law://eu/cjeu/1976/c-18-76/hd_1_1_3_2@2026-11-171. The observations of the applicant concerning the principles relating to the financing of intervention measures relate, primarily, to case No 10 and. secondarily, to the other cases referred to under IV below.1 (a) In its opinion, the Commission did not take account of Article 8 (2) of Regulation No 729/70 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Article 8 (2)’): in the context of that provision and independently of the question whether, in particular cases, expenditure was incurred in accordance with Community provisions the Commission should have examined whether the financial consequences should be borne by the Community.1 (b) In the applicant's view that provision provides that the Community must bear the consequences of irregularities or negligence where recovery of the sums paid is no longer possible or must be ruled out for other reasons, unless the irregularities or negligence are attributable to the administrative authorities or other bodies of the Member State concerned. In that case the Member State should bear the burden of the expenditure incurred. That principle is applicable independently of whether the irregularities or negligence are due to infringements of the law committed by third parties (individuals) or to the wrongful conduct of the administration. The Commission expressed the same opinion in a working paper dated 2 December 1974 (Document VI/157/74). While it there defines ‘mistakes and administrative negligence’ as irregularities in the broad sense, it nevertheless recognizes indirectly that infringement of rules of Community law, due to the wrongful conduct of the administration, must form part of the procedure for attributing liability. It was only in its working paper of 16 October 1976 (Document VI/192/75) on the procedure, practice and consequences of the clearance of accounts that the Commission maintained that the scope of Article 8 (2) does not include irregularities and negligence on the part of persons outside the administration.The Commission's interpretation takes into account neither the wording nor the objectives of Article 8 (2). In view of the fact that the Member States apply Community rules not only in their own interest but also in that of the Community, it would seem to be justified to apportion between the Community and the Member States the risks arising from the application of those rules. That is only possible, however, if the scope of Article 8 (2) is not restricted to irregularities and negligence attributable to third parties only. It is also necessary to take account of difficulties arising from the application of directly applicable Community law. Often it is necessary to take a decision very quickly without its being possible to obtain a statement such as to commit the Commission. In that case mistaken interpretations, made in good faith, should not be excluded. The effect of the Commission's view is that it must decide alone, in the course of the procedure for discharging the accounts, whether Community law has been infringed. When consulting the Fund Committee several governments emphasized, in particular, that it is unacceptable that the Commission should wish to determine finally the expenditure to be borne by the Member States without the States being able to cooperate effectively (they are merely consulted). Furthermore, stress was placed on the considerable difficulties which refusal to recognize expenditure entails for the Member States as they have to ask for corresponding national appropriations from their parliaments and justify the use of such funds to their auditing authorities.1 (c) In the view of the applicant the procedure for the discharge of accounts and the procedure for attributing liability are two different questions which, as is shown by the rules governing them, must be examined from different points of view. There nevertheless exists a link between the two procedures in so far as in the terms of Article 5 (2) (b) of Regulation No 729/70 discharge of the accounts is not possible while the procedure for attributing liability has still to be applied. By taking its decision without either carrying out an examination, which is here obligatory, as to the attribution of liability or registering a reservation to that effect, the Commission acted wrongfully. Its decisions should therefore be annulled.1 (d) The fact that the Commission failed to examine the attribution of liability in accordance with Article 8 (2) cannot be justified by the fact that a procedure for attributing liability was not yet applicable. Even though the implementing provisions referred to in Article 8 (3) of Regulation No 729/70 have not been adopted it is in fact possible to apply the procedure for attributing liability by extrapolating on the basis of Article 8 (2) and of the statement made by the Council and the Commission when adopting Regulation No 283/72 (Document R/151/72). Because it was not possible to reach an agreement and because the entry into force of Regulation No 283/72 could no longer be delayed, that statement was made in order to provide at least for provisional rules for the procedure for attributing liability.According to a statement to be inserted