Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic (73/79) · GlobalLawDB
Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic (73/79)
law://eu/cjeu/1979/c-73-79/hd_1_1_3_2@2026-11-19
Key facts
Court
Court of Justice · Full Court
Case
73/79 · ECLI:EU:C:1980:129
Decided
21 May 1980
Procedure
Infringement action
Applicant
Commission of the european Communities, represented by Antonio Abate, its Legal Adviser, acting as Agent, assisted by Professor Giovanni Puoti, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Mario Cervino, Jean Monnet Building, Kirchberg
Defendant
Italian Ri-public, represented by its Ambassador, Adolfo Maresca, acting as Agent, assisted by Ivo Maria Braguglia, Avvocato dello Stato, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Italian Embassy
Rapporteur
Koopmans
Advocate General
H. Mayras
Bench
7 judgesA. O'Keeffe, A. Touffait (Presidents of Chambers), J. Mertens de Wilmars, P. Pescatore, G. Bosco, T. Koopmans, O. Due
The applicant maintains that the Italian Republic, by applying to sugar from other Member States special internal taxation systematically affectingimported products on the basis of identical criteria but intended to finance aids granted in favour of domestic products to the exclusion of imported sugar — thus contributing to a partial neutralization of the tax burden on the national products — has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 95 of the Treaty.According to the applicant Decision No 1195 of the Price Committee of 1968 Originates in the Community provisions, in this case basic Regulation No 1009/67 and Regulations Nos 430/68 and 432/68 (Journal Officiel 1968, L 89, pp. 2 and 4 respectively) which fixed prices for the 1968/69 marketing year. In having regard to those provisions the Price Committee proceeded on the basis of the derived intervention price fixed for Italy and added the surcharge of Lit 23 per kilogram. Decision No 1195 of the Price Committee of 1968, fixing the surcharge of Lit 23 per kilogram was the means adopted in order to confer upon the sugar industries and producers of beet the aid provided for by Article 34 of Regulation No 1009/67. This was confirmed by the Italian Consiglio di Stato [Council of State] by Decision No 433 of 26 May 1970.With regard to the procedure for the allocation of the aid the amount of the surcharge is paid by each sugar producer less the aid to which he is entitled, whilst that producer, and not the Fund, awards and pays the amount of the aid to the beet-producers.It is not disputed that the surcharge constitutes special internal taxation. Furthermore it cannot be contested that that internal taxation imposes on sugar from other Member States a heavier burden than on domestically-produced sugar.In the course of the 1974/75 marketing year the surcharge amounted to Lit 24 per net kilogram on imported sugar and to only Lit 12.3054 per net kilogram on domestically-produced sugar since the rules provided for an “aid to the processing industry on the basis of Article 34 of Regulation No 1009/67 of Lit 1169.46 per net quintal of white sugar produced in Italy up to a quantity not exceeding the basic production quota or the quota considered as such” (Article 5 (b) of Decision No 27/1974
The same difference in tax treatment between the domestic product and the imported product has been established in the course of the period following the above-mentioned marketing year in relation to the arrangements adopted in order to finance the aids authorized by Article 38 of Regulation No 3330/74.
Furthermore the discrimination already in existence is aggravated since the revenue from the surcharge is used during each marketing year for financing aids benefiting domestically-produced sugar which is not authorized by the Community provisions.
The applicant then disputes the arguments advanced by the Italian Government before proceedings were instituted.
According to the Italian Government the special measures provided for by Article 34 of Regulation No 1009/67 do not fall within the category of “aids” referred to in Articles 92 et seq. of the EEC Treaty but “are rather in the nature of arrangements, intended to equalize the higher production costs recorded in Italy, which would be such as to allow the establishment of a common organization of the market based on common criteria and uniform methods of calculation within the meaning of Article 40 of the Treaty”.
