law://eu/cjeu/1977/c-102-77/hd_1_1_2_2_2@2026-11-20The defendant in the main action observes, first of all, that the national court refers to the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof of 16 December 1976 to justify the statement that Roche occupies a dominant position in the Federal Republic of Germany.The finding made by the Bundesgerichtshof that the market in tranquillizers represents a limited sector of the market appears to accord with the Treaty, even having regard to the rules laid down by the Court in Case 6/72 (Continental Can, paragraphs 32 et seq. of the Decision).The remarks of the Bundesgerichtshof regarding the position of Roche as a market leader and the significance of Valium are sufficient grounds for assuming that Roche occupies a dominant position on the market within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, since for that purpose it is sufficient that an undertaking has the possibility of determining prices for a substantial part of the relevant products (cf. the decision of the Commission of 9 December 1971 in the case of Continental Can, Journal Officiel of 8 January 1972, L 7, p. 25). That criterion was never contested in the judgment of the Court.In this respect the national court observes that a dominant position on the market of a Member State represents at the same time a dominant position within a substantial part of the market as a whole and in this it agrees with the view expressed by the Court in its judgment of 27 March 1974 in Case 12/73 Sabam ([1974] ECR 313, paragraph 5).According to the findings of the national court the Roche group is preventing undertakings from other Member States from entering into competition with its German subsidiary on the market in the Federal Republic of Germany. Such hindrance is an abuse of a dominant position because it infringes Article 3 (f) of the EEC Treaty.In reply to the argument advanced by Roche in the main proceedings to the effect that the ‘specific subject-matter’ of a trade-mark must be protected even against the rules on competition contained in the Treaty, since otherwise an undertaking in a dominant position on the market would enjoy only less extensive trade-mark rights, the defendant in the main action states that according to Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty acts may be prohibited which are otherwise part of the ‘specific subject-matter’ of the industrial and commercial property within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty. In support of this view it refers to the judgments of the Court in Cases 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi ([1977] ECR 557), 40/70 Sirena and 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v Metro ([1971] ECR 487).Every provision which is intended to prevent the abuse of a dominant position necessarily prohibits undertakings which are in a dominant position from engaging in certain activities which are permitted to others. Such is in particular the case where the exercise of an absolute right by an undertaking in a dominant position is prohibited. An undertaking in a dominant position could for example be prohibited from exercising a copyright, the exercise of which by an undertaking not in a dominant position would be allowed (cf. the aforementioned judgment of the Court in Case 78/70). It is therefore quite feasible for Article 86 of the Treaty to have the effect of reducing the scope of a right to restrain others under a trade-mark which an undertaking in a dominant position would have if it did not occupy such a position on the market.In order to find whether the prices of Roche might be ‘unfair’ within the meaning of subparagraph (a) of the second paragraph of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, the Bundesgerichtshof relied on the so-called ‘Vergleichsmarktkonzept’ (the ‘comparable market’ principle), that is the prices actually applied by Roche were compared with prices which would prevail if there were competition. This doctrine may be regarded as prevalent in the Federal Republic of Germany and has also been widely applied in Community law (cf. the judgment in Case 13/60, Geitling v High Authority, [1962] ECR at p. 102, paragraph 3).On the other hand if, as some writers maintain, the doctrine of ‘fictitious competition’ is not appropriate for establishing an abuse of a dominant position, it is necessary to inquire whether Roche has been found to have acted in such a way as to thwart the achievement of one of the objectives of the common market or is creating an obstacle to such achievement. In this respect it is interesting to observe that to obtain excessive prices Roche makes use of the principle of the partitioning of markets. The conduct which the national court imputes to Roche in reliance on the judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof must therefore be regarded as an abuse of its dominant position, even if the doctrine of ‘fictitious competition’ is not followed and it is required that there be an additional violation of the objectives of the Treaty.The view of the Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, that the consolidation of market power which is abused in another context is not in itself an infringement of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, conficts with subparagraph (a) of the second paragraph of Article 86, which expressly states that abuse may consist in directly or indirectly imposing unfair selling prices, and also conflicts with the judgments of the Court in Case 6/72, Continental Can, paragraph 26, and in Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents [1974] ECR at p. 252, paragraph 32.The application of Article 86 is, however, quite independent of any intention or negligence. It simply requires that the undertaking should have acted wrongly from an objective point of view. As regards the application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty that objective interpretation appears from the wording ‘have as their object or effect’ and this, apart from applying expressly to Article 85, applies also to Article 86.
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