law://eu/cjeu/1977/c-82-77/hd_1_1_2_1@2026-11-21The accused in the main action emphasizes first of all that Articles 30 and 92 of the Treaty cannot be applied simultaneously to the same case (see the Court's judgment of 22 March 1977 in Case 74/76, Ianelli and Volpi v Meroni ([1977] ECR 557)).Since the provisions in question constitute a measure adopted by public authorities it is not subject to the review of the Court under Article 85 of the Treaty (see the Court's judgment of 18 June 1975 in Case 94/74, IGAV v ENCC ([1975] ECR 699)).Nevertheless the accused in the main action examines first of all a number of principles laid down by the Court concerning competition law.Whether the contested rules fixing minimum prices were applied by the sector concerned by mutual agreement or in the form of a concerted practice such an agreement or practice is contrary to the prohibition in Article 85 (1) of the Treaty. This is indeed clear from the actual wording of that provision and it has moreover been confirmed in the judgments delivered by the Court in the dye-stuffs cases of 14 July 1972 (Case 48/69, ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619 and the other cases of the same date) and the judgment of 26 November 1975 (Case 73/74, Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v Commission [1975] ECR 1491).The fact that agreements or concerted practices are limited to undertakings within a single Member State does not exclude them from the field of application of Article 85. On the contrary the Court of Justice has laid down in its case-law that agreements between undertakings which cover the entire territory of a Member State a priori affect trade between Member States (see in this connexion the judgments in the abovementioned Cases 48/69 and 73/74 and the judgment of 14 May 1975 in Joined Cases 19 and 20/74, Kali und Salz AG and Kali-Chemie AG v Commission ([1975] ECR 499)). Such an agreement has the effect of reinforcing the walling off of markets at national level, thereby impeding the economic interpenetration which the Treaty is designed to bring about and protecting domestic production (see the said judgment in Joined Cases 19 and 20/74). For a trade to be affected within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty it is sufficient that following the agreement in question trade between Member States develops otherwise than would have been the case in the absence of the restrictions resulting from it (see judgment of the Court of 13 July 1966 in Joined Cases 56 an 58/64, Grundig and Consten v Commission ([1966] ECR 299)).In view of the wording of the definition of a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction which the Court set out in its judgment of 11 July 1974 in Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Dassonville ([1974] ECR 837) and of 3 February 1977 in Case 53/76, Procureur de la République v Bouhelier ([1977] ECR 197) and having regard to the case-law considered in relation to the rules on competition in the Treaty the rules in dispute must be considered as a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article 30 et seq. of the Treaty.The rules in dispute are at least a potential hindrance to intra-Community trade: lower production costs abroad are prevented from making an impact on the Netherlands market; in such circumstances there can be no interpenetration of various national markets; the walling off of the national market has reached an optimum level and national production is effectively protected; the rules in dispute formally pursue the same objective as an agreement on prices between undertakings but the fact that they are governed by public law makes them more effective as regards their restrictive effect on trade and competition.The fact that the contested rules relating to minimum prices are applicable without discrimination to domestic products and imported products does not mean that there are not in the nature of a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction. This conclusion follows from Directive No 70/50/EEC of the Commission of 22 December 1969, based on the provisions of Article 3 (7) of the EEC Treaty, on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports and are not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 17), from the reply given by the Commission on 21 December 1976 to Written Question No 366/76 submitted by Mr Cousté (Official Journal C 27 of 3 February 1977, p. 4) and from the case-law of the Court. In the judgment of 26 February 1976 in Case 65/75, Tasca, and in the judgment in Joined Cases 88 to 90/75, Tasca and Sadam v Comitate Interministeriale dei Prezzi ([1976] ECR 291 and 323 respectively) the Court decided inter alia that a maximum price constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions if it is fixed at such a level that it is no longer profitable for importers to import the products in question. The situation is the reverse with regard to the fixing of minimum prices: in this situation if the fixing is to produce the desired effect prices rapidly attain such a high level in relation to the trade in domestic products that it is no longer profitable for importers to import the products in question.Finally it cannot be argued that the disputed rules are compatible with Community law by relying on the fact that they are intended to protect small undertakings. The Court rejected an argument to this effect in its judgment of 17 February 1976 in Case 91/75, Hauptzollamt Göttingen v Miritz ([1976] ECR 217).The accused in the main action thus suggests that the reply to the first question should be as follows:‘Article 30 et seq of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted to mean that the fixing of minimum prices by a Member State affecting without distinction domestic products and imported products is prohibited as it amounts to a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports.’The Government of the Netherlands observes that the minimum