in the minutes, made by the German delegation at the time of the discussion of the draft Regulation No 283/72 and which was not contradicted by the Commission or by any other delegation, any wrongful act on the part of the administration of a Member State must be regarded as negligence. That concept should also extend to negligence within the meaning of Article 8 (2).In the applicant's opinion the wording of Article 8 (2) gives sufficient indications to enable criteria to be established on the basis of which the financial consequences of irregularities or negligence on the part of a Member State may be attributed to it. If, in accordance with that provision, a distinction were drawn between irregularities and negligence attributable to the Member State and irregularities or negligence which are not so attributable it could be accepted that that attribution requires the existence of some wrongful conduct in the sector falling within the responsibility of an administration. That would mean that all conduct which is merely objectively wrongful cannot lead to the attribution of liability to the Member State concerned. Such apportionment of the financial risks appears to be indispensable, particularly in order to avoid problems with the expenditure incurred in financing the common agricultural policy and to maintain the best possible relations between the Community and the Member States.In the aforesaid statement the Council and the Commission adopted provisional measures relating to rules for the application of the procedure for attributing liability. In the present instances the Commission did not submit to the Council the report in question therein. Furthermore, the EAGGF Committee was not consulted in relation to the attribution of liability.1 (e) The decisions of the Commission are invalid because they were adopted without a prior examination relating to the attribution of liability or because the decision as to the discharge of the accounts should have been adopted subject to an examination of the attribution of liability. If the procedure for attributing liability had been applied the result must have been that the Community should bear the expenditure in question, as the Federal Republic of Germany is guilty of no reprehensible conduct in the field subject to the responsibility of its relevant administrative authorities.2. Before stating its point of view on the matters of principle, the Commission observes that it has already defined that point of view in a succinct form in the working paper of 16 October 1975 (Document VI/192/75) on which its decisions of 2 December 1975 are based (see point 1 (b)).2 (a) The discharge of the accounts consists of a binding decision determining the expenditure of the Member States in the course of a given financial year which is finally to be borne by the Community. Discharge is therefore not a mere internal accounting operation which requires no formal measure by way of decision, as is expressed by Article 8 (a) of Regulation No 1723/72. Such recognition of expenditure is necessary as Community financing is restricted to measures taken in accordance with Community provisions. Regulation No 729/70 defines that point at Article 2 (1) and Article 3 (1). It is that specific definition which, in the view of the Commission, justifies the introduction of those provisions which, for the rest, merely repeat the content of Article 1 (2).The powers conferred on the Commission in this respect are fully in conformity with the procedure laid down in Article 108 (3) and Article 110 of the Financial Regulation of 25 April 1973 (Official Journal L 116 of 1 May 1973, p. 1).Moreover, the discharge of accounts is, as regards its effects for the Member States, not fundamentally different from the decision which the Commission had to take concerning aid from the Fund after consulting the Fund Committee under the previous financial arrangements of Article 10 of Regulation No 17/64.Finally in this context the Commission points out that the procedure for the discharge of accounts gives the Member States a very wide right to voice their opinions. In the Commission's conception the procedure includes a bilateral and a multilateral phase, the latter consisting of consultation with the Fund Committee on draft discharge decisions. The Commission refers in this respect to the aforementioned working paper (Document VI/192/75 of 16 October 1975). Legal protection against decisions taken in the context of that procedure is afforded by Article 173 of the Treaty.2 (b) Article 8 (2) of Regulation No 729/70 relates only to ‘irregularities or negligence’ attributable to (third party) individuals. That is evident from the position of that provision in the system of the regulation, read in conjunction with Regulation No 283/72, and from its origins and the objective which it pursues. The Commission refers in this respect to the first paragraph of the article in question and to Article 8 and the antepenultimate recital in the preamble to the draft regulation No 729/70, which the Commission submitted to the Council on 16 July 1969. Regulation No 283/72 also has the character of a regulation directed at individuals. This is evident in particular from the recitals in the preamble