Contents
In Case 1251/79Italian Republic, represented by Arnaldo Squillante, Consigliere di Stato, acting as Agent, assisted by Oscar Fiumara, Avvocato dello Stato, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Italian Embassy,vCommission of the European Communities, represented by its Legal Adviser, Richard Wainwright, acting as Agent, assisted by Guido Berardis and Gianluigi Campogrande, members of its Legal Department, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of its Legal Adviser, Mario Cervino, Jean Monnet Building, Kirchberg,THE COURTcomposed of: P. Pescatore, President of the Second Chamber, Acting as President, Lord Mackenzie Stuart and T. Koopmans (Presidents of Chambers), A. O'Keeffe, G. Bosco, A. Touffait and O. Due, Judges,Advocate General: G. ReischlRegistrar: A. Van Houttegives the following
Judgment
Facts and Issues
The facts of the case, the course of the procedure and the conclusions, submissions and arguments of the parties may be summarized as follows:
I —Facts and written procedure
A —Legislative framework
B —The facts
II —Conclusions of the parties
The applicant claims that the Court should:— Declare the decision of the Commission of the European Communities of 12 October 1979 void in so far as it excludes from the expenditure chargeable to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund the sum of LIT 604 863 175;— Order the defendant to pay the costs.The defendant contends that the Court should:— Dismiss the application;— Order the applicant to pay the costs.
III —Submissions and arguments of the parties
The applicant asserts first that the statement of reasons on which the contested decision was based is insufficient.It then claims that, as far as the aid for long-term storage of wine is concerned, the decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of the term “conclusion of the contract” used in Article 8 (1) of Regulation No 1437/70, as amended by Regulation No 176/72. Furthermore, the decision was adopted in disregard of the purpose of the Community rules in question and, alternatively, in breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation.
(a)Statement of reasons on which the decision was based
The applicant considers that the statement of reasons on which the contested decision was based is plainly insufficient.Although the fourth recital in the preamble to the decision states that the Member State was informed in detail of the deduction made and that it was able to give its views thereon, there is no explanation of the reasons which led the Commission to maintain the exclusion despite the detailed observations of the national authority concerned.The defendant considers that this submission is unfounded. It accepts that the decision does not include a detailed account of the specific reasons which determined its content, but contends that such an account would have required an extremely long and complicated statement of reasons.However, the procedure followed for the adoption of the contested decision included not only the discussion by the Fund Committee of a report submitted to the Member States on the proposed clearance of the accounts for the financial year in question but also, likewise within the context of the Fund Committee, consultation of the Member States on the draft decisions. In the case in question, that consultation occurred at the meeting of the Fund Committee on 11 July 1979, during which a memorandum from the Italian Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of 7 July 1979 was also discussed.The defendant cites the judgment of the Court of 14 July 1977 in Case 61/76 (Geist v Commission of the European Communities [1977] ECR 1419), according to which a decision adversely affecting a person contains a sufficient statement or the reasons on which it is based if the supporting preparatory documents have been brought to the knowledge of the person concerned, have clearly informed him of the reasons underlying the decision in question and contain all the essential factors sufficient to make review by the Court possible.
(b)The term conclusion of the contract
The applicant states first that after the adoption of Regulation No 2837/71 AIMA took the appropriate measures with a view to granting the aid to the producers. The applications for aid must be submitted in duplicate to AIMA through the provincial agricultural inspectorates, which must verify the correctness of the information declared at the place of storage and forward the original application together with its own report to AIMA within a period not exceeding five days following the day on which the application is received.AIMA then draws up the contract provided for by the Community regulations and sends it to the producer concerned for the purpose of its authentication by the signature of a notary. The period of nine months laid down by the Community regulations begins to run from the date of that signature. The aid is paid for the corresponding period, Article 8 of Regulation No 1437/70 having been construed as meaning that the contract may only have effect from the day on which it is concluded by a formal instrument.The applicant observes however that on 26 January 1972 Regulation No 176/72 was adopted in order to limit the adverse consequences suffered by the producers as a result of the considerable period of time elapsing between the date of the application and the date of the formal conclusion of the contract. That regulation provided that, during the period between 1 December 1971 and 31 August 1972, the period of validity of a contract was to begin on the day on which the application was received, but such retroactivity was limited to 30 days in the case of contracts for which application was received after 29 December 1971, that is for all the long-term contracts provided for by Regulation No 2837/71, which entered into force on 30 December 1971.AIMA paid the aid under each contract in respect of a period beginning 30 days before the formal execution thereof.Pursuant to Article 5 (5) of Regulation No 816/70, cited above, the aid was paid under contracts for which application was made and accepted before 15 February, although the formal execution of the contract was subsequent to that date.The applicant maintains that it cannot subscribe to the Commission's argument to the effect that the contracts were “concluded” on a date subsequent to 15 February contrary to the conditions laid down by Article 5 (5) of Regulation No 816/70.It submits that the contracts in question were all “concluded” during the period from 16 December to 15 February, even if their “formal execution” took place later.In support of that view it puts forward two propositions whereby the contract between the producer and the intervention agency must be regarded either as a bilateral contract containing obligations burdening both the parties, or as a unilateral contract which contains obligations burdening a single party.According to the first proposition the contract is concluded when the intentions of both contracting parties concur. However, in the case of storage aid the intention of the intervention agency is not unfettered, since, according to Article 6 of Regulation No 816/70, those agencies “shall conclude, with producers who apply for them, storage contracts”. In Italy, after the adoption of Regulation No 2837/71, once an application was submitted in the form prescribed by the Community provisions, it was immediately accepted by the intervention agency, provided that its content complied with