law://eu/cjeu/1977/c-90-77/hd_1_1_3_2@2026-11-19Stimming argues that the Commission acted illegally and was also guilty of wrongful conduct in the exercise of its duties.Article 7 of Regulation No 425/77 enables the defendant to adopt transitional measures in particular cases of hardship. In such cases the defendant also has a duty where necessary to use the power vested in it to adopt regulations, when it is a question of ensuring the observance of the principles of protection of the legitimate expectation of those concerned, of proportionality and of equality of treatment.Alternatively, the claim for compensation for damage is based on the general principle of the protection of the legitimate expectation of those concerned, which requires adequate transitional periods, particularly in the case of amendment of tariff classifications. This follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice.The adequacy of the transitional period is to be assessed in the particular circumstances of each case. In this instance, a transitional period of nine months is absolutely necessary, as that was provided for in principle by Article 7 of Regulation No 425/77.The amendment of tariff heading 16.02 B III (b) 1 of the CCT could not have been foreseen by the applicant. It placed reliance, as it was entitled to do, on the official ruling as to tariff classification as well as on the Common Customs Tariff itself.Furthermore, both the recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 425/77 and Article 7 thereof show that there was no overriding public interest which required that transitional measures should not be granted in respect of the contracts which had been entered into. Marinated meat is not a commodity which is produced ad hoc but is wellknown as such, and it is also not possible to substitute marinated meat for meat within heading 02.01 of the CCT, a substitution which Regulation No 425/77 is designed to prevent according to the recitals in the preamble.Regulation No 425/77 infringed the binding effected under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A significant restriction on goods within bound tariff heading 16.02 B III (b) required approval within GATT or partial withdrawal of the binding.The taxes on marinated meat are excessive and have an absolutely prohibitive effect; for that reason they infringe both the provisions of Articles 39 and 110 of the EEC Treaty and the principles of proportionality and nondiscrimination. In the context of the common organization of the market in beef and veal, the institutions of the Community have failed to follow concurrently the objectives laid down in Articles 39 and 110 of the EEC Treaty; what is more, in the common policy on beef and veal they have concentrated on the aim of increasing the individual earnings of the agricultural community (Article 39 (1) (b) of the EEC Treaty) and have hence given up all freedom of action and any possibility of pursuing the other objectives in both the short and the long term.The second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty provides that the Community shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions. The damage may also be made good in kind, this being a general principle common to the laws of the Member States.According to the defendant, the action has no foundation in law.The provisions adopted by the Council cannot be changed by the defendant. They are as binding for the defendant as for third parties. If the applicant challenges the legality of the levy system enacted by Regulation No 425/77, the Council, an autonomous legislative institution of the Community, and not the Commission, is responsible for the legality of legislation adopted by it.The rules of the levy system of Regulation No 805/68 as amended by Regulation No 425/77 lay a duty on the defendant to carry out arithmetical calculations on the basis of prescribed criteria. Those rules do not allow it to grant certain importers particular individual advantages in the form of personal exemption from levies.Article 17 of Regulation No 805/68 as amended by Regulation No 425/77 provides that that regulation ‘shall be applied with due regard to the obligations under international agreements by which the Community is bound’. The obligations entered into under GATT are among the obligations referred to in the said article.However no provision of GATT gives the applicant a right to import goods free of levy which can be directly enforced against the defendant. The applicant was unable to specify which rule of GATT was concerned.The binding of subheading of 16.02 B III (b) 1 is an old binding which concerns only preserved beef and veal, particularly corned beef, as well as preparations of beef and veal consisting of cooked meat. The original decision formally to extend the conventional rate to all products falling within subheading 16.02 B III (b) 1 was a unilateral concession by the Community which has been progressively withdrawn since 1975 by the adoption of protective measures.Article 7 of Regulation No 425/77 gives the defendant a margin of discretion for reasons of administrative convenience. The criterion of the protection of legitimate expectation obliges the defendant to adopt particular transitional measures only if the existence or performance of legal obligations between traders is immediately and unforeseeably jeopardized in the absence of any overriding public interest requiring it. Such was not the case in this instance.Explaining the background to the subject-matter (items 5 and 6 of the defence), the defendant states that the gap in the external protection of the market in beef and veal which was due to the formal distinction between fresh meat within tariff heading 02.01 and prepared meat within tariff subheading 16.02 B III (b) 1 was closed by means of protective measures adopted two years ago. On its own admission, the applicant had imported a consignment of Romanian marinated meat, which was to serve as a test of the market, under the linking system laid down by Regulation No 76/76, which already made the issue of the import licences required for each product within subheading 16.02 B III (b) 1 conditional upon prior purchase of intervention meat. Although from a purely formal point of view it did not have to pay a levy on that occasion, it did make payment of a de facto levy which was incorporated in the price paid to the intervention agency prior to the acquisition of the indispensable import licence. That price was deliberately fixed at a higher level so as to recover the amounts of levy which were not directly charged for procedural reasons.Not only did the levy system laid down by Regulation No 425/77 not entail any profound material alteration in the conditions of importation, but its adaption was also foreseeable. No one could expect the Council to re-open a gap that the defendant had closed after two years of effort.A prudent and well-informed trader would either have made certain of obtaining at the right time a sufficient number of licences issued within the framework of the protective measure, or before entering into important contracts to be performed after 1 April 1977 he would have waited