to the regulation, which refer to intensifying ‘the campaign against irregularities’ and ‘fraudulent practices’, and from Article 3 and Article 6 (3) of the regulation. The idea of undertaking a procedure against an administration acting in a manner which was legally wrong or negligent is rather paradoxical. On the other hand a procedure of that kind could very well be undertaken against officials of the civil service of a Member State.It is true that at the time of the discussions on the proposal for Regulation No 283/72 within the Committee of Permanent Representatives the German delegation issued a statement to the effect that ‘any wrongful act on the part of the administration of a Member State’ should be considered ‘an irregularity within the meaning of this regulation’. The Commission notes, however, that that statement was not included in the minutes of the Council.Regarding the definition of the concept of ‘irregularity’ the Commission refers to the statement made by the Council and the Commission at the time of the adoption of Regulation No 283/72.The working paper of 2 December 1974 (Document VI/157/74, see point 1 (b)) to which the applicant refers was never approved by the Commission. Furthermore, when that document was discussed the departments of the Commission did not maintain the point of view expressed therein.If there were a financial loss due exclusively to the wrongful conduct of a Member State it is only logical that the Member State should also bear the financial risk of its acts. However, a financial loss due to the conduct of a third party would constitute a breach in the sphere of responsibility of the Member State and it would be appropriate to release the State from the financial risk assumed by it. In addition there is also the fact that irregular practices often concern the territories of several Member States, thus making it impossible to determine the location of the factors constituting the irregularity. These considerations come to the fore in the antepenultimate recital in the preamble to the draft Regulation No 729/70 referred to above. In that draft the wording of Article 8 (2) was moreover more specific in this regard (Article 8 (3) of the draft).The Commission further argues that the German text of Article 8 (2) of Regulation No 729/70 has become ambiguous, in particular by virtue of the introduction of the word ‘Versäumnis’, which is rendered in the French text and in the other languages by ‘negligence’, which corresponds rather to the term ‘Fahrlässigkeit’. Examining the German text in isolation one might be tempted, from a purely linguistic point of view, to consider that a case of ‘Versäumnis’ has occurred when a Member State is guilty of an omission in breach of the obligations incumbent upon it. That interpretation however would render incomprehensible the distinction drawn by the provision between attributable and non-attributable negligence; any omission in breach of obligations would clearly be evidence of negligence which constitutes the only reasonable criterion for the attribution of liability.Examination of the Dutch text, which is in conformity with the French text, reveals that the concept of ‘nalatigheid’ could also apply to the conduct of individuals. This interpretation, however, renders superfluous the concept of ‘negligence’ which is covered by that of ‘irregularity’. If, in this context, ‘negligence’ was intended to signify negligent (‘fahrlässig’) action on the part of the administration then in the Commission's view one comes up against the same logical requirements as in the German text but to a still greater degree: is is necessary, in fact, to examine whether the negligent (‘fahrlässig’) conduct of the administration must be attributed to negligence on the part of the administration and must therefore be attributed to it — which is meaningless.The Commission takes the view that that meaningless situation can be avoided only if, in interpreting the provision in question, reference is made to the original wording of the proposal of the Commission and if the concept of ‘nalatigheid’ or ‘negligence’ at the beginning of Article 8 (2) is disregarded as an addition devoid of meaning. On that interpretation the meaning which the Commission gives to the text must necessarily be accepted, taking account of the logic of the wording and without distorting the text: the financial consequences of fraudulent transactions or other irregularities committed by third parties must be borne by the Community in so far as they are not attributable to negligent conduct of the part of the Member States.As the word ‘negligence’ was inserted without explanation into a working paper of the Council of 14 January 1970 (Document R/61/70) and as there is no written evidence that the amendment was discussed, it is impossible to regard it as a substantive amendment to the Commission's proposal. It would, moreover, be surprising to find an attempt to amend the principle laid down by Regulation No 17/64 concerning the power of the Commission to decide on aid from the Fund towards expenditure by the Member States without its being expressed clearly or confirmed in the preparatory documents.The Commission states that its subsequent submissions