law://eu/cjeu/1979/c-66-79/hd_1_1_2_3@2026-11-20After stating that the first question must be understood as concerning the question whether a provision of Community law must be applied to facts occurring prior to a judgment of the Court of Justice in accordance with the interpretation given by the Court, the Commission claims that an affirmative reply appears inescapable having regard to the nature and the actual purpose of a reference for a preliminary ruling. Under Article 164 of the EEC Treaty the Court has a rôle which is typically judicial and excludes any legislative function. That article is an expression of the principle of legality by virtue of which the Court is to decide according to the law and not on the basis of considerations of expediency. In this context Article 177 brings about a close collaboration between the Court of Justice and national courts; the Court interprets the legislative provision generally and in the abstract whilst it is for the national court to apply that interpretation to the specific case.Judgments given by the Court of Justice in pursuance of Article 177 necessarily bind the national court seised of the main action so as to make it possible to attain the purpose for which references for preliminary rulings were instituted as the Court expressly recalled in its judgments delivered on 3 February 1977 in Case 52/76 (Benedetti v Munart, [1977] ECR 163) and on 24 June 1969 in Case 29/68 (Milch-, Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken [1969] ECR 165).As regards the judicial sphere, the judgment delivered by the Court in pursuance of Article 177 is not unimportant also in other cases of the same nature brought before national courts. As far as they are concerned the importance of the interpretation given by the Court arises on the one hand from the fact that superior national courts intending to comply with it are freed from the requirement to make a further reference for a preliminary ruling in accordance with the judgment of the Court delivered on 27 March 1963 in Joined Cases 28 to 30/62 (Da Costa, [1963] ECR 31) and, on the other hand, from the fact that the lower national courts and tribunals cannot, without applying Community law erroneously, adopt a different interpretation short of inviting a further ruling from the Court of Justice in pursuance of Article 177.Thus the Court's interpretation necessarily influences the Community provision in question in the sense that it is to be subsequently applied by any national court in accordance with that interpretation each time the question arises, subject to a variation resulting from a fresh reference for a preliminary ruling.The fact that the Court is seised of an action relating to facts which occurred prior to the judgment of the Court cannot have any significance in this matter.The idea that judgments of the Court of Justice delivered in pursuance of Article 177 exceed the bounds of the individual case and form part of the actual Community provision which is the subject of the interpretation is confirmed, in the Commission's view, by the case-law of the Court relating to the purpose of a reference for a preliminary ruling, to the participation of the Member States and institutions in the proceedings and, finally, to the absence of the parties, as strictly understood, to the main action.The validity ex tunc of the Court's interpretation also follows from the essentially declaratory nature of the judgments in question. The Court's interpretation is in substance close to being an authentic interpretation, which applies generally to prior facts. Not to apply the Court's interpretation to facts prior to the judgment would be tantamount to depriving a provision of its effect or to giving it as regards the past a different meaning by splitting up Community law in point of time. This prerogative belongs only to the legislative arm and not to the judiciary.The effect ex tunc of an interpretation given by the Court of Justice in a judgment delivered in pursuance of Article 177 does however meet with an insurmountable obstacle as regards legal situations which have already taken definitive effect. Situations which have become unassailable, for example on grounds of prescription, lapse of time or by force of res judicata cannot be called in question. In the present state of Community law these matters are governed by the various national legal systems.Next the Commission considers whether the principle of the ex tunc effect of interpretative judgments is not, in whole or in part, paralysed by other principles of Community law which have nothing to do with references for preliminary rulings but which result from overriding considerations of legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectation and the stability of legal relationships. These principles are based on the necessity of not assailing relationships which are henceforward consolidated in the economic context, even though they may not yet have displayed all their effects in the legal sphere, so as to avoid still more serious damage than that resulting from the erroneous application of a given legislative provision. That is the principle laid down in particular by the second paragraph of Article 174 of the Treaty, which was the subject of an extensive interpretation by the Court in the judgment given on 5 June 1973 in Case 81/72 (Council v Commission, [1973] ECR 575).However, the Commission is of the opinion that such a view could not be applied to a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 