for the conditions of the import system then applicable to be fixed with certainty. Details of the entry into force on 1 April 1977 of the new provisions for the current levy system were communicated at the right time by Regulation No 3117/76 (Official Journal 1976 L 352, p. 14).By its legal nature an official ruling as to tariff classification does not contain any guarantee as to the nature or the amount of the charges levied on imports of products coming within the tariff heading concerned. As a matter of principle the defendant is not responsible for rulings of that kind, which are supplied by a national administrative authority. Furthermore, the ruling cited by the applicant was two years old when the applicant entered into the contract at issue.The defendant contends that the applicant is seeking to avoid application of the import system by inventing the product, namely a kind of ‘marinated meat’ ready for cooking, and to use the price advantages thus obtained to induce consumers to buy its goods in preference to normal roasting meat. Thus the applicant is seeking to do precisely what the contested obligation to pay levy was designed to preventThe defendant is not obliged by the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation to grant the exemption from levy claimed by the applicant. Consequendy it is not under an obligation to compensate the applicant.In its reply, the applicant argues that if the regulation at issue is partially illegal, the Commission is also liable on the ground that Article 1 (1) (a) and Article 9 were inserted in Regulation No 425/77 only on its proposal.Article 17 of Regulation No 805/68 provided nothing different from Article 10 of Regulation No 2759/75 on the common organization of the market in pigmeat (Official Journal 1975 L 282, p. 1), according to which ‘for products … in respect of which the rate of duty has been bound within GATT, the levies shall be limited to the amount resulting from that binding’.It is not necessary to mention specific GATT rules, since binding under GATT is the subject of the combined provisions of Regulation No 805/68 and the Common Customs Tariff.The defendant now wishes to put on the tariff heading an interpretation whereby the binding concerns only preserved beef and veal, particularly corned beef, as well as preparations of beef and veal consisting of cooked meat. The applicant considers that the binding concerns one particular tariff heading, and that the products which come within it necessarily benefit from the binding of the rate of customs duty. The Community institutions are not empowered to define the content of a bound tariff heading as they please.Under the Explanatory Notes to the Customs Co-operation Council Nomenclature (formerly known as the Brussels Nomenclature), which is binding on the Community (judgment of 19 November 1975 in Case 38/75 Douaneagent der NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen v Inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen [1975] ECR 1439, at p. 1450), marinated meat falls within bound tariff heading 16.02.The levy system is not at all suited to the marinated meat sector. The beef and veal which that product contains have already been processed and have had ingredients added to them, and this excludes any qualitative comparison with beef and veal as such. Consequendy, the system of levies cannot be applied to that product.Article 7 of Regulation No 425/77 does not primarily refer to ‘reasons of administrative convenience’, but it does make particular mention of substantial difficulties in respect of certain products, which was the case in this instance. Furthermore, the defendant is under a general obligation to adopt particular transitional measures. All the requisite conditions are satisfied, and this entails automatic application of the criteria of the protection of legitimate expectation. The defendant contends that the Community is liable only where its decision constitutes a misuse of powers.The new subdivision of tariff subheading 16.02 B III (b) 1 was not foreseeable by the applicant. The consignment of marinated meat was imported on 25 March 1977without an import licence, subject to customs duties at the rate of 26 %. All that emerged from Regulation No 3117/76 was that the protective measures would be repealed and that the normal arrangements for imports would be reestablished. Thus the defendant brought into being a situation of confidence upon which the applicant was entitled to base its subsequent conduct.In its rejoinder, the defendant first observes that after 31 December 1977 it is no longer empowered to adopt transitional measures as provided for in Article 7 of Regulation No 425/77. Thus the claim stated under heading BI of the application is unfounded.The defendant would be bound to give compensation in money only if it was under a legal duty to adopt the decision claimed by the applicant.Article 7 of Regulation No 425/77 imposes no such duty. Neither can any duty to adopt the decision demanded be inferred from it on the basis of misuse of powers. In order to qualify as misuse of powers, any other action by the defendant would have to be found to be arbitrary, patently mistaken and totally unjustifiable. The defendant has already explained in detail the reasons for which it refused to accede to the applicant's request.Furthermore, nothing in the applicant's individual situation justified granting it the unilateral import advantages which it is claiming.By the very fact of challenging the validity of the system of levies in force, the applicant is challenging the validity of Regulation No 425/77 in its entirety. If the said regulation were not valid, Article 7 thereof would not be valid either. That article is the only legal rule which empowered the defendant to grant the applicant the exemption demanded.The conditions for granting an exemption on the grounds of protection of expectations are not satisfied. Traders must take account of the import rules in force. Exemption from the Community rules on the basis of the protection of legitimate expectation is possible only where earlier Community acts or provisions were likely to give rise to such expectations.It should be noted that the applicant did not place its confidence in the retention of rules which were favourable to it When it entered into its contract with its Romanian supplier, it did not take account of the import system laid down by the common organization of the market in beef and veal.At most, it hoped that the import restrictions still in force at the time of the conclusion of the contract would be replaced by total abolition of restrictions on imports of marinated meat.Moreover, when it adopted Regulation No 3117/76, the defendant confined itself to pointing out that the rules relating to protective measures would expire on 1 April 1977.That notification is not necessarily to be understood, as the applicant claims, as meaning that products coming within subheading 16.02 B III (b) 1 could once again be imported under conditions which had long since ceased to apply. The applicant is alone in interpreting the notification in that way.
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