law://eu/cjeu/1981/c-39-81/hd_1_1_3_4@2026-11-18The applicants point out that, according to the first subparagraph of Article 58 (2) of the ECSC Treaty, the production quotas are to be determined “on an equitable basis, taking account of the principles set out in Articles 2, 3 and 4” of the Treaty.(a) Article 4 (3) of Decision No 2794/80 is not applicable to undertakings which could not participate in the delivery programmes drawn up by-the Commission because they were not pan of the Community and Article 4 (4) is not applicable to undertakings whose investment programme could not be the subject of a Commission opinion for the same reason. Therefore Decision No 2794/80 blatantly discriminates between the last category of undertakings and the others.(b) As a result of the manner in which Anicie 14 of Decision No 2794/8C has been construed further discrimination is created between those undertakings which remain viable despite the restrictions and those which suffer “exceptional difficulties owing to those measures”.(c) Any provision which bases quotas on actual production during the reference period instead of on production capacity will inevitably result in discrimination contrary to the equitable basis required by the strict words of Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty.(d) Discrimination does not consist solely of treating undertakings in similar circumstances differently; in the present case the discrimination is due to the fact that undertakings in different circumstances are treated in the same way.(e) Account should be taken here of the principle of proportionality, which is recognized in the decisions of the Court compared to the Community's crude steel production of 140 million tonnes a year in 1979 and 1980, the total production of the Greek undertakings, which barely exceeds one million tonnes, is insignificant.The Commission contests all those submissions.(a) The basic method of fixing production quotas described in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Decision No 2794/80 takes into consideration, in order to determine reference production figures for each undertaking, a period sufficiently recent to reflect actual structures and sufficiently long to eliminate any fortuitous circumstances. It sets individual abatement rates for each category of products, so as to take account of the particular situation on the market for each category.The aim of Article 4 (3) is to avoid any unfairness which certain undertakings which had participated in the voluntary delivery programmes might have suffered. The Greek undertakings did not participate in those programmes, so there was no need to make adjustments for their benefit. However, no discrimination is caused thereby: it is not an instance of treating undertakings in similar circumstances differently.Article 4 (4) allows account to be taken of the production capacity of new plant put into operation after 1 July 1980 because the output of such plant could not have been reflected in the reference production figures. Since the Greek undertakings were not bound before 1 January 1981 by Decision No 22/66 of the High Authority of 16 November 1966 on information to be furnished by undertakings about their investments (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1965-1966, p. 280), an application from them was considered necessary in order to obtain an adjustment under Article 4 (4). Having regard to such applications and having determined that the investments in question would not have received an unfavourable opinion if they had been notified in the form of investment programmes, the Commission adapted the quotas for two Greek undertakings pursuant to Article 4 (4). That provision clearly does not discriminate between Greek companies and other companies in the Community or in fact between any undertakings operating in similar circumstances.Article 4 (5) seeks to prevent the quota system from jeopardizing efforts at reorganization which some undertakings have successfully made since 1974, when the crisis began.The last subparagraph of Article 5 (2) makes provision for undertakings to apply for an adjustment of their crude steel quotas to enable them to produce the quantities of rolled products fixed by their production quotas. Such an adjustment has already been made in the case of one Greek undertaking.(b) Article 14 makes it possible to reduce the disproportionate sacrifices which the application of the general rules of Decision No 2794/80 might have required of some undertakings. The quotas of any undertaking experiencing exceptional difficulties may be adapted on that account. Non-application of that provision is not discriminatory at all: it does not entail different treatment of similar cases but different treatment of different cases.(c) The fixing of quotas according to actual production during the reference period, which consists of each undertaking's best months of production, enables every undertaking to be treated in the same way.The criterion based on an undertaking's actual production is objective, accurate and quantifiable; the concept of “production capacity”, on the other hand, is less precise and more difficult to define. Moreover, the fixing of quotas by reference to the maximum production capacity of undertakings would inevitably penalize those which, owing to rational management, utilize their capacity to a very high degree and would unjustifiably benefit those operating at a low rate of utilization; it would also be contrary to the aims of Article 3 of the ECSC Treaty, particularly those set out in paragraphs (a) and (e).(d) The claim that the principle of proportionality has been breached is a new submission which Article 42 (2) of the Rules of Procedure prevents from being adduced.In fact, the Commission is by no means ignorant of the situation of the Greek steel industry, whose production, moreover, exceeds that of Denmark and is nearly fifteen times greater than that of Ireland.Moreover, production calculated on a national basis does not provide the relevant figures. Decision No 2794/80 introduced a system of quotas concerning undertakings and the production of each of the five Greek undertakings is not negligible; it exceeds by far the threshold of 3000 tonnes under which small undertakings are exempt from quotas. By virtue of the principle of solidarity the sacrifices demanded of the Greek undertakings should be, and are, the same as those demanded of other undertakings in the Community.The system of quotas introduced by Decision No 2794/80 does not impose on the undertakings concerned burdens which are out of proportion to the aim pursued, namely the adaptation of supply to the reduced demand for steel. It has been held by the Court that the obligation of the Community institutions to ensure that in exercising their powers the burdens imposed on undertakings are no greater than is required to achieve the aims to be accomplished is not to be measured in relation to the individual situation of any particular group of undertakings.
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.