law://eu/cjeu/1979/c-92-79/hd_1_1_3@2026-11-18In its application the Commission claims that the mandatory nature of the directive as regards the result to be achieved means that the Member States have a duty to observe the time-limits laid down. This is apparent from the case-law of the Court (cf. judgment in Case 10/76, Commission v Italian Republic [1977] ECR 1359).Case-law (judgment in Case 100/77, Commission v Italian Republic [1978] ECR 879) clearly shows too that a Member State cannot rely upon domestic difficulties or provisions of its national legal system, even of a constitutional nature, for the purpose of justifying a failure to comply with obligations and time-limits resulting from Community directives.In its defence the Italian Government points out that Italian law already contains certain provisions on the industrial processing of mineral oils (Decree Law No 1741, of 2 November 1933, amended by Law No 367 of 8 February 1934) and on atmospheric pollution (Law No 615 of 13 July 1966 and Law No 437 of 3 June 1971).It wonders whether the state of affairs aimed at by Article 2 (3) of the directive might not actually exist at the present time.The Italian Government states that it does not intend to raise the question whether the directive is valid in the light of the fact that combating pollution is not one of the tasks entrusted to the Community by the Treaty. Nevertheless it feels that the matter lies “on the fringe” of Community powers and that this is actually a convention drawn up in the form of a directive.The Italian Government is note unaware that under the case-law of tne Court “delay” is deemed to be “a refusal” and that both are classed under the general term “failure to fulfil an obligation”; however, it takes the view that it would be more correct to use the concept of “substantial conflict” and to hold that there is such a conflict solely in the case of an express or implied refusal.It asks the Court to examine whether, in order to settle this dispute, it is necessary to apply automatically a criterion of objective liability, or whether, on the contrary, it is possible and requisite to ascertain the actual circumstances behind this “delay”, namely the vicissitudes which were a feature of the brief existence of the seventh legislature of the Italian Parliament, and particularly its premature end.The Italian Government hopes that the draft law, which will be laid before the new Parliament, will be passed within the shortest possible time so that these proceedings will lose their purpose.In its reply the Commission contends that the provisions of the directive have a direct effect upon the establishment and the working of the Common Market. In its view it should be recognized that the directive in question does not on any view lie “on the fringe of Community powers”; there is no need to enter into the question whether a directive dealing only with a matter of environmental policy may be based on Article 100.The duty to supply information designed to enable the Commission to check whether the laws of the Member States are in conformity with the directive relates to the provisions adopted after the directive is issued as well as those already in existence at that time. In its application the Commission does not complain that certain provisions of Italian law are not in conformity with the provisions of the directive but that there has been a failure to observe the obligation laid down in Article 8 of the directive to comply with it and to notify the measures taken; this failure is admitted by the Italian Government.As regards the applicability of Article 2 (3) of the directive, the Commission thinks this does not amount to an opportunity for deferring the introduction of the provisions required by the directive for an indefinite period but of derogating from the “harmonized” provisions in accordance with a procedure laid down in the directive and for a period and on conditions fixed by the Commission.On the question whether an objective criterion should be applied to determine whether a Member State is guilty of an infringement or whether the factual circumstances giving rise to the failure to fulfil the obligation should be taken into account, the Commission takes the view that only an objective criterion may be used. The obligation laid down in Article 8 of the directive is clear, precise and objective. Domestic circumstances peculiar to one Member State cannot have any bearing on the nature of this obligation and cannot therefore determine whether there is a failure or not. That does not however preclude the Commission from taking account of such circumstances when the decision to commence or to continue the procedure laid down in Article 169 has to be taken.In this case the Commission sent the reasoned opinion on 23 January 1978. However, the application commencing these proceedings was not sent until June 1979. The measures should have been adopted by 26 August 1976.The Commission emphasizes that when adopting a directive Member States must take account of the problems which will arise when they have to transpose it into domestic law and that they must not give their agreement to a period with which they certainly cannot comply. It points out in this respect that directives based on Article 100 are adopted unanimously.The Commission, represented by its Agent, A. Prozzillo, and the Italian Government, represented by F. Favara, Avvocato dello Stato, presented oral argument at the sitting on 8 January 1980.The Advocate General delivered his opinion at the sitting on 5 February 1980.
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