the requirements laid down by the Community regulations. The applicant takes the view that the contract must be regarded as “concluded” at the time of such acceptance, which in every case occurred before 15 February.According to the second proposition, that of the unilateral contract, the Community legislature envisaged a unilateral undertaking by the producer to store his produce. As soon as it is established that that undertaking has been observed, the intervention agency pays aid to the producer, which is certainly not the counterpart of a benefit, but merely a contribution by way of incentive. Under Article 1333 of the Italian Civil Code, once an offer by a producer to make such an undertaking has been submitted in due and proper form to the intervention agency, the contract must be regarded as concluded. According to this proposition too, the storage contracts were concluded before 15 February.The applicant adds that the formal execution of the contract in writing, effected by AIMA in accordance with the prescribed forms and after various checks and formalities, merely constitutes the crystallization in documentary form of an already perfect contract. It admits that in the case in question such crystallization took place without exception after 15 February.Finally, the applicant points out that the first subparagraph of Article 8 (1) of Regulation No 1437/70, which provides that “a contract may not be concluded for a period beginning before the date of the conclusion of the contract”, cannot preclude the interpretation which it suggests. Whilst that provision was not felicitously phrased, it would appear, none the less, that when it speaks of a contract being “concluded”, it is referring to the decisive moment from the point of view of substantive law, and that when, at the end, it speaks of “the conclusion”, it is referring to the formal execution. Considered as a whole, that provision must therefore be understood as meaning that following conclusion of the agreement in the prescribed period, namely between 16 December and 15 February, the da te on which the period of storage begins to run may not be prior to the “formal execution”.The defendant, for its part, observes that the function of the storage contract is to create reciprocal obligations between the producer, who untertakes to store a certain quantity of table wine and not to place it on the market for a certain period, on the one hand, and the intervention agency, on the other, which undertakes to pay the prescribed aid, after establishing that the conditions relating thereto are fulfilled.In this connexion the first subparagraph of Article 8 (1) of Regulation No 1437/70 must be construed as meaning that the reciprocal obligations of both contracting parties come into being at the moment when the contract is formally concluded, after the intervention agency has carried out all the prescribed checks.The defendant points out that, before the formal conclusion of the contract, the producer who applies for it, is not yet certain that the intervention agency will conclude the contract; in those circumstances, he may freely dispose of his product. Cases are not uncommon where the producer in fact sells his wine during the period between the submission of the application and the date fixed for the formal conclusion of the contract. The intervention agency, for its part, enjoys a certain discretion concerning the verification of the conditions which must be fulfilled under the Community regulations applicable.For those reasons the defendant considers in the first place that it can rule out the theory put forward by the applicant to the effect that the storage contract is a unilateral contract. However, even if the theory of a bilateral contract is adopted, the distinction suggested by the applicant between the “conclusion” and the “formal execution” of the contract is not acceptable. Indeed, the manifestation of the two parties' intentions can occur only when the contract is formally executed, because it is only from that moment on that the contracting parties are bound to observe their respective obligations.Furthermore, the defendant observes that the provisions of Article 9 (1) and of Article 12 of Regulation No 1437/70 show that the formal execution of the contract in writing is an essential part of the system established by that regulation. Moreover, acceptance of the applicant's argument would have the illogical consequence of compelling AIMA to bestow a gratuitous benefit upon the producer, since, pursuant to Article 15 of Regulation No 1437/70, AIMA would then have had to pay the quarterly instalments from the day on which the application was submitted, even if the contracts had been executed several months later.The defendant states further that it had decided, by the adoption of Regulation No 176/72, to grant a derogation from the rule in the first subparagraph of Article 8 (1) of Regulation No 1437/70, having regard to the assertion by the Italian authorities that they were not in a position to carry out immediately the verifications required for the conclusion of the contracts, and also for the reasons stated in the preamble to Regulation No 176/72. Since the latter is a Commission regulation, it clearly cannot derogate from the basic regulation of the Council. The possibility of retroactive effect can therefore in no way affect the need to comply with Article 5 (5) of Regulation No 816/70 of the Council, which stipulates 15 February as the final date for the formal conclusion of the contract.The defendant states that Regulation No 176/72 provided for a legal fiction in the sense that it dissociated the time, at which the contract was formally concluded from that at which it took effect, bringing the latter forward to the time at which the application was received, whilst limiting the retroactivity to not more than 30 days. If the applicant's interpretation were accepted Regulation No 176/72 would cease to serve any purpose. If, indeed, the view were taken that the contract was “concluded” on the submission of the application, independently of the subsequent execution of a formal contract, it would not have been necessary to provide for such a derogation.With regard to the term “conclusion of the contract”, the applicant states in its reply that a margin of discretion on the part of the intervention agency in verifying the conditions required for the conclusion of the contract is inconceivable. Moreover, even if it were accepted that the verification must precede the conclusion of the contract, instead of being intended as a condition subsequent of a contract already concluded, in practice such verification was carried out immediately after the submission of the application by the provincial agricultural inspectorate, acting on behalf of AIMA.Under the contractual scheme adopted by the Community regulations, the concurrence of the parties' intentions, which, under Article 1326 of the Italian Civil Code, of itself determines the conclusion of the contract, occurs when the application from the producer reaches the intervention agency or, at the latest, when it is established by that agency that the application complies with the legal conditions. In the cases in question, those dates were prior to 15 February.In its rejoinder, the defendant maintains that in the system established by the Community rules the formal conclusion of the storage contract between the producer and the competent intervention agency constitutes the essential condition for the grant of aid.
