law://eu/cjeu/1977/c-80-77/hd_1_1_2_2_1@2026-11-21The lawfulness of Article 31 (2) of Regulation No 816/70 depends on the answers to the question whether in order to resolve problems arising in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy Article 43 of the EEC Treaty enables the Community legislature to create obstacles to trade contrary to Articles 9 to 37 of the Treaty.It follows from Articles 39 to 43 of the Treaty and in particular Article 38 (4) that(1) The rules on the free movement of goods are fundamental principles binding the Community legislature in the agricultural sector. It may even be inferred from the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 10 December 1974 in Case 48/74 Charmasson [1974] ECR 1383 that if an order of precedence had to be established between the objective of free movement and the establishment of a common agricultural policy, the former would come first.(2) Exceptions to this rule are more apparent than real. The Commission cites in this respect the monetary compensatory amounts which were conceived only to prevent disturbances to trade as appears from the judgments of the Court of Justice of 24 October 1973 (Case 5/73 Balkan [1973] ECR 1091; Case 9/73 Schlüter [1973] ECR 1135; and Case 10/73 Rewe [1973] ECR 1175) and the provisions of Regulation No 1876/74 of 15 July 1974 (Official Journal L 198 of 20 July 1974, p. I). It adds that in the light of the judgments of 16 March 1977 (Case 68/76 Commission v French Republic [1977] ECR 515) and 25 January 1977 (Case 46/76 Baubuis [1977] ECR 5) it must also be accepted that the Community legislature has the power to prescribe measures which, if taken unilaterally by Member Stales, would constitute obstacles prohibited by the Treaty to free movement of goods, in so far as such measures respect the unity of the Common Market and do not discriminate between producers or consumers of the Community.The Commission claims that if Article 31 (2) of Regulation No 816/70 is looked at in the light of these principles it will be seen this provision was included in its proposal to the Council regarding the said regulation because at the time (1970) the Commission considered in accordance with theory that even after the expiration of the transitional period obstacles to trade inherent in an organization of a national market could continue so long as such organization was not replaced by a common organization. It followed that it must be lawful for Community institutions to incorporate such obstacles in a Community regulation. The judgment of the Court in the Charmasson case (judgment of 10 December 1974, Case 48/74 [1974] ECR 1383) removed the premise from this argument by ruling that after the end of the transitional period the existence of a national organization of the market for agricultural products not subject to a common organization could not justify obstacles to intra-Community trade.It would appear moreover that Article 31 (2) does not fulfil the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned case-law of the Court of Justice, namely that Community measures restricting the free movement of goods must preserve the unity of the Common Market and may not be of a discriminatory character. Article 31 (2) clearly discriminates against producers. The Commission considers that the judgment of the Court of 21 March 1972 (Case 82/71 SAIL [1972] ECR 119) does not run counter to its contention for although in that case the Court accepted the maintenance of the national system of milk centres beyond the expiry of the transitional period, it was only in order to make the abolition of that system coincide with the end of the current milk year. If the same criterion were applied in the present case, Article 31 (2) could be valid only until 31 August 1970 at the latest, the date of the end of the wine year. The Commission suggests that the Court of Justice should answer the first question put by the national court in the negative.
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