly on affiliated producers. In the present case growers are at liberty to carry on their business as they please and the requirement of registration does not affect in any way the quantity of apples and pears available on the market.The Development Council declares that in those circumstances the obligation to register must be regarded as wholly a matter of administrative convenience connected to the payment of the annual charge and the making of returns. The Development Council considers that, if its other functions are not incompatible with Community law, the obligation to register is likewise not incompatible.Finally, with regard to the exemption from the national measures which is afforded to growers occupying less than two hectares of land or land planted with less than 50 apple or pear trees, the Development Council submits that such an exemption accords with common sense, good administration and with the principle of proportionality and that it cannot constitute discrimination so as to contravene Article 40 (3) or any other provision of Community law. The exempted producers cannot realistically be regarded as commercial growers. The exemption in question certainly does not constitute a breach of the principle of nondiscrimination contained in Article 40 (3) which, as the Court emphasized in the Holdijk case, applies to the objectives pursued by the relevant common organization of the markets. A right to confer certain advantages on certain small-scale producers was upheld in the judgment of 30 October 1980 (Case 76/80 Schneider-Import, [1980] ECR 3469).The United Kingdom considers that the mere existence of a common organization of the market does not ipso facto preclude all national measures affecting the agricultural products concerned. In this connection it refers to the judgment of the Court of 2 February 1977 in Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb [1977] ECR 137 and to the judgment in the Holdijk case cited above.With reference to the Pigs and Bacon Commission case and the Buys case, cited above, the United Kingdom considers that a national measure is incompatible with the common organization of the markets if it undermines or creates exceptions to, or jeopardizes its aims and functioning.According to the United Kingdom the essential question is whether a national compulsory levy to finance promotional activities for apples and pears is so clearly incompatible with Regulation No 1035/72 that individuals may invoke such incompatibility in the national courts.In that regard, the United Kingdom observes that the Development Council has no power to, and does not, make binding rules as to common quality standards, that it has no power in relation to producer organizations and does not affect their formation or activities in any way and that likewise no activity of the Council infringes upon the intervention and price mechanism established under Regulation No 1035/72.With regard to Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty, which were given effect by Article 31 of the regulation, the United Kingdom Government refers to the Pigs and Bacon Commission case, cited above, which, in its view, does not entail the result that all State aids are rendered unlawful but establishes that, in addition to being subject to Articles 92 to 94, the aid must not of its nature be incompatible with the common organization of the market. For the reasons set out above the levy at issue is not incompatible with the common organization. Nevertheless, on the basis of the Steinike case cited above the levy remains subject to review by the Commission pursuant to Article 93 of the Treaty.In the opinion of the United Kingdom examination of the characteristics of the regulation in question do not suggest that the levy at issue is incompatible with the specific mechanisms thereof. Furthermore, the United Kingdom submits that there is no principle of Community law whereby a levy used to finance advertising and related activities is of its nature incompatible with the regulation in question. In this connection the United Kingdom refers to the decisions of the Court in the Geddo and Pigs and Bacon Commission cases, cited above. In conclusion it should be observed that there is no a priori reason why a levy like the one in question should be contrary to the principles of the common organization of the markets.Thus, whilst the United Kingdom fully accepts that the basic principle underlying Regulation No 1035/72 is the freedom of trade and of commercial transactions subject to the provisions of that regulation, it does not consider that the levy at issue endangers that principle.With regard to the obligation of growers to register with the Development Council the United Kingdom considers that registration of itself is unobjectionable provided that the levy as such is compatible with Community law. Nor may it be suggested that the means of collecting the levy are out of proportion to the end to be achieved.The Danish Government declares in its written observations that this case turns primarily on the question whether national rules setting up an organization such as the Development Council are compatible with the common agricultural policy. It considers that the object of the Development Council appears to be to improve the efficiency and productivity of the sector as a whole and observes that it is therefore necessary to determine the extent to which the national rules on agricultural products, for which a common organization of the market exists, are permitted under Community law. In this connection it summarizes the principles which the Court has set out in its case-law, for example, in the judgments in the Van der Hulst's Zonen, Pigs Marketing Board, and Irish Creamery cases, cited above.The Danish Government concludes from its analysis of that case-law that once a common organization of the market has been established for a given product Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking any measure which might alter the common organization or affect its scope. On the other hand the existence of a common organization of the market does not exclude all national measures. Thus the Member States are obliged to adopt the necessary provisions for implementing the common rules, for example provisions imposing penalties, rules of procedure, and rules on supervision. Even in the more restricted sphere of measures regulating the market properly so-called the Member States continue to retain certain powers. The extent of such supplementary powers depends upon an appraisal both of the express provisions of the common organization of the market and of its objectives.Finally, the Member States may assess taxes and duties, subject always to the limitations flowing from Community law, in particular from the requirement that such taxes and duties may not hinder the operation of common organizations of the markets.The Danish Government then refers to the other central provisions of Regulation No 1035/72 and notes that the regulation contains provisions concerning aid for the formation of producers' organizations with a view to consolidating the position of producers through concentration of supply and regulation of prices at the producer stage.The Community has taken the view that, in particular in the market in fruit and vegetables, it is important to consolidate the position of producers.The Danish Government refers to the Van der Hulst's Zonen case, cited above, and emphasizes that the organization of the market in question contains no reference, either in positive or in negative terms, to the compatibility or