law://eu/cjeu/1981/c-290-81/hd_1_1_2_1@2026-11-18Singer takes the view that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret GATT only in the event of its provisions being incompatible with Community law.It states that such were the circumstances dealt with in the judgments of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 and in Cases 19/73 and 38/75.In support of its point of view, Singer refers to long extracts from Judgment No 3616/76 of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione [Supreme Court of Cassation].In that judgment, the Corte Suprema di Cassazione stated in particular that it should not be assumed that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret GATT in circumstances different from those already considered by the Court.Moreover, according to the Corte Suprema di Cassazione, in the absence of a question concerning the validity or interpretation of a Community measure or regulation, there is not even an obligation to refer the matter to the Court of Justice. Indeed, the case in which the problem is to determine whether a rule contained in an international agreement overrides a Community provision can be distinguished from the case in which it is necessary to establish which of two rules, both belonging to a national system, must be applied in a given case, even though one of those rules was incorporated into that system by a measure implementing an international agreement. In the first case a reference for a preliminary ruling is necessary in order to prevent the various national courts from delivering different decisions on the question of the validity and scope of the rules of Community law, whereas such a requirement does not exist in the second case, which does not concern any Community measure since GATT is in fact an agreement outside the Community order, covered by the first paragraph of Article 234 of the EEC Treaty.On the basis of the considerations set out by the Corte Suprema di Cassazine, Singer concludes that the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the first question. However, it reserves the right to consider that question, purely as a precautionary measure.So far as the second question is concerned, Singer considers that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction in relation to the question of the successive application of the schedules, but that such jurisdiction relates exclusively to what was decided directly by the Community in the framework of GATT, that is to say in this case the supplements and amendments made in the Kennedy Round.According to Geigy, it seems indisputable, in view of the clear statements which appear in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 November 1975 in Case 38/75, that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the rights and obligations arising out of GATT.Geigy further considers that those rights and obligations also include the position of individuals in relation to Member States as a result of the rules laid down in GATT where there are no incompatible Community provisions, in view of the fact that according to the case-law of the Court the validity of measures adopted by the institutions may be assessed in relation to a provision of international law where that provision binds the Community and is capable of giving rise to rights upon which its citizens may rely before the courts.Geigy adds that in any event the Italian courts have held that individuals have the right to obtain a refund from the Italian State of the duty for administrative services and the only question at issue is the scope of that right ratione temporis. Indeed, it is a question of the natural consequence of the infringement of a prohibition which is not subject to any reservation entitling the States to subject its implementation to the adoption of a measure of national law.The Government of the Italian Republic does not discuss the Court's jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of GATT but states that a preliminary ruling on the scope of those provisions appears necessary only if they are capable of conferring on individuals the right to rely upon them before the courts in the various Member States.It is well-known that the Court has already, on other occasions, held that the provisions of GATT, regard being had to its spirit, general scheme and terms, cannot give rise to rights and duties for individuals. Under the circumstances, since the plaintiffs in the main action cannot rely on a protection which is not conferred upon them by the rules of GATT, a preliminary ruling by the Court does not appear necessary.That conclusion can be drawn not only in relation to the first question but also in relation to the second, in view of the fact that it cannot be maintained that the negotiation of the so-called “common” schedule gave rise to special rules in relation to what are generally known as charges having equivalent effect.In its observations the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers solely the question whether GATT may be regarded as forming part of Community law for the purposes of Article 164 of the EEC Treaty.The “special new legal order” created in international law by the Treaties is distinguished by the fact that certain provisions of Community law are incorporated in the internal national legal order of the Member States without the need for any national measure, at least in so far as the nature of those provisions permits. That order constitutes a system which is not closed but “open”. Certain provisions of international agreements concluded by the Community with nonmember countries and with international organizations by which the Community is bound in its own right may themselves also be part of Community law in so far as they are capable of direct application. Those conditions are fulfilled in the case of GATT. The Court of Justice, in stating that it has jurisdiction to interpret international agreements which are binding on the Community, has never distinguished between the case in which the agreement in question was concluded by the Community itself, within the framework of its powers, and the case in which agreements (such as GATT) were concluded by the Member States but none the less relate to a sphere in which the powers of the Member States have been transferred to the Community by virtue of the EEC Treaty.It should, however, be noted that up to now the case-law of the Court has always related to the examination of a Community measure in relation to the international agreement in question (so far as GATT is concerned, the examination in the light of GATT of the validity of provisions of secondary Community law), whereas in these cases it is necessary to determine whether the Court also has jurisdiction in a case in which no rule of Community law is applicable.In that regard, the Netherlands Government considers that the Court's jurisdiction to interpret an international agreement cannot be subject to the existence of a Community regulation. Indeed, a provision of an international agreement could also (provided that the Community is bound by the agreement and the provision is itself capable of affecting relations within - the Community) be regarded as forming part of the Community legal order even if it has not been implemented by the Community.In the present cases, the national court stressed that the Court has ruled that it has jurisdiction to interpret not only the Treaty of Rome but also international rules such as GATT in so far as their content (through the substitution of the Community for the Member States in relation to obligations undertaken by the latter in the framework of multilateral agreements) “is referable to Community law”.The Commission of the European Communities notes that the existence, effect and scope of an obligation under GATT are Community questions in so far as the Community has been substituted for the Member States with regard to the fulfilment of the commitments arising out of GATT.The Commission contends that, in order to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction in these cases, it is therefore necessary to examine whether the Commission has actually been substituted for the Member States, over the period in question in these cases, with regard to the fulfilment of the commitments laid down in Article II (1) (b) of GATT concerning charges on imports other than ordinary customs duties.The Commission considers that such substitution did in fact take place with effect from 1 July 1968. It notes that, on the one hand, at international level the tariff commitments of the Kennedy Round (1964 to 1967) were negotiated and accepted by the Community alone, and that within the Community, on the other hand, all powers in relation to tariffs were fully and completely exercised by the Community as from 1 July 1968, the date on which the Common Customs Tariff entered into force in its entirety.
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