prices laid down in the rules in question were fixed in such a way as to guarantee a minimum return only for undertakings which would be profitable in normal competitive conditions. This claim is borne out by two facts: despite the rules in question only about half the retail wine and spirit businesses in the Netherlands are profitable; after the regulation entered into force the prices of well-known brands of hollands gin and vieux settled at a lower level than before the system of resale price maintenance was abandoned even though value-added tax and excise duties applicable to such products had in the meantime been increased by more than Hfl 2.The Government of the Netherlands further claims that it may be inferred from the definitions of the concept of a measure having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions contained in the judgment of the Court in Case 8/74, Dassonville and in Directive No 70/50 of the Commission of 22 December 1969 that the provisions concerning minimum prices can constitute measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions only in so far as they have an effect on imports.However, provisions concerning minimum prices must in principle be applicable both to imports and to domestic products. This must be so if a system of minimum prices is to be effective; furthermore Article 7 of the Treaty requires that provisions enacted by a Member State with regard to minimum prices must in principle be applicable in like measure to imported products.The Netherlands Government thus considers that a specific measure, or the implementation thereof, need not be considered as a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction unless insufficient account is taken of the situation, which may be different, of imported products in relation to the domestic product. Rules fixing minimum prices thus do not constitute a measure having equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 30 if, when the minimum price was fixed, account was taken of differences existing in the cost price of domestic products and that of imported products and if the rules provide, either explicitly by providing for the possibility of express exemption in respect of imports, or by implication, by allowing for exemptions of a general scope, for the adoption of special measures concerning imported products if the equality of treatment reserved for domestic products and imported products constitutes and impediment to imports. Only a refusal on the part of the competent authorities to exercise their powers to grant exemptions in favour of imported products, if the circumstances justified such a step, could be considered as constituting a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports.The rules in dispute comply with the abovementioned criteria: they do not constitute an impediment to trade and if the cost prices of domestic products and imported products develop differently in future it will be possible to employ the powers of exemption laid down in Article 8 of the regulation.In general terms the regulation on prices does not constitute an impediment to imports since imports of hollands gin and vieux are practically non-existent.The Government of the Netherlands then appraises separately the various provisions concerning minimum prices.The prohibition on selling at prices below the actual cost prices cannot in any way affect trade between Member States. This provision leaves retailers entirely at liberty to pass on to consumers the full benefit of rebates, discounts and provisions concerning prices obtained on purchasing the imported products.Neither does the regulation, which provides that the catalogue price per unit fixed by the manufacturer shall be increased by Hfl 0,60 and by value added tax, constitute an impediment to imports: the minimum price is fixed individually for each product, not on the basis of the cost price or of the quality of the domestic product; the provision concerning prices applies solely to sales to individuals and does not affect competition between importers and domestic traders; the provision in question even makes cheap offers particularly attractive to retailers since the difference between the purchase price and the minimum price belongs entirely to them; only competition between retailers is restricted, but such restriction has no effect on trade between Member States.Likewise the catalogue price per unit does not constitute an impediment to trade between Member States: since the prices applied by the manufacturer are taken into account all products are treated alike. It follows that this provision too does not constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article 2 (3) (c) of Commission Directive No 70/50 of 22 December 1969.The Government of the Netherlands emphasizes that it is unnecessary to take account of every difference in price, however small, between the imported product and the domestic product. In fact if that were necessary it would be quite impossible to supervise such provisions concerning prices, in particular where the cost price of the foreign product cannot be established.The Government of the Netherlands concludes that the rules in question comply with the abovementioned conditions for the conformity of a system of minimum prices with the Treaty: the minimum price was fixed on the basis of the level of prices applied to cheap spirits, which certainly differed from the level of prices of well-known brands of spirits, but within which the prices of various kinds of hollands gin and vieux did not differ greatly. Article 8 of the regulation furthermore makes it possible to exempt imported products from the provisions of the rules on price-control; however, that provision has not so far been used.The Commission takes the view that there is no doubt that even rules fixing price and profit margins which apply without distinction to domestic products and imported products may also constitute measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 