law://eu/cjeu/1979/c-62-79/hd_1_1_2_2@2026-11-17Coditei points out that the Court's case-law on the application of Articles 30 and 36 to the exercise of industrial property rights may reasonably be applied mutatis mutandis to services. It refers to Cases 15 and 16/74, Centrafarm v Sterling Drug & Winthrop ([1974] ECR at pp. 1168 and 1199 to 1200), and 192/73, Hag ([1974] ECR 731 at p. 745).It emphasizes that Article 59 of the Treaty became directly applicable upon the expiry of the transitional period (Van Binsbergen judgment, cited above). It is also accepted that Article 59 has a “horizontal direct effect” (judgment in Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch [1974] ECR 1405 at p. 1420; judgment in Case 13/73, Dona [1976] ECR 1333 at p. 1341; judgment in Case 90/76, Van Ameyde [1977] ECR 1091 at p. 1126), whereby private persons are, like Member States, bound to refrain from any measure which is liable to impede freedom to provide services.Coditei comments that both Ciné Vog and the German television channel are the assigns of the original owner of the copyright; as there is therefore a common origin there are grounds for applying by analogy the rule in the Hag judgment (cited above). Such an application leads to the conclusion that the restriction upon diffusion in Belgium is not objectively justified but constitutes an unlawful obstacle to the freedom to provide services. The restriction in issue arises from the fact that the Berne Convention is interpreted by the Cour d'Appel, Brussels, as allowing Ciné Vog to forbid the diffusion in Belgium, via a cable diffusion network, of films broadcast in Germany.One possible objection, based upon the lack of a legal relationship between the person providing the service, in this case the German broadcasting station, and the recipients of the service, in this case the Belgian television viewers, is not a crucial one. The provision of services does not necessarily imply the existence of a legal relationship between the provider and the recipient of a service; furthermore, such a requirement is scarcely compatible with economic reality in industries such as the newspaper, radio and television industries in which revenue is often largely generated by advertising, which is nevertheless calculated according to the number of recipients actually reached.In conclusion, Coditei proposes that the Court should answer the second question as follows:“It is not in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on freedom to provide services for the assignee of the performing right in a cinematographic film in one Member State to rely upon his right in order to prevent the showing of that film in that State by means of cable diffusion of television where the film thus shown has been broadcast in another Member State by a third party with the consent of the original owner of the right.”The Union Professionnelle de Radio et Television feels that the effect of the case-law of the Court is that although the existence of an industrial property right or of a right akin to copyright escapes as such from the prohibitions laid down in the Treaty, the exercise thereof may still be covered by the prohibitions enacted by the Treaty. By relying upon copyright legislation Ciné Vog cannot therefore recreate restrictions which are incompatible with the Treaty.Ciné Vog and the Chambre Syndicale Belge de la Cinématographie examine the second question on a subsidiary basis only, since in their opinion the first limb of the first question requires an answer in the negative.They claim that if it is accepted that Article 59 of the EEC Treaty may in principle apply here to the services provided by the cable television distributors, then it must be acknowledged that the requirement that the licence of the author or of his assign be obtained is on no account a restriction prohibited by Article 59 because that requirement does not cause any discrimination which the provisions of Article 59 intended to abolish.The restrictions to be abolished pursuant to Articles 59 and 60 include “all requirements imposed on the person providing the service by reason in particular of his nationality or of the fact that he does not habitually reside in the State where the service is provided, which do not apply to persons established within the national territory or which may prevent or otherwise obstruct the activities of the person providing the service” (cf. judgment in Case 22/74, Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299; judgment in Case 39/75, Coenen [1975] ECR 1547).The requirement that the licence of the author be obtained is a general one; provision is made for it in an international agreement which binds inter alia the nine Member States and it does not entail any discrimination from the point of view of the nationality of the person providing the cable diffusion service or from the point of view of his place of establishment.A person providing a service must make sure that the service he performs is itself lawful. For example, a cable television distributor established in Belgium cannot diffuse over its network to its subscribers a film the content of which has been judged by a Belgian court to be offensive to public morality, whilst in neighbouring countries the film is shown freely creating the possibility that the film may be transmitted by a broadcasting organization in a neighbouring Member State.The subject-matter of the service should cause the person providing it to ensure that he fulfils all the conditions for that service to be lawful. In the present case the licence of the author is a condition which does not cause any discrimination intended to be abolished by Article 59 of the Treaty.The cable television distributors established in Belgium have, moreover, been at pains to obtain that licence for the music contained in a cinematographic film. They have entered into a contract for this purpose with the Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs (SABAM) [Belgian Association of Authors, Composers and Publishers]. By that contract, renewed on 1 December 1977, they are obliged to pay a fee of Bfrs 30 for each basic subscription of Bfrs 2000.In conclusion, Ciné Vog and the Chambre Syndicale Belge de la Cinematographic propose that the Court should answer the second question as follows:“The requirement that a licence be obtained from the owner of the television performing right in a film in order to communicate that film to the subscribers of a cable television diffusion network in the Member State of that owner when the film is broadcast by television from another Member State is not a restriction upon the