law://eu/cjeu/1982/c-222-82/hd_1_1_2_1_1@2026-11-18The Development Council points out that, since no allegation has been made that there are quantitative restrictions on either imports or exports, it is only necessary to consider the alternative, namely whether there exist “measures having equivalent effect”.With regard to Articles 30 and 34 the Development Council cites certain decisions of the Court, in particular the judgment of 12 July 1974 in Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 which concerns imports and relates to Article 30 of the Treaty, and the judgment of 8 November 1979 in Case 15/79 Groenveld [1979] ECR 3409 which concerns exports and relates to Article 34 of the Treaty. According to the Development Council the view taken by the Court in the Groenveld case was confirmed by the judgment of 14 July 1981 in Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 1993 and in the judgment of 1 April 1982 in Joined Cases 141 to 143/81 Holdijk [1982] ECR 1299.In the Groenveld case the Court placed a narrower interpretation upon Article 34 than that which it adopted regarding Article 30 in the Dassonville case. In the Groenveld case the Court stated that Article 34 “concerns national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports” and it further laid down the requirement of a difference in treatment between domestic trade and export trade and that the trade of other Member States should be adversely affected. The Development Council considers that there is no reason why the Groenveld test should not apply mutatis mutandis to Article 30.The Development Council emphasizes that it is merely an advisory, research and promotional body with no power to intervene in the market or to enforce rules as to marketing, prices or production and notes that, even on the broad approach adopted in the Dassonville case, it is inconceivable that it as an organization, or any of its measures or powers could amount, indirectly or potentially, to an obstacle or hindrance to exports. The position becomes even clearer if the more “narrow” Groenveld test is applied. Not only would it be wholly unfounded to suggest that the “specific object or effect” of the Development Council and its activities is to restrict the pattern of exports of apples and pears, but there could not possibly be shown to exist the necessary additional factor of resultant discrimination between the domestic trade and the export trade in apples and pears or the prejudice thereby caused to other Member States. The Development Council considers it quite clear that its functions relate indiscriminately to all production in England and Wales, irrespective of whether it is to be exported or consumed domestically. In this connection it refers to paragraph 11 of the decision in the Holdijk case.The Development Council further states that domestic production of apples and pears in the United Kingdom is capable of supplying only about 40% of the whole market so that, in its view, there is no realistic prospect of establishing a significant export trade in the near future.On the basis of the observations which have been summarized above the Development Council considers that any argument based on Article 34 must fail.The Development Council also denies that there has been any infringement of Article 30. The powers and functions of the Council extend only to growers established in England and Wales and their products. Exporters in other Member States are entirely free to place apples and pears on the United Kingdom market. In this connection the Development Council observes that imports from other Member States have increased since 1972: apples by about 170% and pears by about 120%, thereby accounting for the major proportion of United Kingdom consumption of apples and pears.It is clear not only from the approach in the Dassonville case that there has been no infringement of Article 30. The same result is obtained by applying the decision in Groenveld, both with regard to Article 30 and to Article 34. The Development Council considers that there are no grounds for the claim that it accords different treatment to the domestic trade and the import trade in apples and pears, emphasizing once again that its powers are wholly confined to the national product. There is therefore no question of any prejudice to the production or trade of any other Member State.Finally, the Development Council argues that, whilst the use by the Court of Justice in the Dassonville case of the words “all trading rules” is clearly not definitive, it gives a reasonable indication of the proper sphere of operation of Articles 30 and 34. Viewed in that light none of the activities of the Development Council falls within the scope of those articles since they do not amount to “trading” and it has no power to impose rules.With regard to the charge the Development Council takes the view, on the basis of the judgment of the Court of 12 July 1973 in Case 2/73 Geddo [1973] ECR 865 and of the opinion of the Advocate General in Case 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission v McCarren [1979] ECR at pp. 2209 and 2210, that it cannot constitute a “measure having equivalent effect” since those cases show that pecuniary barriers to trade should be assessed under Articles 12 to 16 of the Treaty.In this connection the Development Council observes that the Court also stated in Geddo that an internal payment levied exclusively on national products, the purpose of which is to provide funds to assist national production, did not constitute a measure having equivalent effect to a customs duty on exports.The Development Council also refers to the judgment of 10 March 1981 in Joined Cases 36 and 71 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers' Association [1981] ECR 735 in which the Court