law://eu/cjeu/1977/c-110-77/hd_1_1_3@2026-11-19The applicant maintains, first of all, that the Commission infringed the express terms of Vacancy Notice COM/643/1976 and, consequently, Article 7 (1) and Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials. In addition it contravened the principle ‘legem patere quam ipse fecisti’. The defendant, having specified the qualifications required for the post in question, was bound to appoint a person having those qualifications. The contested appointment is not in the interests of the service, since the abilities and qualifications of the person appointed did not meet the requirements of the post. The defendant has contravened the rule, which it had adopted for itself, of selecting and appointing an official of the highest standard of ability.The Commission infringed Article 45 of the Staff Regulations and misused its powers, as is shown by the great difference in merit between the applicant and the person appointed. The absence of a degree and of technical qualifications cannot be properly compensated in another manner. Familiarity or even experience can be helpful but they are not sufficient.The decision also infringes Articles 3 and 45 of the Staff Regulations, since the candidate appointed did not have two years' actual seniority in his grade at the date of publication of the Vacancy Notice. In fact, he did not take up his duties in his Grade A 4 post until 20 November 1974.As regards the first submission, the defendant replies that Mr L may be regarded as possessing the specified qualifications for the post.He has, first or all, ‘equivalent practical experience’. In accordance with the principles laid down by the Court in Joined Cases 18 and 19/64 (Alvino and Others and Benoit and Others v Commission of the European Economic Community [1965] 2ECR 789) and in Case 44/71 (Marcato v Commission of the European Communities [1972] 1 ECR 427) Mr L's experience was regarded as such that he would be able to fulfil the requirements of the post at issue, which was one which would normally be held by a qualified engineer. In that regard the most important consideration is the requirements of the post. It is a post of head of division, not that of engineer. It was not, therefore, necessary to inquire whether Mr L had practical experience in the whole of the engineering field or whether he had sufficient expertise to be employed in a purely engineering capacity. In fact, Mr L has shown over a period of two years to the complete satisfaction of his director that he has the ability to deal with highly technical matters.As regards the other knowledge required by the Vacancy Notice, Mr L satisfied all the requirements (cf. in particular, his ability to direct a large administrative unit).The interests of the service required the post to be filled by someone who possessed the necessary technical expertise for dealing with such matters but they also required the possession of administrative ability and knowledge of, and practical experience in, the detailed work attaching to the post. Technical knowledge was therefore only one requirement for the post.Similarly, the allegation that the candidate appointed was not of the highest ability cannot be maintained.The Commission continues to believe that although it was proper for it to take into consideration the views of the group of officials who were qualified engineers expressed in the memorandum by Mr Le Goy (who had considered the applicant and not Mr L to be qualified for the post), it was not bound by them. The said group examined only the formal qualifications of the candidates. It was not qualified to pronounce on the question of ‘equivalent practical experience’ since this could only be assessed in relation to the requirements of the service, about which they knew little.Mr Le Goy's memorandum does not arrive at any definite conclusion and does not provide the Commission with any fully reasoned recommendations. That memorandum comprises, therefore, only one element to be taken into consideration in making the appointment. Mr Le Goy and the aforementioned group of officials cannot be regarded as equivalent to a selection board. It was the Commission itself which conducted a full examination of the comparative merits of the candidates. Its decision is therefore not in breach of the principles laid down by the Court in Cases 62/75 (Serio v Commission [1966] ECR 561) and 21/68 (Huybrechts v Commission [1969] ECR 85).Furthermore, although the applicant regards his own merits as being necessarily superior to those of Mr L, the memorandum by Mr Le Goy casts doubt on his present administrative ability.The promotion of Mr L to Grade A 4 with retroactive effect from the previous 1 January was in accordance with current practice in so far as promotions within a particular career bracket are concerned. That practice, which is explained by budgetary considerations, is not contrary to the provisions of Article 3 of the Staff Regulations, since at all material times the promoted official is entrusted with and performs the same duties, that is to say, the duties appropriate to the particular career bracket. Mr L therefore completed the minimum period of two years in Grade A 4 on 1 January 1976 and was accordingly eligible for promotion to Grade A 3 when the defendant's decision was adopted on 20 December 1976.In his reply, the applicant, referring again to the facts, points out that the duration of the experience of Mr L stated by him to be equivalent to a university degree or diploma in engineering extended from 1 July 1973 to 1 April 1975, whereas it takes a period of at least four years' study to acquire an engineering degree. Furthermore, Mr L attached documents to his application contrary to the instruction set out at the top of page 1 of the form and accordingly contravened the said