30. In this connexion it refers to Article 3 of Commission Directive No 70/50 of 22 December 1969, which states that measures applying without distinction to ‘the marketing of products’ come within the prohibition on measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions where ‘the restrictive effect of such measures on the free movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to trade rules’. Article 3 further states that: ‘This is the case, in particular, where the restrictive effects on the free movement of goods are out of proportion to their purpose’ and where ‘the same objective can be attained by other means which are less of a hindrance to trade’. Article 3 does not indeed refer to measures governing prices and profit margins as examples of such ‘trade rules’; nevertheless it is clear that with regard to such measures criteria must be adopted which are at least identical to, if not more stringent than, those mentioned in the directive since they exercise a direct influence on the operation of the market and on competition, and this indeed often their express purpose, as in the case of the disputed Netherlands price rules.In the present case it is of prime importance to establish the effect which the contested regulation has ‘directly or indirectly, actually or potentially’ on imports from other Member States (see the judgment of the Court in Case 8/74 Dassonville, the judgment of 23 January 1975 in Case 31/74, Galli ([1975] ECR 47), the judgment in Case 65/75, Tasca, and the judgment delivered in Joined Cases 88 to 90/75, Sadam.With regard to the fact that exports to the Netherlands from other Member States constitute only a very small percentage (0,5 to 1 %) of domestic sales of new and old hollands gin and vieux the Commission emphasizes that the applicability of Article 30 et seq. of the Treaty does not depend on the volume of the imports affected by the restrictive measure.The Commission maintains that minimum prices, unlike maximum prices, of necessity distort price competition between the products on the market. Viewed in this light a system of minimum retail prices like the one in question may thus be compared to a collective system of resale price maintenance agreements, freely entered into.Collective resale price maintenance agreements to which manufacturers, importers and traders in the same Member State are parties generally come under Article 85 (1) of the Treaty. Even if each party fixes freely, the level of his prices such systems in fact lead to horizontal agreements whereby the persons concerned, in this case manufacturers and importers participating in such agreements, undertake to apply the system of maintained prices to the resale of their products The participation of importers means that international trade must inevitably be affected, especially if the most important importers are parties to the agreements.The Commission then examines each of the three systems of minimum prices in dispute in order to establish whether they are capable of influencing trade between Member States.The general floor price excludes all competition on prices at the retail trading stage. Where imported products could, but for this minimum price, be retailed at lower prices it depends on a number of factors whether the floor price constitutes an impediment to imports.In this connexion the Commission observes first that it must be determined how the retail prices of domestic products of a comparable price and quality would develop if there were no floor price.If the opportunities for price competition at retail level were more restricted for imported than for domestic products comparable in price and in quality there would in any event be an impediment to imports which would fall under Article 30 of the Treaty. However, a restriction of price competition affecting to the same degree domestic products and imported products would also impede trade between Member States. Imported products generally have to attain their place on the market through a more aggressive policy and by their nature have a greater need for competition and, moreover, are more inclined to be competitive.Although the general floor price leaves prices entirely free to find their own level at the production, wholesale and import stages such freedom is not capable of cancelling entirely any restrictive effect on imports caused by the general minimum price to the consumer; at the most it can only alleviate this effect somewhat and even this is doubtful. In fact, although the retail trade may have an interest in stimulating the sale of the foreign product because the retailer obtains a wider profit margin chiefly through the floor price it is doubtful whether the retail trade can induce the consumer to forsake the domestic product in favour of spirits at the same price distilled abroad.It follows that the general floor price in fact restricts price competition between cheap hollands gin and vieux on the one hand and more expensive branded products on the other without at the same time protecting the profit margins enjoyed by the retail trade in respect of these cheap spirits. This floor price thus principally promotes the interests of Netherlands distillers of branded products.Whether the imported products could be offered more cheaply to consumers if there were no floor price and whether a floor price limits price competition in respect of cheap imported drinks more than for home-produced drinks is a question of fact which must be settled by the national court.With regard to the rule that the catalogue price per unit fixed by the manufacturer must be increased by Hfl 0,60 and value added tax the Commission maintains that this is in fact a rule fixing minimum profit margins. It excludes at the retail stage all price competition on prices within each brand of new hollands gin and vieux whilst permitting such competition to operate freely between the various brands.With regard to imported products