concerning the attribution of liability and the procedure for attribution assume particular importance if the fundamental conception of the applicant relating to the interpretation of Article 8 (2) is held to be correct.As regards the substantive ‘criteria for attribution’ the Commission is basically in agreement with the applicant's view. Derogation from the principle of the charging to the Community of the financial consequences in the factual conditions set out in Article 8 (2) is possible only where ‘the consequences of irregularities or negligence [are] attributable to administrative authorities or other bodies of the Member States’.Article 8 (2) of Regulation No 729/70 lays down neither the circumstances in which liability must be attributed nor the time at which that must be done, in contrast to the text proposed by the Commission which states that there must be negligence on the part of the Member States. However, even in the absence of that express specification, the current provision could be interpreted in the same sense as the proposal. That would, in essence, produce the same result as the interpretation stating, for example, that a condition for the attribution of liability is ‘conduct which is open to criticism’ for which an administration is to be held responsible.As the general rules referred to in Article 8 (3) have not yet been adopted the definition of the concept of ‘conduct which is open to criticism’ must be sought in the application of the law by way of interpretation. In defining that concept, on no account may subjective elements appertaining to the official executing the act be taken into consideration.If an observer has a priori reasonable doubts as to the correctness of a given legal interpretation, the national administration should be invited to attempt to dispel those doubts, for example by consulting the Commission. If it does not do so it lays itself open to the charge that it may have misinterpreted a provision and it would also have to bear the financial consequences thereof.This view is necessary for the actual application of Community law in order to avoid the national administration's being as it were awarded a premium for having applied Community law without due consideration.2 (c) In the Commission's view there does not exist a procedure for attributing liability in the legal sense. As the Council was unable to reach agreement on the procedure for which the Commission made provision in Article 14 of its proposal for Regulation No 283/72 the general rules are applicable pursuant to Regulation No 729/70, that is to say the provisions laid down for the discharge of accounts.The existence of a joint statement by the Council and the Commission made at the time of the adoption of Regulation No 283/72 does not affect that position. By failing to take account of the procedural rules laid down in those minutes the Commission has at the most merely infringed a sort of ‘gentleman's agreement’ and should bear the political responsibility therefor. That statement does not imply that the Commission's powers are affected by the procedure laid down therein. In any event it does not constitute the basis for a power of decision on the part of the Council, even to lay down outline provisions. The report which the Commission was to submit to the Council under paragraph (c) of the statement was intended only to provoke discussion at the highest level, as the Commission was certainly expected to take account in its decision of the views of the Council. The fact that the report should, ‘where appropriate’, be accompanied by proposals relating to solutions to be adopted by the Council can only constitute a reference to the ever-present possibility of resolving a problem arising in a particular case in general terms and for the future, by means of a legal measure adopted under the normal legislative procedure.The possibility for the Council to intervene in such individual cases is, moreover, capable of having a detrimental effect on the institutional balance of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Council has a tendency to impose ‘political’ solutions on cases submitted to it. The prospect of such a political compromise might encourage the Member States to oppose, in the first instance, the attribution to them of the financial burden of ‘irregularities’, to submit the matter to the Council and to find, once Community law is applied, a solution which is in their national interest. Finally, in contrast to the Commission, the Council is not in a position from an administrative point of view to deal with numerous individual cases.The Commission associates itself without reservation with the statement proposed by the French delegation for the minutes drawn up at the time of the adoption of Regulation No 283/72 by the Council, which does not seek to make the Council a conciliatory body but to implement conciliation procedures within the EAGGF Committee, that is to say within an agency of the Commission.2 (d) The Commission does not believe that the considerations of principle relating to the apportionment of the financial risk between the Community and the Member States put forward by the applicant can have the effect of creating a fundamental derogation