law://eu/cjeu/1978/c-257-78/hd_1_1_3_2@2026-11-21In its statement of defence the Commission replies with regard to the first argument that the interpretation given by the applicant to Article 4 (1) (a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, is far from being in accordance with the case-law of the Court but, on the contrary, runs counter to it. Whilst according to the judgment in the Airola case (judgment of 20 February 1975, Case 21/74 [1975] ECR 221), the fact that a nationality is imposed upon a female official on her marriage without it being possible for her to renounce it, although she has retained her nationality of origin by virtue of an express declaration, cannot result in the loss of the expatriation allowance, the judgment delivered on the same day in the Van den Broeck case (supra) qualifies the matter. Where a wife is able to renounce the nationality acquired by marriage and does not do so, there are no reasons associated with equal treatment why the nationality which was acquired on marriage should not be taken into account in applying the first indent of Article 4 (1) (a) in Annex VII to the Staff Regulations.The applicant's argument is also incompatible with Article 4 (3) of Annex VII (which came into force with retroactive effect from 1 July 1972 by virtue of Articles 21 and 35 of Regulation No 912/78 of 2 May 1978, Official Journal L 119, p. 1) which provides, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, that, for the purposes of the provisions which govern the conditions for granting the expatriation allowance, it is only where a female official has by marriage ‘automatically acquired and cannot renounce the nationality of the State in whose territory she is employed’ that she may be considered not to have that nationality. The applicant's argument goes beyond the intention of the Community legislature which was to follow the case-law established by the judgment in the Van den Broeck case referred to above, and infringes Article 4 (3) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations.In the applicant's view her British nationality, which is her nationality of origin, should, for the purpose of applying the provisions concerning the expatriation allowance, take precedence over the Belgian nationality which has been acquired by marriage but she has submitted no argument in support of that opinion although legal writings and national case-law concerning the determination, where dual nationality is held, of which nationality is to be considered as ‘effective’ or ‘dominant’ would lead to preference being given in her case to the Belgian nationality.As far as the second argument is concerned, the defendant first recalls that Article 4 (1) (b) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations provides that the expatriation allowance shall be paid in particular to officials who are nationals of the State in whose territory the place where they are employed is situated but who ‘during the ten years ending at the date of their entering the service habitually resided outside the European territory of that State for reasons other than the performance of duties in the service of a State or of an international organization’. The Commission maintains that according to that provision the requirement of residence in a different country in order to be able to claim the expatriation allowance must have the following characteristics: (1) it must have been habitual; (2) it must have been for a period of ten years; (3) it must have been for reasons concerned with the performance of duties in the service of a State or of an international organization.The Commission concludes that none of those conditions is fulfilled in the present case since between 1967 and 1971 the applicant resided in Belgium, the country of which she has been a national since her marriage, between 1971 and 1972 she resided in Italy whilst in the service of the Communities and between 1971 and 1974 she resided in Saudi Arabia whilst working for a regional office of the United Nations.As to the third argument, based on the infringement of the rule which compels the defendant to give compensation for the damage due to the wrongful act, which it is said to have committed, the Commission contends that in the present case there has been no wrongful act, no damage, and no causal connexion between its conduct and the alleged damage.As to the wrongful act, the case-law of the Court, especially the judgments of 28 May 1970 (Joined Cases 19, 20, 25 and 30/69, Richez-Parise and Others [1970] ECR 325) and 9 July 1970 (Case 23/79 Fiehn [1970] ECR 547) states that apart from the exceptional instance, the adoption of an incorrect interpretation does not constitute in itself a wrongful act. The applicant fails to explain why the fact that the expatriation allowance was paid by mistake should constitute an exceptional instance of a wrongful act; on the contrary, the officers of the Commission realized their error in less than two months and rectified it immediately.As to the alleged damage and the causal connexion the defendant maintains that the applicant took out the loan with the Beamtenheimstättenwerk at least four months after being notified of the withdrawal of the expatriation allowance, so that any financial difficulties connected with repayment of the loan cannot have been caused by the defendant's conduct, even if that conduct should be considered as wrongful which the Commission denies.
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