instruction.As regards the first submission, the applicant emphasizes that each of the different qualifications set out must be taken into account in arriving at a decision and that no candidate may be appointed unless he shows that he possesses each of the qualifications, for each of them is ‘required’. Mr L's practical experience in engineering — a period of 21 months in Division C 3 — is not equivalent to an engineering degree or diploma. The period was far too short to gain good sound practical experience. Therefore, the contention that Mr L was capable of providing the Director General of DG VII with technical advice is open to serious question.The aforementioned Alvino and Marcato cases have no relevance to the matter at issue. Unlike that of the applicants in those cases, the practical experience of Mr L falls far below the normal period for university studies and the activities performed by him during that period were not at a level comparable to those performed by a person who has received a university education in engineering.Cases 15/63 (Lassalle v European Parliament [1964] ECR 31) and 118/73 (Grassiv Council [1974] 2 /ECR 1109) clearly show that no person may be appointed unless he complies with the requirements set out in a Vacancy Notice in their plain and ordinary meaning. Unlike many other Vacancy Notices, the one at issue in this instance mentions specifically a qualification in engineering.As regards the second submission, the applicant observes that the Commission did not make a proper comparative study from similar sources. The memorandum by Mr Le Goy did not deal with Mr L although it expressed an opinion in respect of several other candidates. Not having all the necessary material, the defendant was under an obligation to refer the matter back to Mr Le Goy and, in the meantime, to defer making any appointment (cf. Case 27/63, Raponi v Commission [1964] ECR 129, Case 97/63, de Pascals v Commission [1964] ECR 515 and the aforementioned Serio case, which, so far from supporting the defendant's case, appears to add further support to the applicant's submissions: as Mr L's name is not mentioned in the memorandum drawn up by Mr Le Goy, the present case is not one of ignoring the precise order of merit as between different suitable candidates but rather of the appointment of a candidate whose name does not appear on the list of suitable candidates).The applicant requests the Court to order the defendant to produce all the memoranda prepared by Mr Le Goy relating to the appointment of Mr L. Although they were made subsequent to the appointment, those memoranda would show what Mr Le Goy would have stated if he had been consulted by the defendant on all candidates.The Commission replies that Mr L had acquired 21 years' experience in the area in question: he worked from 1956 to 1962 for a transport firm and from his entry into the service of the Commission he worked in the transport sector as an official in Grade A. In addition, the documents attached to his application form headed ‘supplementary information’ concern the ‘nature of the duties’ attaching to the more recent posts which he had held. Mr L could quite properly have included all that information on page 3 of the application form under the heading ‘nature of duties’.As regards the first submission, if the applicant's argument were correct, the only candidates eligible for the post in question, apart from formally qualified engineers, would be those who have worked as engineers but who have failed or have not attempted to obtain the requisite degree or diploma.The question in the present case is whether the Commission was entitled to decide that Mr L was qualified by his practical experience not only to perform the above-mentioned duties but to perform them with such competence as would be expected from a qualified engineer. In that regard it is submitted that the requirements of public office are better satisfied by a person of Mr L's experience than by someone who has spent years working at a drawing board without obtaining any qualifications whatsoever.The Grassi case referred to above is not relevant in this instance. On the basis of the Alvino case, the Commission was entitled to regard an official as having the requisite practical experience when he had had more than 14 year's experience in the field in question, had during the period from 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1975 performed the duties relating to a post which required technical knowledge at the level of an engineering degree or diploma and had performed those said duties very satisfactorily.As regards the second submission, the memorandum by Mr Le Goy did not ignore Mr L, who was included among the candidates who were adjudged ‘less well qualified’.As regards evidence, no documents drawn up after Mr L's appointment to the post in question can De taken into consideration. Furthermore, it is immaterial to know what Mr Le Goy would have said if he had been consulted further by the Commission, since the only question at issue is whether the Commission was entitled to proceed on the basis of the terms of his memorandum. It is clear that all the candidates were interviewed by Mr Le Goy and the group of officials of DG VII and that his memorandum covers all of them. The subsequent memoranda which he drew up are confidential and are addressed solely to a member of the Commission, which should not be requested to produce them save for the most compelling reasons.The applicant, represented by Mr W. Young, Solicitor in Dublin, the Commission for the European Communities, represented by its Legal Adviser, Mr T. Townsend, acting as Agent, presented oral argument at the hearing on 23 February 1978.The Advocate General delivered his opinion at the hearing on 16 March 1978.
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