from its conclusions. In its opinion all thoughts on this matter must be based on the principle that the Community finances only measures which are adopted in accordance with Community provisions.It appears difficult to reconcile the applicant's view with the wording of Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation No 729/70, unless one gives a quite general significance to the words ‘refunds … granted in accordance with the Community rules … shall be financed …’ which, from the point of view of linguistic usage, is ruled out by the fact that Article 8 (2) contains an exception to that view and therefore suggests a conclusion a contrario.In particular, it is not possible to reconcile such a view with the fact that the Member States apply the Community provisions in question upon their own responsibility and not ‘at the request of’ the Community or as a ‘subordinate institution’ of a higher Community authority. The administrative authorities of the Member States are not bound by instructions of the Community executive and furthermore the Commission does not possess a supervisory power within the usual meaning of administrative law. The Commission is merely able to call attention to infringements recorded by it, by means of opinions which are not binding, in the context of its bilateral contacts or in existing committees. The counterpart of the application of Community law by Member States upon their own responsibility is precisely the obligation to bear the financial risk of an incorrect application of that law.This conclusion cannot be affected by the fact that the application and interpretation of Community law sometimes raise practical difficulties: such difficulties can often be resolved when the measure is being prepared by consultation with the Commission or in the context of numerous committees and so on; the remaining instances should be extremely rare; where necessary, payments could either be delayed or made subject to reservation.Nevertheless, some exceptions do exist to the principle put forward by the Commission, for example in cases of irregularities on the part of third parties — Article 8 (2) of Regulation No 729/70 — where the Commission has itself occasioned the incorrect application or where it may be held responsible for the incorrect application for another reason: see in this respect the situation resulting from the judgment of the Court of Justice delivered on 12 November 1974 in Case 34/74 (Roquette v France [1974] ECR 1217).The Commission is not convinced by the applicant's argument that the Commission's refusal to recognize certain expenditure could lead to budgetary consequences for the Member States. In the opinion of the Commission, the Member States must take budgetary measures in advance to deal with additional charges. Moreover, the Member State should not undertake those additional charges so suddenly as to give rise to difficulties in payment; in fact the mandatory procedure makes it possible to foresee a decision of refusal on the part of the Commission in good time. Nevertheless, if a Member State were faced with real fiscal obstacles, it would be possible to find, with the cooperation of the Commission, practical means of overcoming the problem.3. The applicant replies that the Commission's opinion that the EAGGF finances only measures which are in accordance with the Community provisions is not in conformity with the terms of Article 2 (1) and Article 3 (1) and, furthermore, does not comply with the system of Regulation No 729/70. In the applicant's view the wording of Articles 2 and 3 of that regulation does not lend itself to a restrictive interpretation but, on the contrary, intentionally leaves great latitude: those provisions refer to all the refunds and interventions laid down by Community law which occur in the context of the common organization of the market and in the performance of tasks assigned to the Community; the fundamental rules are decisive; formal requirements on the other hand are of merely secondary importance.The applicant emphasizes that it shares the Commission's point of view on the concept of ‘irregularities’ as defined in the declaration made by the Council and the Commission at the time of the adoption of Regulation No 283/72 (Document R/151/72). That is not the case with the concept of ‘negligence’ which, in the applicant's view, has a particular significance which is quite distinct from that of ‘irregularities’, as the latter term refers to the acts of third parties. The fact that ‘negligence’ cannot be a mere confusing interpolation or an unsuccessful attempt at improving the wording is evident, in the applicant's view, from the following facts: at the time of the discussions preceding the proposal for Regulation No 729/70, which originally referred only to ‘irregular’ or ‘fraudulent transactions’ (‘agissements frauduleux’, ‘betrügerischen Handlungen’), agreement was reached on the idea that the field of administrative action which is contrary to the law is covered only imperfectly by the concept of ‘irregularities’, both as regards the legal rules and as regards the concept; it was agreed, therefore, to include the administrative field in the procedure for attributing liability; at the time