III —Submissions and arguments of the parties in the written procedure
In their application, the applicants adduce a single submission relating to (a) infringement of the Staff Regulations, in particular of the second paragraph of Article 25 and Article 73; (b) infringement of the Joint Rules, particularly Article 3 (2) thereof; and (c) breach of rules and general principles of law, especially the principal that every administrative measure must be based on grounds permissible in law, that is to say, relevant and not vitiated by errors of fact or of law, or both.In support of that submission, the applicants observe first that Article 3 (2) of the Joint Rules expressly provides that any aggravation of a preexisting disease is to be considered an occupational disease if such aggravation arose in the course of or in connection with the performance by the official of his duties with the Communities. Next, they comment that the report of the Medical Committee of 17 September 1981, on which the contested decisions are based, concluded at least that Mr Seingry's working conditions and pressure of work had aggravated the coronary disease which caused his death. However, the Medical Committee concluded that in this particular case, there was no occupational disease “in the strict sense”. According to the applicants, the Committee had wrongly applied a restrictive interpretation of the concept of occupational disease, thus forgetting that in the framework of the Joint Rules that concept has in fact a wide application, since it also covers aggravation of a preexisting disease.On those grounds, the applicants consider that the contested decisions either erroneously interpreted the conclusions of the Medical Committee's report or disregarded the provision contained in Article 3 (2) of the Joint Rules. In the alternative, they claim that the contested decisions do not state the grounds on which they are based, as required by the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations. In that connection, the applicants refer to the uncertainty as to the ground relied upon. The statement of the grounds upon which the contested decisions were based does not make the Council's attitude clear. Indeed, it is not sufficiently clear whether the Council does not recognize that Mr Seingry's working conditions and pressure of work aggravated the disease which caused his death or whether in fact the Council denies that the aggravation of a preexisting disease may be an occupational disease within the meaning of the Joint rules.The Council of the European Communities, the defendant, stresses first that the questions relating to the causes of a disease or of its aggravation are clearly medical questions. It adds that Dr Simons, the doctor appointed by the institution, has stated that infarction is not recognized as an occupational disease. Next, the Council observes that the Medical Committee did not, as the applicants seem to suggest, conclude that Mr Seingry's working conditions and pressure of work had aggravated a preexisting disease: the Committee merely stated that Mr Seingry's “particularly exacting working life ... may have been” an aggravating factor. According to the Council, such a finding involves only the possibility that that factor was one of the causes of the disease which caused Mr Seingry's death. Indeed, although it cannot be denied that a strenuous working life constitutes a risk factor, it is equally true that such risks are aggravated by the personal lifestyle and character of the person concerned. In that regard, the Medical Committee found that several other factors, in particular nicotinism, gave rise to Mr Seingry's disease. In those circumstances, it has not been sufficiently established that Mr Seingry's disease or its aggravation arose in the course of or in connection with the performance of his duties with the Council.According to the Council, there is no reason to think that the Medical Committee clearly failed to have regard to the provision contained in Article 3 (2) of the Joint Rules. Nor was there any infringement of the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations. The Council considers that the contested decision, if reference is made to the medical reports annexed thereto, in particular the decision of 14 May 1982, are clear and contain an adequate statement of the grounds on which they are based.In their rejoinder, the applicants observe that, even if the questions relating to the causes of a disease or its aggravation are medical matters, questions concerning the concept of “occupational disease” or the correct interpretation of the conclusions of the Medical Committee are questions of law. In that connection, they again submit that the Medical Committee's interpretation of the concept of “occupational disease” was too narrow. Having found that Mr Seingry's working conditions and pressure of work aggravated his coronary disease, the Committee erroneously considered, in view of the law applicable, that aggravation of a preexisting disease was not an occupational disease. According to the applicants, it is of no consequence that the pathogenesis of coronary disease involves a number of factors and that several factors did actually apply in Mr Seingry's case, since such a finding does not affect the fact that Mr Seingry's exacting working life was an aggravating factor.In its rejoinder, the Council concedes that the concept of “occupational disease” is a legal one. However, in order to qualify as an occupational disease, a disease must not only have arisen in the course of or in connection with the performance of duties with the institution, but it must also be established that the performance of those duties caused the disease or the aggravation of a preexisting disease. In this case, it has not been sufficiently established that Mr Seingry's working life was actually a factor aggravating his heart disease. Consequently, the defendant maintains that the contested decisions were based on sound reasoning.In its application to intervene, the intervener sets out in part the same arguments as those put forward by the defendant. In addition, it observes that the Court, in its judgment of 12 January 1983 in Case 257/81, (K. v Council, [1983] ECR 1) stated under what conditions a disease or the aggravation of a preexisting disease not contained in the European List may be regarded as an occupational disease. In that judgment the Court stated inter alia that it must be sufficiently established that “the applicant's pathological condition has a sufficiently direct relationsship with a specific and normal risk inherent in the duties which he performed.” Next, the intervener refers to Recommendation No 66/462, adopted by the Commission on 26 July 1966 (Journal Officiel 147, p. 2696), which defined the occupational diseases not contained in the European List as diseases “of which the risk is inherent in the work carried out and to which certain workers are exposed to a greater degree than the population as a whole”. Finally, the intervener refers to the opinion of Mr Advocate General Roemer in Case 29/71 (judgment of 15 July 1972, Vellozziv Commission, [1972] ECR 513 at p. 523), stating that: “Occupational diseases ... are those ... where it is established that the performance of those duties was the principal or the predominant cause of the disease or of the aggravation of an existing disease.” According to the intervener, it follows from the abovementioned quotations that the Council was right to refuse to acknowledge that Mr Seingry's disease was of occupational origin.
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