freedom to provide services such as was intended to be abolished by Article 59 of the EEC Treaty. That licence does not in fact cause any discrimination to the detriment of the person providing the service and the necessity for it is derived from an international agreement which is not incompatible with Article 59 of the EEC Treaty.”In the opinion of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the answer to the second question should be in the affirmative.National legislation prohibiting, to the advantage of the owner of the right, the retransmission by an unauthorized third party of a film picked up from another Member State must be regarded as a limitation, recognized by Community law, on the free movement of services. It forms part of rules which are applicable without distinction to national broadcasts and to those received from another Member State and which limit the free movement of services at the organizational level.According to Article 60 of the Treaty services transcending national boundaries shall be provided “under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals”. The fact that Articles 56 and 66 of the Treaty taken together leave Member States the power to maintain discriminatory restrictions to the detriment of those who provide services extending beyond national boudaries must be understood to mean that Member States are all the more justified in adopting general rules which are not discriminatory.If the entitlement of the owner of a right to prohibit the retransmission of films were to be considered, contrary to the view of the German Government, as a restriction upon the movement of services within the meaning of Article 59 et seq., it would nevertheless be justified by applying by analogy the combined provisions of Article 36 and of Articles 56 and 66 of the EEC Treaty.The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany states that it is not unaware that, in the case of industrial and commercial property rights held to be “of the same origin”, the legal effect of the Court's case-law is that the holder of the property right cannot avail himself of the right of prohibition given to him by national legislation in the context of trade within the Community.These principles cannot, however, be applied to copyright since that would entirely deprive copyright of its substance. Unlike a trademark, the right in which is exhausted upon marketing, copyright as a basic principle comprises a lasting right of prohibition which derives from its function in terms of property, remuneration and reputation which is not exhausted when the right is exploited.In the opinion of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany the answer to the second question should therefore be in the affirmative.The Government of the United Kingdom is of the opinion that the very nature of copyright rights prevents them from being discriminatory and states that those rights are not the sort of restriction struck down by Article 59 at all. It points out that a specific subject-matter of copyright protection is the entitlement of the proprietor to prevent the unauthorized use of his material for cable television. That specific right is recognized by the Berne Copyright Convention to which all Member States are parties. It is inconceivable that Article 59 should destroy a part of the specific subject-matter of the copyright protection.The Commission considers that the Court's interpretation of Article 36 in regard to the protection of industrial and commercial property rights must also apply to literary and artistic property rights.The Court has interpreted Article 36 as meaning that the existence of exclusive rights given by the legislation of Member States is not affected by the Treaty but that the exercise of those rights may, however, fall within the scope of application of the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods and on competition (judgment in Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v Metro-SB-Großmärkte [1971] ECR 502; judgment in Case 15/74, Centrafarm v Sterling Drug [1974] ECR 1147; judgment in Case 119/75, Terrapin v Terranova [1976] ECR 1061). The effect of this is that the holder of an industrial property right protected by the laws of a Member State may not rely upon those laws to resist the importation of a product which has been lawfully placed on the market in another Member State by the holder himself or with his consent.The reasons for this are primarily based upon the principle of the exhaustion of an industrial and commercial property right which itself is based upon the view that the holder receives his remuneration upon the sale of the protected product. For this reason the right of the holder ceases from the moment when he places the product on the market.When applying these principles to copyright it is important to bear in mind some particular features of literary and artistic property. Unlike exclusive industrial and commercial property rights such as patents and trademarks, we are here concerned with the protection of a personal creation (an immaterial right). The protection given by copyright takes account of this feature; it is both wider and more varied. The concept of copyright comprises the prerogatives of the author, which are inalienable, rights of distribution when there is a material medium and of performance if there is no material medium.The application of the exhaustion principle is justified as regards copyrights whose subject-matter is the distribution of a material medium (written works, sound-recordings, films, artistic creations). That involves goods which are traded in and are scarcely any different from products made under licence or marketed under a trademark. The author — like a patentee or the owner of a trademark — receives his remuneration upon the sale of his work in a material form. The Commission refers to the judgments in Cases 155/73, Sacchi ([1974] ECR 428), and 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon ([1971] ECR 499).On the other hand, that principle may not be applied to copyrights where there is no material medium. These are essentially performing rights. If there is no material medium the criterion of marketing cannot be used to determine the extent of the exclusivity of the right.Such copyrights are distinguished by the fact that they are not exhausted at the first performance of the works they protect. The different forms of performance are independent of one another and each performance giiœs rise to copyright and therefore to remuneration.The Commission observes that in general performing right is the author's preserve and that the exercise