law://eu/cjeu/1978/c-7-78/hd_1_1_2_1@2026-11-16The appellants point out that the coins exported were sixpences, shillings, florins and half-crowns. All but the latter were still current legal tender, but were no longer in circulation as such. They had been withdrawn by private persons who, since the value of their silver content so greatly exceeded their face value, freely traded them in the United Kingdom at prices matching the market value of their silver content. The silver coins the subject of the criminal charges in the indictment had all been obtained from numerous residents in the United Kingdom, by means of lawful advertisement and offer in a periodical circulating in the United Kingdom. The Government in the United Kingdom had taken no measures to prevent or even discourage such a trade. No system existed initiated or approved by the Government whereby a citizen could obtain from the Government the value of the silver content of the coins. The Royal Mint which is in effect the Government Department responsible for these matters will buy all these silver alloy coins at face value only. The silver alloy coins exported from the United Kingdom were sold to the German company AGOSI at the prevailing market price of their silver content.The price at which Krugerrands were delivered to one of the appellants was determined by the market price at which these coins then lawfully and freely circulated in Germany. Throughout the period covered by the charges in the indictment and to the present time, Krugerrands lawfully and freely circulate in the United Kingdom at prices determined by a free market in common with all other gold coins whatever the country of origin and date of origin. Krugerrands may be imported into the United Kingdom by any person or corporation licensed for this purpose by the Government of the United Kingdom. A Government Department determines the time at which such licence shall be effective and the nature and quantity of the coins to be imported. No restriction is thereafter placed on the trading in the coins in the United Kingdom which can be undertaken by that person or corporation. The United Kingdom coins concerned in this case may be exported from the United Kingdom by any person or corporation licensed for this purpose by the Government of the United Kingdom. The Department of the Government determines the time at which such licence shall be effective and the quantity of coins to be exported.Section 10 of the Coinage Act 1971 enables the courts in the United Kingdom exercising criminal jurisdiction to act against any person who melts down or breaks up any metal coin which is current in the United Kingdom or which has been current in the United Kingdom at any date after the 16 May 1969. (All the silver alloy coins concerned in this case were within this definition). In the period in question they would also be able to act against any persons who conspired to commit such offences outside the territory of the United Kingdom, provided, as in this case, some acts of the conspirators were carried out in the United Kingdom (Director of Public Prosecution v Doot, 1973, A. C. 807)Dealings in gold currency in the United Kingdom, or outside the United Kingdom by United Kingdom residents are subjected to controls by the Exchange Control hex 1947.The appellants submit that Questions 1 and 2 posed for the Court cannot be answered ‘in principle’ since the status of the coins depends on the transactions to which they are subject. Question 3 required the Court to consider Part Two, Title Three of the Treaty before considering Part Two, Title One. They submit further that it is more convenient for the Court, to examine-the questions raised on this Appeal in the following order: (a) Articles 30 to 35, (b) Article 36, (a) Capital. These submissions are made having regard, first, to the nature and extent of the criminal charges preferred against the appellants under the domestic legislation of the United Kingdom, namely, that the appellants were trading in ‘goods’ and, secondly, to the concession made in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) by the Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the Respondents to the Appeal, Her Majesty's Commissioners of Customs and Excise, and accepted by the Court set out in the Judgment as follows:‘This Solicitor-General conceded that, if coins of the kind in question are properly to be regarded as goods to which Title One of Part Two of the Treaty (of Rome) applies, the prohibitions imposed invalidate the relevant restriction unless they can be justified under Article 36 …’The relevant United Kingdom legislation in respect of the importation of goods arises from an Act of Parliament dated 1939. The order giving authority for the issue of licences to import goods is dated 1954. General licences were subsequently issued until 15 April 1975 when it became unlawful by this domestic law to import goods of the class concerned in this case and other gold items except under the authority of a licence. It will be noticed that the Common Customs Tariff nomenclature and numbering is used for all the items. The relevant United Kingdom legislation in respect of the exportation of goods also arises