otherwise of national regulations, present or future, with the common organization of the market. That also applies to the organization of the market in fruit and vegetables.The Danish Government considers that the United Kingdom measures concerning the Development Council are compatible with the objective of the common organization of the markets and with Regulation No 1035/72. On the basis of the information available to the Danish Government there is no reason to consider that the measures in question limit production or the right of the producers freely to market their products. They do not affect the rules of the organization of the market and of the Treaty concerning trade between Member States and with nonmember countries.There are, finally, no grounds for considering that any other aspect of the national measures in this case entails any discriminatory treatment contrary to the principles laid down in the Treaty.With regard to the levy of the charge, the Danish Government considers that, in the absence of any provisions on the matter, it is not contrary to the provisions governing the common organization of the market. It is proper for the expense of financing the Development Council to be shared equally by the growers concerned, all of whom benefit from it.It is assumed that the charge is not so heavy as to affect the operation of the organization of the market, including its system of prices.The settled case-law of the Court of Justice shows that it is the task of the national court to decide whether a national measure has in fact produced effects which hinder the operation of the common organization of the market.The Commission observes for its part that if the sales promotion carried out by the Development Council covered apples and pears generally, the Commission would see no objection to it as regards Community law in general or the common organization of the market. However, the Development Council carries out sales promotion for English and Welsh apples and pears only which could lead to their share of the market increasing at the expense of competing products from other Member States. Indeed, the Council's Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year 1981 shows clearly that the aim of the promotion campaign “is to recover for growers their rightful share of the United Kingdom market”. The Commission therefore considers that the campaign appears to be directed in particular at certain varieties of apples and pears at the expense of others.The Commission is unwilling to express a definitive view at this stage regarding the compatibility of such a campaign with the common organization of the market and recalls the two judgments of the Court in the Geddo and Van der Hulst's Zonen cases, cited above. If, as the Commission thinks, the approval of the Court relates to publicity campaigns the second case may be regarded as reversing Geddo pn that point in so far as the Court stated that national provisions conflict with the principle of nondiscrimination “where the revenue from the charge is intended to place national products at an advantage”. The Commission also refers to the Pigs and Bacon Commission case, cited above, in which the Court held that in so far as a levy was employed for purposes incompatible with the common organization of the market that levy was itself incompatible therewith, and to the Irish Creamery case, likewise cited above, which the Commission considers may not be entirely relevant here since that case was concerned with a charge paid into the general budget of the State and accordingly was not earmarked for a use which would in any way affect the operation of the common organization of the market.After considering the relevant case-law the Commission regrets that it is still unable to express a view as to whether an advertising compaign of the kind in question is compatible with Regulation No 1035/72. If the campaign is not compatible, the levy must also be incompatible in so far as it is used to finance the campaign.With regard to the Development Council's influence on the quality of apples and pears produced in the United Kingdom, the Commission observes that it is incompatible with the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables. Member States do not have sweeping powers to derogate from the quality standards fixed by the Community.The Member States indeed enjoy a certain discretion, as is shown by the requirement that “the fruit must be sufficiently developed and sufficiently ripe to withstand the transport and handling ensuring its arrival in a satisfactory condition at its place of destination” (Section II (A) of the Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 1641/71 of the Commission of 27 July 1971 laying clown quality standards for dessert apples and pears (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1971 (II), p. 616).Likewise, when a derogation from the Community quality standards is provided for by a Community regulation the Member States may be empowered not to apply that derogation (see Article 1 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1677/82, Official Journal 1982, L 186, p. 11). Nevertheless, such a measure must take the form of a formal decision by a Member State and not an administrative measure adopted by a body such as the Development Council.According to the Commission the Development Council's 1981 Annual Report shows that the Council exerts its influence on growers to prompt them to comply with quality standards which are not necessarily those of the Community. Such compliance is ensured by means of “recommendations” which appear to be more peremptory than is usually implied by that word, since the report states “it was rarely that a grower again marketed such fruit after the lapse had been brought to his notice” and that wholesalers who repeatedly supply “substandard” fruit are reported to the National Federation of Fruit and Potato Traders.Furthermore, the Development Council is not one of the authorities notified by the United Kingdom to the Commission as empowered to apply quality standards pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation No 1035/72. The Commission considers that it is unable to take a final decision on this point and observes that if the Development Council induces or seeks to induce producers to comply with quality standards other than those fixed by the Community regulations it may undermine the operation of the common organization of the market. Consequently, in so far as the levy is applied for such purposes it is also incompatible with the common organization of the market.As regards exemption from the levy and the requirement of registration the Commission considers that they are not incompatible with Article 40 (3) of the Treaty. It is clearly sound to exempt from such requirements producers who are not engaged in commercial production and those who produce small quantities. The Commission considers that the requirement to register is merely incidental to the collection of the levy even though failure to comply with the requirement has been made a separate offence under English law. In this case the requirement cannot be considered to be a restriction on growers' access to the market. That is why the Commission considers that the judgment of the Court in the Vriend case, cited above, is not relevant since in that case, according to the Commission, the requirement of registration constituted a restriction on marketing. The lawfulness of a requirement to register thus depends on the lawfulness of the levy.
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