of that right is possible only if he gives his consent. If consent is not given the author may prohibit the performance. The Commission thinks that the requirement of consent is intended to enable the author to negotiate a fair remuneration.Since the use of the author's intangible rights give rise to the provision of services — and not to the movement of goods — the question arises whether the exception laid down in Article 36 is applicable to them. Academic writers are virtually all agreed that the guarantee afforded to industrial and commercial property rights in Article 36 of the Treaty must also apply to copyright.The Commission shares that view. It states that whilst it is true that the provisions of the Treaty on the freedom to provide services do not contain any express reference to the protection of literary and artistic property, that omission may not however be interpreted as meaning that the authors - of the Treaty intended to remove from those rights the protection which they gave to industrial and commercial property in Article 36. Article 36 is in fact, as far as the guaranteed existence of those rights is concerned, the expression of a general principle which is not confined to Title I, Chapter 2, on the free movement of goods; it must also apply to the freedom to provide services to the extent to which literary and artistic property rights may give rise to the provision of a service.The Commission feels that the question referred to the Court is relevant only if the cable diffusion of a film picked up from a broadcasting station and simultaneously transmitted to subscribers constitutes a broadcast which requires the authority of the owner of the right.It gives a summary of the national laws on the subject.Belgium and Luxembourg do not have legislation of their own. Those countries apply the Berne Convention in regard to nationals and foreigners alike.Case-law in the Federal Republic of Germany approaches the problem of cable diffusion of television from the point of view of the television viewer. Moreover, it gives weight to the fact that cable diffusion of television provides normal reception in areas where this would not otherwise be possible because of the existence of buildings.In the United Kingdom and Ireland cable diffusion companies are authorized by law to transmit broadcasts by the national broadcasting organizations without being obliged to pay any remuneration. In the case of the retransmission of broadcasts of foreign broadcasting organizations, a decision by the Performing Rights Tribunal may declare such retransmission to be exempt from payment, or grant the owner appropriate remuneration.In France Article 27 of the Law of 11 March 1957 contains only a general provision regulating the right to broadcast which does not distinguish between a transmission and a retransmission. The interpretation of that provision is controversial.In the Netherlands Article 12 (4) of the Law on Copyright provides that the publication, by wire or otherwise, of a work diffused by radio or television is not to be considered as an independent broadcast if it is made simultaneously with the broadcast by the organization which made the broadcast.Italy and Denmark do not have any provisions dealing with the problem.In the United States retransmissions by a cable system are subject to a form of compulsory licence, which nevertheless provides remuneration.In the opinion of the Commission this description of the legal situation in the various Member States shows that the question of the status of cable diffusion of television in regard to copyright remains largely unsettled. British and Irish legislation basically denies to owners of broadcasting rights the right to prohibit retransmission by cable. American legislation has adopted the same solution but makes provision for remuneration. Discussions within the Berne Union, which have not yet reached any clear outcome, are continuing. They may be summarized as follows: in the case of the simultaneous retransmission of original broadcasts it is accepted that it is left to each legislature to interpret what it understands by the concepts of “body other than the original one”, “public” and “communication to the public” contained in paragraph (1) (ii) of Article 11 bis of the Berne Convention. As regards the re-diffusion of national programmes, it has been pointed out that in a case where a broadcasting organization is subject to a legal obligation to ensure reception of its programmes by all the nationals of the country in question, the act of diffusing television by cable cannot be dissociated from the act of broadcasting, even if the cable diffusion is carried out by an organization other than the original one. However, the cable retransmission of foreign programmes must be regarded as a communication to the public within the meaning of Article 11 bis of the Berne Convention.It can be seen from the foregoing that cable retransmission is assessed differently depending on whether a national programme is involved or one received from abroad. Where programmes from another Member State are involved — which is the case here — such a distinction requires, however, some comments regarding Community law. Whilst it is in fact understandable that this distinction is made'within the Berne Union, it cannot be accepted in Community law. The latter requires that restrictions on the free movement of goods or, where appropriate, on freedom to provide services are applicable without distinction to services provided within a Member State and to those provided from another Member State. In the case of the exception based upon copyright, it must be of general application since it would otherwise be, in the words of Article 36 of the Treaty, “a means of arbitrary discrimination” or “a disguised restriction on trade between Member States”. In an analogous situation concerning trademarks the Court underscored in Case 119/73, Terrapin v Terranova ([1976] ECR 1061), the obligation upon Member States not to differentiate, as regards the application of legislation conferring an exclusive right, between the criteria which are valid within the Member State and those which are applied to imports.The Commission concludes from this that, on the basis of the options left to it by the Berne Convention, the Cour d'Appel, Brussels, cannot make a distinction between the transmission by cable of programmes of national television organizations (which cable diffusion undertakings are obliged to transmit in full)note and the transmission by cable of programmes coming from television organizations of another Member State. In the event that the Cour