from the Act of Parliament of 1939. The Order giving authority for the issue of licences to export goods is dated 1970. General Licences were issued subsequently until 15 July 1974, when it became unlawful by this domestic legislation to export ‘goods’ of the class concerned in this case except under the authority of a licence.The Community law by which such purported prohibitions must be judged is found, in the first place, in Article 42 of the Act of Accession annexed to the Treaty of Accession of 22 January 1972, which provides:‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and exports shall, as from the date of accession, be abolished between the Community as originally established and the new Member States and between the new Member States themselves.Measures having equivalent effect to such restrictions shall be abolished by 1 January 1975 at the latest’.It follows that, as from the dates specified in Article 42, quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and measures of equivalent effect must be justified, if at all, by some provision of Community law applicable to the present case.In order to apply Article 42 of the Act of Accession, it is necessary to have regard to Articles 30 to 37 of the EEC Treaty dealing with the same matters. Those Articles are in principle applicable in and to the United Kingdom (Article 2 of the Act of Accession) subject only to any special provisions in the Act of Accession. Also, Articles 30 to 37 have to be read in the light of the EEC Treaty as a whole, including Articles 3 (a), 5 and 9 and also Articles 67 to 73, 103, 108 and 109. Having regard to all the relevant provisions and to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the appellants submit that: (a) the transactions involved were the movement of goods; (b) the prohibitions involved were quantitative restrictions; (c) the prohibitions were quantitative restrictions which violated Article 42 of the Act of Accession and Articles 30, 31 and 34 of the EEC Treaty; (d) those articles have direct effect and prohibitions which violate them are legally invalid.The word ‘goods’ is not used in Article 42 of the Act of Accession or in Articles 30, 31 (first sentence) or 34 of the Treaty. But it is clear that the word should be read into those provisions, having regard to the Articles 3 (a) and 9 and the wording of Tide One of Part Two of the Treaty. The appellants refer to the definition of goods in Case 7/68, Commission v Italy:‘By goods, within the meaning of Article 9, there must be understood products which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial transactions’.Both the pre-1947 silver alloy coins and the Krugerrands were valued in money terms by the parties to the transactions. Such coins, notwithstanding that they may be legal tender (respectively, in the United Kingdom and South Africa), have a separate value as goods within the commercial transactions, a price determined by market forces, including supply and demand.The Community's Common Customs Tariff shows that gold and silver and coins are recognised prima facie as being the subject of transactions to which that tariff applies (Regulation No 2500/77, Official Journal 1289 — headings 71.05, 72.01 and 99.05). For the purpose of applying the Common Customs Tariff, Regulation No 803/68 provides that the value of goods is taken to be:‘the normal price, that is to say, the price which they would fetch … on a sale in the open market between a buyer and a seller independent of each other’.These provisions reflect the fact, illustrated by the present case, that gold and silver coins do have a value on an open market as goods which form the subject of commercial transactions. Furthermore, the prohibitions to which the present case relates were orders for the control of the import and export of ‘goods’, the charges in the present case refer specifically to the import and export of ‘goods’, as do the Act of Parliament, the orders and licensing systems under which these charges were preferred.Thus the relevant Treaty provisions prohibit quantitative restrictions which were in effect on the date of accession and those which are introduced thereafter. The revocation of the Open General Licences with effect, respectively from 16 April 1975 (import) and 15 July 1974 (export) created new quantitative restrictions as from those dates. After the date of accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC on 1 January 1973 the importation of gold coins was freely permitted between 5 July 1973 and 16 April 1975. Similarly the export of all coins from the United Kingdom was freely permitted from the date of accession to 15 July 1974. These then can only be regarded as quantitative restrictions rather than measures having equivalent effect. According to the well-established principles of Community law relating to the direct effect and the supremacy of Community law, national courts should not apply national provisions which are incompatible with Community law. Article 42 of the Act of Accession and Articles 30, 31 (first sentence) and 34 are all covered by those fundamental principles of Community law. The provisions impose a clear and precise obligation on the Member States; they are unconditional; and they do not call for supplementary implementing legislation (at least after the end of the Community's original transitional period — cf. Submissions of Advocate General Mayras in Van Duyn v Home Office — Case 41/74; Salgoil v Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade — Case 13/68).As to Article 36 of the Treaty the appellants submitted:(i) The onus of justifying the prohibitions particularly by reference to Article 36 of the EEC Treaty rests on the Government of the United Kingdom.