Klöckner-Werke AG v Commission of the European Communities (119/81) · GlobalLawDB
Klöckner-Werke AG v Commission of the European Communities (119/81)
law://eu/cjeu/1981/c-119-81/hd_1_1_4_2@2026-11-18
Key facts
Court
Court of Justice · Full Court
Case
119/81 · ECLI:EU:C:1982:259
Decided
7 Jul 1982
Procedure
Action for annulment
Applicant
Klöckner-Werke AG, a steel undertaking having its registered office in Duisburg, represented by Professor Bodo Borner of the University of Cologne, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Ernest Arendt, 34 B Rue Philippe-Il
Defendant
Commission of the European Communities, represented by its Legal Adviser, Norbert Koch, acting as Agent, assisted by Professor Eberhard Grabitz of the Free University of Berlin, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Oreste Montalto, a member of its Legal Department, Jean Monnet Building, Kirchberg
The applicant contends that the allocation of quotas under Decision No 2794/8C was not concluded “on an equitable basis” within the meaning of Article 58 (2) of the ECSC Treaty because the Commission ought to have rectified the negative effects of subsidies granted in violation of the Treaty to the steel industry in some Member States, in particular, Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.(a) According to the figures available, steel groups in those countries have received from or have been promised by their governments for the period from 1975 to 1983 subsidies totalling at least DM 60000 million. It is clear from the case-law of the Court, in particular its judgments of 23 Februarv 1961 in Case 30/59, Steenkolenmijnen [\96\] ECR 1 and 6 July 1971 in Case 59/70Netherlands v Commission [1971] ECR 639, as well as from Article 1 of Commission Decision No 257/80 of 1 February 1980 establishing Community rules for specific aids to the steel industry (Official Journal 1980, L 29, p. 5) that to a large extent those subsidies constitute prohibited aid.That infringement of the Treaty brought about increases in production which would not have occurred if the subsidies had not been available: hence the importance of this aspect for the undertakings which complied with the Treaty. The Commission fixed the applicant's quotas as if it were unaware that such subsidies had been and were being granted. Such conduct is incompatible with the ECSC Treaty.If the United Kingdom subsidv rate per tonne in 1975/76 to 1978/79 were taken as a basis, the applicant alone would be entitled to DM J2C million in subsidies each year.(b) When allocating production quotas under Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty the Commission ought to have awarded a fidelity bonus in the form of increased quotas to undertakings which had not infringed Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty or, better still, cut the production quotas of subsidized undertakings normally granted under the general rules. In the result the equal treatment applied by the Commission as a matter of principle constitutes an infringement of Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty because it is “no equitable basis” for the sharing out of production.
(c) Even if the argument were true that in most cases the subsidies in question were not specific subsidies granted to the steel industry but general measures as provided for in Article 67 of the ECSC Treaty, nevertheless they are measures which seriously damage the steel undertakings of other countries and the applicant in particular. In spite of that the Commission has failed, in breach of Article 8 of the Treaty to exercise its powers under Article 67.
The prohibition of subsidies was of fundamental importance for the conclusion of the ECSC Treaty and still is for the continued existence of the c ommon market in steel; the production of customs duties and quantitative restrictions in trade between Member States may only be maintained if the prohibition of subsidies is enforced at the same time. It is vital to pay very special attention to the prohibition of subsidies where Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty is applied, and not just in connection with Article 88, which, moreover, has not been applied either.
At the more general level of Community policy excessive disharmony between the various aims is unacceptable; therefore the Community may not, in the sphere of the EEC, prohibit a State subsidy but in the sphere of the European Coal aitd Steel Community declare another, higher subsidy to be tolerable.
The Commission considers that &e complaint of a breach of the prohibiten of subsidies is unfounded.
(a) The applicant's figures on the amounts of subsidies granted to the stecrl industry in Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom should be treated with caution: a study by a private interest group may be accepted as an assertion only and not as appropriate means of proof.
In any case, the question of the amount of subsidies granted by Member States to the steel industry is immaterial in the present case.
(b) Such subsidies are not caught by the prohibition enunciated in Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty. That prohibition covers only subsidies or aids specifically granted to the coal and steel industries; aids received by those industries as part of the general exercise of the powers retained by Member States in the sphere of economic, industrial, regional, fiscal or social policy must be judged in the light of Article 67. That aniele does not prohibit general aids but merely lays down a procedure whereby the positive or negative effects of such action on coal and steel undertakings are to be eliminated.
(c) Moreover, aids granted specifically to the steel industry are not contrary to the prohibition of subsidies enunciated in Article 4 (c) of the Treaty provided that they remain within the limits of the Community rules contained in Commission Decision No 257/80 of 1 February 1980 and No 2320/81 of 7 August 1981 establishing Community rules for aids to the steel industry (Official Journal 1981, L 228, p. 14).
(d) In any case, special subsidies which are caught by the prohibition contained in Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty cannot be taken into account in the context of a system of production quotas introduced under Article 58. To enforce the prohibition of subsidies contained in Article 4 (c) the Commission only has as its disposal the procedure laid down in Article 88 of the ECSC Treaty by which it is required, in the event of a breach of the prohibition of subsidies, to institute proceedings against the Member State concerned for infringement of the Treaty.
(e) If undertakings which received a special subsidy had their quota reduced under the system of production quotas this would allow the prohibited subsidy to continue to exist and thus maintain the infringement of the Treaty. To link the aims of Article 58 of the Treaty with those of Articles 4 (c) and 88 would not be permissible.
In providing that the principles set out in Articles 2, 3 and 4 are to be taken into account when quotas are fixed, the first sentence of Article 58 (2) does not refer to Article 4 (c), which is not addressed to the Community but to the Member States.
To replace the sanction for which Article 88 of the Treaty provides in the event of breach of the prohibition of subsidies with another sanction to be incorporated in the quota system would offend against the general principle of public law that powers conferred by public law may not be used for purposes for which another form of action is mandatory.