In reality Article 34 of Regulation No 1009/67 and Article 38 of Regulation No 3330/74 are covered by the technical concept of “aids granted by States” referred to in Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty. This is clear from the wording of Article 41 of Regulation No 3330/74 in which express reference is made to the existence in that regulation of provisions contrary to Articles 92 and 94 of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Court of Justice itself has already classified such arrangements under the category of “aids” (judgments of 25 May 1977 in Case 77/76, Cucchi ν Avez [1977] ECR 987 and in Case 105/76, Interzuccheri S.p.A. ν Società Rezzano e Cavana [1977] ECR 1029).
The Commission also disputes the argument that it is the Italian consumer of sugar rather than the producer or importer who is liable to the surcharge.
The Commission in fact maintains that the “person passively subject to” the charge is the person who corresponds to the criteria laid down by tax legislation and who thus becomes directly the debtor of the tax authorities. In this case the sugar producers and importers are the only persons who are passively subject to the charge in question.
The Commission also challenges the argument of the Italian Government to the effect that there is not a close connexion between “the payment in advance by the producer of the surcharge (for the benefit of the consumer) and the collection of adaption aids payable to the same producer since a large part of those adaption aids is earmarked for a product other than sugar (sugar beet)”.
The applicant bases its argument on the fact that the part of the adaptation aid earmarked for beet-producers was not taken into consideration for the purposes of the present dispute and observes that the payment in advance by the producer is effected in the name and for the account of the latter (there is no relevant legal relationship between him and the consumer) and that it constitutes a “payment in advance” because the amount of the surcharge is calculated on the quantity of sugar produced (or imported) which gives rise to the need to effect a set-off against the quantity released for consumption. The Italian Government's objection concerning the absence of a connexion between the payment of the surcharge and the collection of the adaptation aids thus appears unfounded.
Both the decisions of the Price Committee concerning the various sugar marketing years and the circulars issued by the Fund indicate that the producer pays the Fund a surcharge already diminished by the prescribed aid. Since the surcharge'constitutes a debt of the producer to the Fund and the aid represents a claim by the producer against the Fund the debt and the claim are offset (without prejudice however to the processor's obligation to pay directly to beet-producers their share of the aid).
Finally, the Italian Government considers that the surcharge is not incompatible with Article 95 of the Treaty since the amount collected and the method of collection are identical for the domestic product and the imported product.
However, the parity of the rates is purely notional since the charge on the domestic product is not paid in full and the reduction available in respect of it corresponds to the amount of the aid granted for that product.
The defendant maintains that the arguments advanced by the applicant indicates that the discrimination consists in the amount of the aid granted in favour of domestic sugar. However, the aid is authorized under Article 38 of Regulation No 3330/74. In those circumstances the aid in favour of the Italian production sector should represent a clear and constant difference in its favour. That is why the amount of the aid granted within the authorized limits cannot logically be deducted from the amount of the surcharge imposed on national sugar in order to establish the existence of tax treatment favouring the domestic product.
According to the defendant the system of financing the aid for domestic sugar does not have a protectionist effect which goes beyond that aid.
The position of the imported product as against the national product would not show any change as compared with the present situation if the aids were financed by the budgetary credits of the State whilst the surcharge was retained subject to the same conditions for the two products. That finding confirms that the arrangements for financing the aid for domestic sugar do not produce any protectionist effect or adversely affect the imported product.
The defendant acknowledges that the surcharge constitutes internal taxation for the purposes of Article 95 of the Treaty. However, within the national legal system the surcharge constitutes a measure equalizing the high costs which form an integral part of the price of the product and ultimately constitute a charge on the consumer.
The applicant claims that the proceeds from the surcharge have been used for aids which are not authorized by the Community rules. The defendant remarks that that question is being considered in other legal contexts, namely in Case 72/79 and the procedure initiated under Article 93 (2) of the Treaty.
In order to establish the existence of a close connexion between the surcharge and the aid the applicant has described a system of payment of the former and recovery of the latter which is not even still in force. According to the defendant the present system of payment is as follows :
Point 5 (c) of Decision No 24 of the Price Committee of 1 October 1976 (Gazzetta Ufficiale No 264 of 4 October 1976) shows that producers are obliged to pay the surcharge on the quantities of sugar “withdrawn from storage before 1 December 1976” in the course of the fifteenth day of the month following the month in which they were withdrawn.