(ii) The prohibitions were not necessary for any of the purposes specified in Article 36.(iii) If the prohibitions related to the enforcement of United Kingdom criminal law relating to British coinage, it was a purpose which should have been pursued by regulation at the Community level or, if it might validly have been pursued at the national level, it should have been pursued through the amendment and/or regular enforcement of the criminal law and not by hindering the free movement of goods.(iv) If the purpose of the prohibitions related to the protection of economic interests of the United Kingdom, the prohibitions could not be justified by reference to Article 36.(v) If the purpose of the prohibitions related to the protection of the United Kingdom balance of payments, it should have been pursued through use of the Treaty provisions relating to the balance of payment problems.The prohibitions in question include, in the first place, the two Acts of Parliament, the Act of 1939 and the Customs and Excise Act of 1952, under which the prosecution was brought. These are general in form. Neither of these acts could be expected to, or in fact does, encompass or envisage the principles governing the Treaty or the Act of Accession. The orders which are similarly general in form and which are made under the authority of the first Act of Parliament and are dated respectively 1954 and 1970 similarly cannot be expected to encompass or envisage the principles governing the Treaty or the Act of Accession. It is difficult to see how these acts, orders, or licences subsequently issued could conceivably be justified on any of the grounds envisaged by Article 36. The prohibitions in question include, secondly, the revocations of the general licences in respect of coins.The only ground in Article 36 which it is necessary to consider in relation to these prohibitions is the ground of ‘public policy’ since this is the sole justification put forward by the Government of the United Kingdom for invoking Article 36. The term ‘public policy’ has not been defined by United Kingdom legislation. It has been used by United Kingdom courts to justify the restriction of any activity which might be thought to be contrary to the general welfare of society. The United Kingdom acceded to the Treaty without securing any redefinition of the term as it appears in the original texts. The appellants rely on the fact that all the language texts of the Treaty are equally authentic. (Article 248 of the Treaty and Article 160 of the Act of Accession). The French and German equivalent of ‘public policy’ are ‘ordre publique’ and ‘offentliche Ordnung’. Neither has the same wide meaning traditionally given to the phrase in the United Kingdom. The appellants also rely on the fact that the same words are now in Article 48 (3) and 56 (1) of the Treaty, where the same meaning ought to be given to them. They should be narrowly as well as strictly interpreted. They refer to Case 41/74, Van Duyn.The appellants submit that that which the prohibitions and restrictions permitted under Article 36 have in common is that they are intended to protect substantial national interests which are shared by all Member States, which can more appropriately be protected at the national rather than the Community level, which can be protected without any distortion of trade or discrimination against other Member States, and which cannot reasonably be protected by some means other than a prohibition or restriction on imports or exports. It would follow that the phrase ‘public policy’ cannot have been intended to be a phrase to cover any other policy interests of a Member State beyond those listed in the rest of the article. The French and German versions of the phrase should be preferred, since they make it clear that the phrase is intended to refer to the public order of the State, an interest in protecting the political and social structure of the State which is shared by all the Member States. The phrase could not cover specific economic interests of a particular Member State which must be protected, if at all, through the use of the many other provisions, relating to economic matters (cf. Commission v Italy — Case 7/61).The Government of the United Kingdom seeks to justify the importation prohibition on the ground of preventing a drain on its balance of payments. It is difficult to see how such a ground could conceivably be covered by the ‘public policy’ exception in Article 36. In the case Commission v Italy 7/61, the Court said:‘Article 36, as distinct from Article 226, is directed to eventualities of a non-economic kind which are not liable to prejudice the principles laid down by Articles 30 to 34 as the