held that a national duty to be borne by agricultural producers on the value of certain agricultural products did not constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on exports if it was applied systematically to both goods intended for sale on the home market and to those destined for export, which is the position in this case.The Development Council thus considers that the charge is unlawful only if it allows the financing of activities which themselves are unlawful. In view of the fact that most of the funds raised by the annual charge are spent on promotion and publicity with a view to maintaining and increasing consumer-awareness of English apples and pears the Development Council considers that the charge is fully compatible with the rules of Community law as set out in the decisions of the Court (see Geddo, cited above): In this connection the Development Council also relies upon the judgment of 26 June 1979 in Case 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission v McCarren [1979] ECR 2161 in which the Court accepted implicitly that the purely promotional purposes for which the national authority also used the levy in question were acceptable under Community law, which was furthermore the view taken by the Advocate General in that case (see page 2214). Finally the Development Council emphasizes the difference which exists between the present case and the judgment of 10 July 1980 (Case 152/78 Commission v France [1980] ECR 2299).The Development Council goes on to state that it has no power to impose restrictions of any kind or to affect in any other way the freedom to import or export. Since Articles 30 to 36 of the Treaty refer to “measures” (Articles 30 and 34) and “prohibitions” (Article 36) it claims that its activities cannot be covered by such words. The Development Council is entirely free to make up its own mind how to spend its money and is entirely free to decide how best to promote the distinctive apples and pears produced by growers in England and Wales.Finally, the Development Council does not see how the tenuous and incidental connection between it and the State can transform a lawful and indeed laudable activity by growers, which is fully compatible with the “essential objectives” of the market organization, into a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports or exports. It is self-evident that the apple and pear market forms a minute segment of the economy.In this connection the Development Council also refers to Commission Directive 70/50/EEC of 22 December 1969 based on the provisions of Article 33 (7) on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports and are not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 17), and in particular to Article 2 (3) (k) thereof. Even if it were accepted that that directive was directly applicable and the Development Council could be properly described as a “public authority” its activities would not amount to encouragement for the purposes of the directive. If that were the case there would not be a sufficient causal connection between such encouragement and the behaviour of consumers.The United Kingdom states in its observations that the essential issue raised by the first question is the validity of the compulsory levy. Therefore, the United Kingdom first provides an analysis in order to establish whether such a levy is contrary to the relevant provisions of the Treaty before proceeding to consider the essential problems to which it gives rise in connection with the common organization of the market.The United Kingdom takes the view that the levy is not contrary to Articles 12, 16 or 95 of the EEC Treaty and, on the basis of the judgment of the Court of 22 March 1977 in Case 78/76 Steinike mid Weinlig [1977] ECR 595, that the levy must in principle be regarded as part of a system of aid to which Articles 92 to 94 of the Treaty apply; it then considers Articles 30 and 34 of the EEC Treaty in closer detail, noting that the judgment of 22 March 1977 in Case 74/76 [1977] ECR 557 Iannelli & Volpi appears clearly to indicate that measures which are of a fiscal nature or which comprise a system of aid do not ordinarily fall under Article 30 or 34 at all. The United Kingdom also refers to the opinion of the Advocate General in Pigs and Bacon Commission v McCarren, in particular his observation (at p. 2209) that there is no case in which a pecuniary obstacle to trade such as a levy has been held to be contrary to Articles 30 or 34, and also to the judgment of the Court in Geddo (pp. 875 to 879).Finally, the United Kingdom states that it could not be validly suggested that the levy in this case satisfies the test laid down in Oebel, cited above, in which (at p. 2009) the Court confined the application of Article 34 to “national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports”.The United Kingdom concludes, from an analysis not only of Articles 30 and 34 but of all the provisions of the Treaty which it considers relevant, that it appears clear that the levy at issue in this case could not be challenged in the national courts.In its written observations, the Commission does not expressly set out its views on the question whether there has been an infringement of Articles 30 to 34 but examines the application of Articles 92 and 93 and considers the discriminatory effect which may be produced by promotion of sales of domesticallyproduced pears and apples alone.The Danish Government docs not make specific reference to Articles 30 and 34 of the Treaty in its written observations. It indicates, however, that one of the conditions for acceptance under Community law of a system such as that with which this case is concerned is that it must not hinder the free movement of goods.
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