d'Appel does not consider that the transmission by cable of Belgian television programmes is not a new broadcast giving rise to copyright, it cannot treat the transmission of television programmes coming from another Member State in any other way.The Commission acknowledges that the Cour d'Appel, Brussels, has held that because Ciné Vog's right has its origin in a “legal situation under which it enjoys protection erga omnes”, it falls outside “the considerations pertaining to contracts and concerted action to which the words of the Treaty refer”. However, in view of the case-law of the Court of Justice — inter alia in Case 40/70, Sirena v Eda ([1971] ECR 82), in which the Court clearly laid down the distinction to be made between the existence of an exclusive right conferred by national law as a legal entity and the contractual exercise of that right, particularly by means of licences — the situation may also be viewed in a different way.The content of the contract of 8 July 1969 shows in fact that La Boétie did not actually transfer its copyright to Ciné Vog. The producer authorized Ciné Vog to exploit the film in question in Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. That authorization covered a specific territory only, it was limited in time and gave rise to payments to be made in proportion to the return obtained from cinema performances. That contract therefore fulfilled all the requirements with regard to a licence contract. This also holds good if Ciné Vog is regarded as the owner of the performing right for Belgium.In those circumstances it is not impossible that the provisions of the Treaty on competition, in particular Article 85, may be applicable.In order to resolve the question referred to the Court, it is furthermore necessary to examine the contractual relationship between the original owner (La Boétie) and the German broadcasting organization. It is necessary to know whether the consent given to German television to broadcast the film also extended to the retransmission of the broadcast by cable. In the event that the original owner gave his consent to retransmission by cable, Ciné Vog could no longer assert its performing right.Finally, the Commission examines the feasibility of a Community solution, bearing in mind the special characteristics, in fact and in law, of cable television.It considers that it is a matter of finding -a way of reconciling the principle of freedom to provide services with the protection of the specific subject-matter of the copyright in question. In doing this it must be borne in mind that cable television is a relatively new technique of which the copyright laws in force in the different Member States, except in the United Kingdom and Ireland, have not been able to take account because they came into force before this new technique emerged. This is also true of the Berne Convention. Discussions both in Member States and within the Berne Union demonstrate that the problems involved are far from finding definitive solutions.On a practical point, it should be noted that the cable diffusion companies concerned are not even in a position to obtain the authority of copyright owners in all cases. Television station programmes, simultaneously re-transmitted by cable, are in fact known to the public only a short time before the broadcast itself. Therefore it is generally impossible for cable diffusion companies to secure the consent of the owners of the performing rights. That means that as long as Member States have not introduced a system of obligatory licences into their national law or as long as there are no copyright management companies exploiting cinematographic rights, the requirement of the authorization or the consent of the copyright owner in the event of the retransmission by cable of a film being broadcast makes it impossible to carry on this activity in many cases.These facts lead the Commission to ask whether this state of national copyright law must be accepted without more ado at the Community level. In its opinion it is first of all incumbent on the national legislatures to solve this problem. But it is also possible to imagine the Community taking steps to harmonize national laws on the subject. These possibilities do not however deprive the Court of Justice of the jurisdiction to determine — by interpreting the relevant provisions of Community law — whether the obstacle to freedom to provide services in the Community constituted by the performing right in question is justified by the specific subject-matter of that right. The answer cannot be found in the laws of any one single Member State. This question requires a general answer, based upon existing national laws, and taking account of the requirements of Community law.The Commission believes that the protection of the specific subject-matter of the performing right in question — concerning the simultaneous retransmission by cable of the original broadcast — does not require that the owner of that right should have a right to give his authorization, with the result that he can prohibit retransmission. As the owner has consented to the initial broadcast, his legitimate interest may be regarded as satisfied if national law entitles him to receive fair remuneration from the cable diffusion company which made the simultaneous retransmission.In conclusion, the Commission is of the opinion that in its answer to the second question of the Cour d'Appel, Brussels, the Court should hold that the assignee of the performing rights in a cinematographic film in Belgium, Ciné Vog, was not entitled to prohibit Coditei from showing that film in that State by means of cable diffusion; on the other hand, Belgian law may entitle the owner of the right in question to claim a fair remuneration for the showing of the film by means of cable retransmission.Should the Court not share that conclusion and consider that Community law does not preclude the national law of a Member State from entitling the owner of a performing right in a film to prohibit simultaneous retransmission by cable, the Commission proposes that the Court should make it evident in its answer that the rule of national law must be applied without distinction to all cable retransmissions, to those of broadcasts by national television stations as well as to those of broadcasts from another Member State and, furthermore, that if the original owner has given his consent to the initial broadcast as well as to the retransmission by cable in another Member State, the owner of the performing right in that State may no longer forbid that retransmission.
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