last sentence of the article confirms’.There were no circumstances existing at the relevant time which could justify the Government of the United Kingdom's imposing any unilateral restrictions or prohibitions on imports of Krugerrands, or would require (whether of its own volition or at the request of the United Kingdom Government) the Commission's undertaking investigation or action under Article 108. It is not claimed by the Government of the United Kingdom that such circumstances existed, nor was it the action undertaken under Article 109 or Article 135 of the Act of Accession. It would threaten to undermine the general structure of the Treaty and the principles on which the customs union of the Member States was founded if it were open to any Member State to take unilateral measures (possibly undisclosed to other Member States) in derogation from the principle of the free movement of goods, and if it were able subsequently to justify these measures by unverifiabie reference to the protection of its balance of payments.Question 4 (a) (ii) raises a wholly social consideration, the merits or demerits of which are wholly irrelevant to a proper consideration of the extent of Article 36. It cannot be right to allow weight to be given to an attitude which is wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the Treaty. This is particularly so when a lawful and free market exists within the United Kingdom for trade in silver and gold coins whether of domestic or foreign manufacture. It must plainly be an ‘arbitrary discrimination’ for one Member State to prohibit a trade in such articles with other Member States but to permit such a trade within its own boundaries.As to Question 4 (b) (i) the supply of current coins in the United Kingdom lies wholly within the control of the Government and the silver alloy coins had been out of circulation for many years. This was not the purpose stated publicly in the United Kingdom by the Government when the prohibition was in introduced. It cannot apply to some of the coins namely the half-crowns, since they have not been legal tender from a date prior to the introduction of decimalization in 1971, and after 16 May 1969. There is and has been no shortage in the United Kingdom of current coin, either in fact or claimed.As to Question 4 (b) (ii) the appellants submit that it cannot have been the object of the Treaty to provide a Member State with the legal means of acquiring an economic advantage by requiring that the value of an article should accrue to the State rather than to an individual. If it is acceptable that trade in articles whatever their source or their original valuation within a Member State should be controlled by the domestic legislation of that State, then a failure to exercise that control should not permit the State to restrict or prohibit trade between residents of different Member States. The restriction or prohibition on trade between individuals in Member States on the grounds that a Member State might at some unspecified time in the future introduce domestic legislation requiring the surrender by residents of that State of coin current in that State could not justify action under Article 36.As to Question 4 (b) (iii), assuming that the effect of Section 10 of the Coinage Act 1971, which creates the relevant offence, is related to acts committed within the United Kingdom it is apparent that the provision could be amended to cover acts committed abroad. Principles of public international law concerning criminal jurisdiction would not prevent or inhibit the assumption of jurisdiction over such acts. United Kingdom law already includes many such instances, namely the Exchange Control Act 1947. The assumption of jurisdiction over an offence of this nature committed abroad would not, in the appellants' submission, constitute a restriction on trade for the purposes of the Treaty at least so far as it related to current coinage. On the other hand, to use a general export ban as the method for achieving such a purpose involves a direct restriction of trade. It also goes far beyond the achievement of the specific purpose, in that it covers the export of coins for the purposes other than physical destruction, that is to say, export in the normal course of trade. For all these reasons the appellants submit that the prohibition involved in the present case cannot properly be justified by reference to Article 36.So far as the appellants are aware the Court has not had occasion to define the expression ‘movement of capital’ used in the Treaty. The expression should be interpreted in the light of the wording and purpose of the provisions in which it is used and the place of those provisions in the overall structure of the Treaty, and also in the light of the implementation of the provisions by the institutions of the Community. It is apparent that coins are capable of being used as means of payment, or as part of a barter deal, or as goods bought and sold for a price, or as a form of investment asset. Secondly, it must be the circumstances of any given transaction which determine the particular role which coins are playing in that transaction. Thirdly, it is probable that the EEC Treaty will contain provisions