On the basis of the provisional production, and leaving out of account any equalization, the Fund paid to sugar producers by 20 December 1976 at the latest the entire amount of the aid payable to beet-producers and the processing industry; it was then for the latter to credit the beet-producers with the share payable to them by 31 December at the latest.
The Fund partially offsets the amount of the surcharge paid on the quantity released for consumption before 30 November 1976 against the amount of the aids. The amount of the aids calculated on the whole estimated production, disregarding equalization, in fact is necessarily greater than the amount of the surcharge collected on the quantities released for consumption at the latest in the course of November. There is only a partial set-off since in this connexion regard is had only to the part of the aids payable to the processing industry and not to that payable to beet-producers.
The part of the aids not covered by the set-off is paid by the Fund before 20 December with finance usually obtained through bank loans.
Sugar producers then pay on the quantities of sugar released for consumption after December the total amount of the surcharge before the 15th of the month following that in which the sugar is released from storage.
These observations show that the Fund makes over the whole aid payable to the sugar producers at the latest on 20 December (and likewise that it pays the whole aid to beet-producers) whilst it is only subsequently that it collects part of the surcharge (that on the quantities released for consumption after December).
The applicant, in its reply, states that it does not put forward any claim for the abolition of an aid authorized by the Council but that it merely requires that that aid should not be financed by charges imposed wholly or partially on imported products.
The essence of the argument advanced by the defendant amounts ultimately to stating that the end of an aid justifies the means employed to finance it.
The applicant bases its argument on the settled case-law of the Court. It recalls in this connexion that precisely with regard to the system of aid issue in this case the Court of Justice stated in its judgments delivered on 25 May 1977 in the above-mentioned Cases 77/76(Cucchi) and 105/76 (Interzuccheri) that:
“Authorization under Article 38 of Regulation (EEC) No 3330/74 to grant the aids provided for therein cannot be taken to mean that any method of financing these aids, whatever its character or conditions, is compatible with Community law.
In the financing of the aid granted, the national authorities are in particular subject not only to the obligations arising under the Treaty but also to those arising under other provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 3330/74”.
The Community authorization granted to the Italian State relates to the grant of aids to domestic producers of sugar and not to the institution of a discriminatory tax on imported products which could not have been authorized since Article 95 of the Treaty does not permit exceptions to the rules therein contained. In the present case the defendant has thus disregarded the objective of Article 95 which is intended to prevent all tax discrimination between domestic products and products imported from Member States in order to permit the attainment of two fundamental objectives of the Treaty: the neutrality of taxation and the abolition of barriers to the free movement of goods.
The applicant considers that the defendant's statement that there is only a partial offsetting of the surcharge paid on quantities released for consumption at a certain date and the amount of the aids does not affect the fact that that charge has in fact a lesser incidence on the Italian product. It is also irrelevant whether the offsetting is effected simultaneously or subsequently (cf. the judgment of 22 March 1977 in Case 74/76, Ianelli & Volpi, already cited).
The defendant, in its rejoinder, claims that the argument of altering the system of financing — that is to say, maintaining the surcharge at an identical amount and financing the aid through the State budget — shows clearly that the complaint of infringement of Article 95 is inconsistent. In fact even such a change in the system of financing would not modify the position of imported sugar and would not benefit. it. The absence of any advantage for imported sugar shows that the present system does not place it at a disadvantage and that there is thus no breach of Article 95.
It considers that the judgments delivered in Cases 77/76, Cucchi, and 105/76, Interzuccheri (cited above) which merely set out statements of principle cannot establish tax discrimination in this case.
The defendant maintains that the aid is granted within the quantitative and financial limits authorized and regardless of whether the surcharge on sugar is paid or not and of the actual yield of the surcharge.