law://eu/cjeu/1978/c-138-78/hd_1_1_2_2@2026-11-17Mr Stöking refers in this connexion to the arguments set out in the order making the reference (see under heading I above).According to the German Government, the method of calculation laid down for the co-responsibility levy does not infringe the prohibition on discrimination laid down in Article 40 (3) of the EEC Treaty. That provision imposes upon the Community legislature the obligation to use a fair criterion for the calculation of the burden, that is to say a criterion which is neither subjective nor arbitrar).Even having regard to the general situation of the respective exchange rates, unequal treatment of producers in the Member States is impossible. A ‘higher’ burden of levy in a country with a strong currency is accompanied by a correspondingly higher price paid for milk, since the conversion into national currency of the target price for milk fixed in units of account is also carried out on the basis of the green rates. For a country with a weak currency, the lower price for milk is accompanied by a lesser charge to tax.Therefore the third question does not require an answer.The Council considers that Question 2 must be answered in the negative, and that Question 3 is therefore purposeless.All intervention measures, of which the co-responsibility levy forms an integral part, are subject to the system of the socalled green exchange rates. That system is applicable to agriculture generally. To apply another system of conversion to the co-responsibility levy would represent a discrimination.The Commission observes that the level of the guaranteed prices, which is variable owing to the application of the so-called green exchange rates laid down in Regulation No 878/77 Official Journal 1977 L 106, p. 27(), affects the income of producers in the Member States. This is especially true in sectors such as that of milk in particular, in which due to the existence of a surplus the market level is determined to a large extent by the guaranteed prices.In such a situation it would be economically paradoxical to allow producers in countries with strong currencies to benefit from the advantages of the favourable rate of exchange by the expedients of guaranteed prices, aids and refunds, whilst on the other hand taking the day-to-day rates as the basis for the fixing of the negative component of prices, namely the co-responsibility levy. The converse is true of producers in Member States with weak currencies.The Commission considers that in the present case there is equality of treatment for practical purposes. Indeed formal equality of treatment applied to variable situations of fact would constitute inequality of treatment, and would consequently have to be deemed discriminatory (Case 13/63 [1963] ECR 165, at pp. 177/178).There is no longer any need to answer Question 3.
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