that rule is in fact applied only to branded Netherlands products exported to other Member States for subsequent resale to Netherlands retailers because the manufacturers established in those other Member States did not notify the catalogue price per unit.By excluding all price competition within each brand and imposing minimum profit margins this rule protects retailers whose cost prices are relatively high against undertakings whose cost prices are not so high, as well as against large stores and discount shops. In fact the price control prohibits passing on via the selling price discounts obtained on purchase and reducing the selling price by rebates in the case, for example, of self-service sales or large-scale purchases.On the other hand the rule does not exclude price competition between brands. Such competition is however rendered less intensive by the fact that it is concentrated at distillery level. In fact the distillers determine by their own price policies the minimum prices to consumers and thus limit the influence on competition which the price policy of an active and independent retail business might exert.The fixing of minimum profit margins thus constitutes an impediment to intra-Community trade even though the domestic products are subject to the same restriction on price competition.The Commission also claims that the prohibition of sales at prices below the actual cost price also constitutes a kind of rule fixing minimum profit margins.It is difficult to consider such a prohibition on sales at a loss as a restriction on competition since ‘special offers’ involving a loss are rather symptoms of distortion of competition on the market. Likewise it cannot be claimed that imported products require ‘special offers’ at a loss to acquire a place on the domestic market. Thus it cannot be considered that this part of the contested price-control rules can impede imports.The Commission observes with regard to the rules on competition in the Treaty that, although they are only applicable to undertakings the Member States cannot ignore them.The Commission maintains that, whilst it is impossible at the present time to deny to the Member States any power to impose minimum price systems it is necessary, in order to appraise the compatibility of such systems with Article 30, to take into consideration the principles set out in the rules on competition in Article 85.The Commission thus reiterates the argument which it put forward in Case 13/77, G.B.-INNO-BM. v Vereniging Kleinhandelaars in Tabak (judgment of 16 November 1977).The Commission next considers whether the Netherlands rules in dispute are compatible with Article 30, having particular regard to the criteria laid down in Article 3 of Commission Directive No 70/50 of 22 December 1969, of the judgment delivered in Case 8/74, Dassonville, and of the principles set out in Article 85 of the Treaty.In its view the objective which the Netherlands authorities assigned to the fixing of prices appears legitimate and not unreasonable. Article 85 (3) furthermore states that the prohibition on agreements between undertakings set out in paragraph (1) may be declared inapplicable if the agreements contribute to improving the distribution of goods.The general floor price may be said to have a limiting effect on imports out of proportion to its purpose. In fact a. rule fixing profit margins which applied also in respect of cheap spirits would not only afford better protection for the retail trade but also would entail less restriction of price competition between the different brands and varieties. The Commission recalls in this connexion the criterion set out in Article 85 (3) in accordance with which an agreement may not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of the objectives of the agreement.The rule imposing minimum profit margins on the other hand appears not to restrict competition and intra-Community trade more than is necessary to attain the objective in view, always provided however that the profit margin fixed is not excessive. This is a question of fact which the national court must settle. The system restricts competition at the retail stage and allows it to have full effect at the production, importation and wholesale stages. Seen from this point of view also this rule does not entail a greater degree of restriction than Article 85 (3) permits for an agreement (‘which does not… afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question’).The Commission concludes from this that the general floor price must be considered as a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on trade prohibited by Article 30 of the Treaty in so far as it is applied to products imported from other Member States which, if that floor price did not exist, could be supplied to the consumer at a lower price. On the other hand the rule imposing minimum profit margins and the prohibition on sales at a loss does not fall within the prohibition set out in Article 30.The Commission accordingly proposes that the reply to the first question should read as follows:‘National rules, applicable without distinction to domestic products and imported products, fixing minimum prices for retail sales on the domestic market of a product for which there is no common organization of the market constitute, in so far as their application to products imported from other Member States is concerned, a measure having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports if the price is fixed at such a level that, taking into account both the prices for this product prevailing in other Member States and the general conditions of competition between domestic products and the imported products in question, it has the effect of impeding imports directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, and if such restrictive effects on imports are out of proportion to the legitimate purpose of the price-control rules.’
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