(c)The purpose of the regulations in question
The applicant recalls that the objective of the Community regulations is to withdraw from the market surplus quantities of wine, by virtue of the storage commitment which the producers assume, when the greatest surplus appears, namely between 16 December and 15 February, and for a minimum period of nine months, that is to say until the new wine harvest. It emphasizes that that aim was fully achieved in the case in question.In fact, in the 1971/72 wine-growing year in Italy, the producers submitted their applications and undertook to store their produce well before 15 February 1972, even if the execution of formal contracts, which determined the beginning of the period of storage, took place after some months' delay.On the one hand, the producers were obliged to store their produce for a much longer period than that laid down by the Community regulations, since Regulation No 176/72 does not allow their contracts to be back-dated by more than one month. On the other hand, the longer withdrawal of the product from the market certainly helped to stabilize prices. If, in the final analysis, AIMA had not concluded the storage contracts with the producers, the aim of the regulations would not have been achieved, and the adoption of Regulation No 176/72 would have served no purpose.In interpreting the Community regulations excessive formalism, which distorts their scope and their effects, must therefore be avoided.As regards the achievement of the objectives of the Community regulations, the defendant asserts that the argument put forward by the applicant is untenable. It points out that, as the inspections carried out by the Fund clearly indicated, the contracts for the 1971/72 wine-growing year were concluded with considerable delays, which in some cases even extended beyond the normal period of validity of nine months, reckoning from 15 February 1972. During those delays the applicant producers considered that they were free to market their products, which they in fact did in certain cases. Such a situation is likely to prejudice the attainment of the objective of the regulations in question.Finally, the situation created by the conduct of AIMA certainly did not promote the additional function of the storage contracts, which consists in ensuring accurate knowledge of the market with a view to new measures of intervention.
(d)The alleged breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation
Finally, the applicant relies, in the alternative, on the judgments of 7 February 1979, in which the Court stated that the rules of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 must be interpreted as meaning that the Commission is bound to charge to the Fund expenditure incurred by Member States in a manner which did not comply with the Community rules as a result of an erroneous interpretation thereof, when the incorrect application of Community law is attributable to an institution of the Community (Case 11/76 Netherlands v Commission [1979] ECR 245, and Case 18/76 Federal Republic of Germany v Commission [1979] ECR 343).In this regard, the applicant claims that it was the lack of clarity of the Community regulations which gave rise to the difficulties. The problem of the damage incurred by producers as a result of the foreseeable delay in the execution of a formal contract, which gave rise to the adoption of Regulation No 176/72, is closely linked with AIMA's belief that the period of storage begins to run when the formal contract is executed and not from the date when the contract is concluded.By enacting Regulation No 176/72 the Commission adopted the view taken by AIMA, with which it was perfectly familiar. If AIMA's conception was based on an incorrect interpretation of the Community regulations, the Commission should have requested AIMA to alter the procedure followed and to “execute formal contracts” before 15 February.By reason both of the imperfect wording of the Community rules and in view of the confirmation, implied at least, of AIMA's interpretation by the Commission, that allegedly incorrect interpretation must be deemed to be attributable to the Community institutions.The defendant states that it never supported, even by implication, a view which was different from the one which it is defending in this case. It authorized the derogation contained in Regulation No 176/72 fully aware that the final date for the conclusion of the contracts was 15 February 1972.Furthermore, the derogations previously authorized for the 1970/71 winegrowing year, as formulated in Regulation (EEC) No 436/71 of the Commission of 26 February 1971 (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1971 (I), p. 101) and Regulation (EEC) No 617/71 of the Commission of 24 March 1971 (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1971 (I), p. 165) plainly reveal the clear distinction made between the application by the producer and the conclusion of the contract. The provisions of those regulations show that AIMA could not be unaware of the Commission's view on that matter.
IV —The parties presented oral argument at the sitting on 15 October 1980.
The Advocate General delivered his opinion at the sitting on 16 December 1980.
Decision
Costs
Operative part
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