law://eu/cjeu/1977/c-137-77/hd_1_1_2_2@2026-11-20The defendant in the main action, having emphasized the importance of health inspections for game, considers that in the absence of harmonized rules on game there is no doubt that the Member States are authorized to carry out health inspections on imports of game from third countries.Broaching next the problem of charges, it observes that for the purpose of answering the question whether the system of charges laid down in Directive No 72/462 is applicable by analogy to imports of game, it is unimportant whether the prohibition of principle on levying charges on imported game follows from the Common Customs Tariff or from Article 2 (2) of Regulation No 827/68.The determining factor is whether, by the provisions on costs contained in Directive No 72/462, the Community legislature has adopted an essential decision of principle which is applicable to the treatment under tax law of imports of meat from third countries which must be applied by analogy to other imports of meat which have not yet been harmonized. In this connexion it is necessary to attach fundamental importance to certain statements made by the Commission in Case 21/75 (Firma J. Schroeder KG v Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt Köln). It stated that ‘to attain the objective laid down in the common organization of the market a uniform treatment of the question of charges relating to the importation of goods from third countries is required’ ([1975] ECR 912) and therefore declared that ‘with regard to the imposition of charges relating to inspections of meat preparations carried out as public health measures, a system will be introduced identical to that which already exists in the case of cattle and fresh meat’. These statements, made with regard to meat preparations, also apply to the inspection of game which is likewise not yet harmonized. According to the defendant in the main action it results necessarily from these statements that Directive No 72/462 is lawful and must be applied by analogy and that the arguments put forward against such applications must be rejected. Examining these arguments, the defendant in the main action replies first to two preliminary objections put forward by the plaintiff in the main action.The statement that Articles 12 (8), 23 (4) and 26 of Directive No 72/462 do not contain any authorization for the Member States to levy charges is incorrect. The clear wording of those provisions shows that the costs of all the measures of inspection are chargeable to the importer.The statement that if it were necessary to consider those provisions, in particular Article 26, as empowering the Member States to levy charges they would infringe a superior rule of Community law is also incorrect. The plaintiff in the main action invokes in this connexion the judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 December 1973 (Joined Cases 37 and 38/73, cited above) and the provisions of the Treaty relating to the common commercial policy but its arguments are not well founded. In fact even if Article 100 et seq. of the Treaty on commercial policy could prohibit independent measures being adopted by the Member States they would not nevertheless restrict the freedom of the Community itself in the choice of measures of commercial policy. Article 26 of Directive No 72/462 forms part of the sphere of the common commercial policy and naturally the same applies to the extent to which the rules on costs contained in Directive No 72/462 were applied by analogy to similar products. Concluding its preliminary remarks, the defendant in the main action observes that it is impossible not to take into account the fact that within the context of Directive No 72/462, the Community legislature has not harmonized the charges themselves. It is clear that because of different cost structures national charges cannot be identical. Although it is possible within the context of the harmonized inspections on imports which are subject to Directive No 72/462 to waive harmonization of the charges neither the interests of the Community nor the principles of the common commercial policy require that import charges should be made absolutely uniform. On the contrary, in the case of imports of meat from third countries, the Community legislature gives priority to complete and precise implementation of the inspections and that implementation depends in fact largely on the raising of the corresponding funds by means of the charges. Consequently, likewise outside the scope of the rules laid down by Directive No 72/462, the permissibility of national charges for inspections on imports of meat from third countries cannot depend upon the prior harmonization of the system of charges at the Community level. The defendant in the main action states that in this sector the national charges relating to the inspection of imports do not appreciably affect the functioning of the common commercial policy nor the application of the Common Customs Tariff and concludes that the question whether Articles 12, 23 and 26 of Directive No 72/462 may be applied by analogy cannot be answered in the negative on the ground that it is necessary for Community law to lay down the details of the charges themselves.With regard to the first question the defendant in the main action considers that in issuing Directive No 72/462 the Council adopted a basic decision of principle which was applicable to the system of imports of meat from third countries. It is therefore necessary to reply to the first question in the affirmative in the case of imports of meat of roe deer or red deer because it is necessary to carry out essentially the same inspections as in the case of domestic animals.The argument that Articles 12, 23 and 26 of Directive No 72/462 are provisions laying down exceptions from the prohibition on the levying of charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties and that provisions laying down exceptions must be interpreted strictly does not result in the rejection of the application by analogy of those provisions. The rule that exceptions must be interpreted strictly does not apply when they are exceptions which clearly embody a narrower systematic principle. In the present case there is little doubt that the rules adopted in Directive No 72/462 which are applicable to imports of meat from third countries are based on the principle that all charges relating to the inspection of imports may lawfully be levied on those imports by the Member States. In so far as the field of application is clear it is unnecessary to interpret them restrictively. The defendant in the main action adds that the case-law of the Court of Justice, which states that it is necessary to interpret exceptions strictly (see Case 29/72, S.p.A. Marimex v Italian Finance Administration [1972] ECR 1309 and Joined Cases 90 and 91/63, Commission of the EEC v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium [1964] ECR 625), always refers to the basic principle of freedom of movement within the Community, in other words to a case which is fundamentally different from that which is in question in the present dispute.The defendant in the main action concludes that neither the basic principles of the Common Market nor the powers of the Community institutions nor any overriding interest of the Community would be affected if by means of the application by analogy resulting from Community law itself the system of charges laid down in Directive No 72/462 were extended to areas in which there is no doubt that the Community legislature would have laid down provisions to the same effect if it had already adopted rules.Since a reply to the first question in the affirmative makes the second question purposeless, the defendant in the main action replies to the second question only subsidiarily. After describing the German system of health inspection and payment of charges which was already in existence when the Common Customs Tariff came into force, the defendant in the main action concludes from this that according to the case-law of the Court of Justice it was possible for the Federal Republic of Germany to continue to levy those charges. Since the charges were increased during the period from 1968 to 1975, the question arises whether that increase is permissible within the meaning of the judgment of 13 December 1973 (Joined Cases 37 and 38/73, quoted above). According to the defendant in the main action the Court of Justice considered this question in relation to the Common Customs Tariff and ruled to the effect that it is prohibited for the Member States to amend ‘the level of protection as defined by the Common Customs Tariff’ ([1973] ECR 1623). This interpretation does not necessarily exclude each nominal increase in the charges which occurs solely within the context of the general increases in costs. In the case of ad valorem customs duties, this adjustment results automatically from the increase in the price of the goods imported. It follows that charges, expressed in absolute figures, may be adjusted in order to remain in the same relationship to the Common Customs Tariff since the Court of Justice clearly intended to recognize as the ‘level’ the relationship existing in 1968 between the Common Customs Tariff and the ‘existing’ charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties. Such an adjustment in no way amends the previous level of protection, so that there would only be an increase in the charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties within the meaning of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 December (Joined Cases 37 and 38/73) if the increase in the charges exceeded the ascertainable increase in general costs and in particular the increase in the costs of the administration, which does not apply in this case.
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.