affecting coins in all four different roles, to the extent that such provisions are necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market. Accordingly, the Treaty provisions applicable to a transaction involving coins will depend on the nature and circumstances of the transaction. The appellants submit that it is possible to form a view as to the ‘movement of capital’ covered by Articles 67 to 73, in the first place, by elimination of transactions covered by other provisions. Such other transactions would include the movement of goods and current payments connected with the movement of goods, service, capital or persons — those transactions being dealt with in the Treaty in a form which makes it clear that they are themselves distinguishable from the ‘movements of capital’. The transactions involved in the present case are properly included in such other transactions. It is further submitted that it cannot have been the intention of the Treaty to submit products which in practice may be traded as goods to the application of other sections of the Treaty, (particularly those whose operations after the transitional period has finished are unclear and unresolved).The meaning of ‘movements of capital’ for present purposes may be found with the assistance of acts of Community institutions implementing the Treaty provisions. Such acts cannot be a conclusive interpretation of the Treaty, but they provide useful guidance as to the interpretation given to the provisions by the institutions and by the Member States. In the First Directive for the implementation of Article 67 (11 May 1960; consolidated version, as amended by the Second Directive, in Official Journal No 62 of 1963), List D of Annex I includes the item —‘Physical import and export of financial assets’referring to item XIII in the Nomenclature in Annex II —‘XIII Import and export of financial assets.A. Securities (not included under TV) and means of payment of every kind.B. Gold’.The appellants submit that the words ‘Financial assets’ indicate the kind of transactions to which these provisions relate. So far as they relate to coins, they are concerned with the coins used as assets, that is to say, not with coins when they are being transferred as goods. The expression ‘means of payment’ in Item XIII, is used as a generic term to describe the objects in question (‘moyens de paiement’) not to identify the nature of the transaction in which they are used. This classification can therefore have reference only to the transfer of assets in circumstances where none of the features of trade exist. Otherwise the directive would permit a very substantial derogation from the principles of free trade set out in Articles 30 to 36 in respect of any of the items containing gold set out in items 71.07, 71.08 and 99.05 of the C.C.T. and possibly in respect of any goods which might be described within the wide phrase ‘means of payment of every kind’. The appellants rely on a statement contained in a Commission Memorandum of March 1969 —‘Free movement of capital is necessary for the achievement of a number of objectives included in, or implied by, the Treaty (steady and balanced expansion throughout the Community, freedom of establishment, equality of conditions of competition among firms, development of an industrial policy and advances in industrial combination)’.(Bulletin of the European Communities, May 1969, p. 21).This statement places the ‘movement of capital’ provisions in a context which is quite different from the unambiguous commercial character of the transactions involved in the present case. The appellants further rely on the indisputable fact that all the prohibitions in question were not, in substance or in form, controls on the movement of capital. They were created and applied wholly within the context of the import and export of goods. It is not material to this question that those exported were by the domestic law protected from destruction or that some were legal tender within the United Kingdom. These considerations throw no light on the question whether they were being dealt with as goods or capital.Finally, if, contrary to the above submission, the Court should consider that there was an element of ‘movement of capital’ in the transactions involved in the present case, the appellants respectfully suggest that the Court should now hold that Article 67 has direct effect to the extent that the items in this case have a dual function as ‘goods’ and as ‘capital’. Having regard to a series of decisions of the Court (Reyners — Case 2/74, Commission v France — Case 67/73, Van Binsbergen — Case 33/74, Defrenne — Case 43/75), there would seem to be ground for holding that, since the end of the transitional period, Article 67 cannot have become defunct and must have some direct effect, imposing some obligation on the Member States which cannot simply be ignored. The expression ‘to the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Market’ makes the determination of the extent of the direct effect difficult and means that that extent may change as the Common Market develops, but it cannot deprive the provision of all obligatory effect.
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