to justify the effect ex nunc of interpretative judgments. Although the importance of the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectation should not be underestimated they must nevertheless necessarily be coordinated with the principle of legality, which involves a correct and uniform application of Community law. The absence of an express provision in this respect in the Treaty does not appear to make it permissible to acknowledge that interpretative judgments delivered in pursuance of Article 177 have an ex nunc effect.However, it is not possible to exclude the possibility of exceptional situations in which, whether by reason of the extent to which economic relationships would be dislocated or by reason of special effects on legitimate expectation, it may appear advisable to give preference to the principle of legal certainty by thus giving a lesser scope to the interpretation of the Court under Article 177. It should be possible in such cases for the Court to find that there is a lacuna in the procedure for preliminary rulings and to make it good by applying by analogy the principle taken from the second paragraph of Article 174 of the Treaty.Applying these principles to the cases before the national court regarding the importation of agricultural products and agricultural levies the Commission thinks that there is no doubt that the concept of “day of importation” used by the Community regulations on this subject must be understood, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, as the date on which the import declaration is accepted. There is no reason to make a distinction between transactions prior to the judgment delivered by the Court in Case 113/75 and those subsequent to it.With regard to the second question referred to the Court, the Commission takes the view that it follows from the case-law of the Court, in particular from the judgment in Case 33/76 (Rewe, previously cited), that it is acepted in the case-law that when Community law confers rights on individuals, national courts are required to ensure that they are protected and that, if procedures and time-limits for the relevant actions are, in the present state of Community law, governed by national law, they must not be as to render practically impossible the protection of the rights in question or in any case to be less favourable than those applicable to analogous actions relating to domestic relationships. There must be no question of provisions adopted specifically for Community law so as to limit its application. On the basis of the considerations which it has put forward with regard to the first question the Commission takes the view that the fact that the events in question occurred prior to an interpretative judgment of the Court is without importance with regard to the power of those concerned to take legal action so as to obtain a correct application of the Community provisions in question. However, by virtue of the principle of legitimate expectation and solely as regards actions of the State with a view to demanding sums which it might have levied on the basis of a correct interpretation of a Community provision, it must be admitted that national law may in certain circumstances restrict the power of the State to take legal action. The proposal for a regulation (Official Journal C 138 of 11 June 1977, p. 13) presented to the Council by the Commission for the purpose of laying down uniform conditions for post-clearance collection of duties by Member States tends in this direction. According to the Commission there are good grounds for having recourse to the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation when the fact that a charge has been underpaid is due either to information transmitted by the competent authorities or to general provisions which have been subsequently annulled or invalidated by judicial decisions or finally to an error on the part of the competent authorities which cannot be identified by the individual in good faith.In the present state of Community law it is permissible but not mandatory for national law, on grounds of legitimate expectation, to restrict the State's right to act.On the basis of these considerations the Commission suggests that the Court should reply to the questions submitted for a preliminary ruling in the following manner:1. Under Article 177 of the Treaty, when the authorities of a Member State, in connexion with relation T ships not yet defined pursuant to national law have, with regard to imports, charged what they should not have charged or on the contrary have not charged what they should have charged in pursuance of Community law, as it has been subsequently interpreted by a judgment of the Court of Justice, the relevant Community provisions must be applied by national courts in accordance with the said judgment as regards such relationships also in the absence of a fresh reference to the Court and of exceptional circumstances resulting from the judgment itself.2. For such relationships national law must allow persons concerned the right to take legal proceedings so as to demand the payment or the repayment, on the basis of Community law as interpreted by the Court of Justice, of what either was due and has not been charged or of what was paid although not due, subject to any restrictions applied by national law, so as to protect the legitimate expectation of individuals, to the power of the State to initiate proceedings.”
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.