all those participating in the session were unanimous in considering that irregularities on the part of individuals may frequently be coupled with negligent conduct on the part of the national administrations; this idea was, for the first time, at the origin of the use of the concept of ‘negligence’ in the text of 15 January 1970 (Document R/61/70). The fact that the regulation finally adopted differs in this respect from the original proposal of the Commission shows that the proposal, in the version submitted by the Commission, was not accepted by the Member States. No conclusion of a binding nature can therefore be derived from the version which was not adopted. Consequently, the Commission cannot contend that ‘negligence’ merely constitutes an omission in breach of obligations. On the contrary, negligence may also consist of a wrongful act.As regards the interpretation of the concept of conduct which is open to criticism the applicant shares the Commission's view that not only the subjective factors appertaining to the official executing the measure but rather the opinion of an objective observer who is well versed in the matter must be taken into account.Regulation No 729/70 does not indicate in a precise and concrete way how liability is to be attributed. However, Article 8 draws a distinction between conduct which is attributable and conduct which is not. According to the applicant the origin of that distinction can only be as follows: a Member State must not be liable for the financial consequences of wrongful conduct by its officials unless the wrongful conduct is also reprehensible (‘vorwerfbar’). In this respect decisive importance should be attached to the external circumstances which are at the origin of the wrongful conduct by the administration, for example, the degree of causality and the extent of the infringement having regard to the aims of the rules infringed. All these points are in conformity with the opinion of the Commission.The question of the point at which objectively wrongful conduct or an error may be said to be reprehensible may remain open in view of the fact that in the cases in question there was neither conduct of a reprehensible or indefensible nature which was contrary to obligations nor an error on the part of the officials who executed the measure. However, it follows from the Commission's opinion that reprehensible conduct cannot be said to exist prima facie even in cases of simple negligence (‘Fahrlässigkeit’). On the contrary, its officials took their decisions after much thought and with the necessary care.The Commission's opinion that ‘Versäumnis’ means an omission in breach of obligations and that the omission is clear evidence of negligence is not relevant, for two reasons: first, the Commission overlooks the fact that ‘Versäumnis’ may consist not only of an omission but also of a wrongful act; secondly, a distinction should be drawn between conduct which contrary to given obligations and the ensuing consequences regarding liability (‘Zurechnung’). Conduct contrary to obligations as such gives no indication as to the extent of liability or its reprehensible nature.Under Regulation No 729/70, consequently, it is necessary to verify successively in the following order the points set out below:— Are the payments made by the Member State in question provided for by Community law as refunds or intervention and do they fall within the context of the common organization of the agricultural markets?— Have the said payments given rise to ‘irregularities’ or ‘negligence’ in the widest meaning of the term?— Are the ‘irregularities’ or the ‘negligence’ the act of the Member State concerned and, therefore, must they be attributed to it?In the cases in issue the Commission reduced those three stages to a single examination; it reduced the applicant's legal protection. This became evident from an examination of the individual cases in dispute.As regards the procedure for attributing liability the applicant replies that the statement made by the Council and Commission at the time of the adoption of Regulation No 283/72 (Document R/151/72) assigned a specific role to the Council, with the agreement of the Commission. The mere facts of its composition and its other functions mean that the participation of the Council may lead more easily to a reconciliation of interests in relations between the Commission and the Member States than is possible in the case of a unilateral determination by the Commission.Even if it was only a ‘gentleman's agreement’ the Commission thereby created a legitimate expectation which has to be respected, as all measures of administrative authorities are subject to compliance with the principle of good faith. By the very aim which it embodies the verbal statement is conceived as a legally binding rule. It is on the very subject of the attribution of liability that a conflict of interests between the Community and the Member States is inescapable and co-operation between the Member States, the Commission and the Council is necessary, the latter in particular being given in this respect the task of reconciling those interests. Without its participation the risk would arise of an interminable series of cases before the Court of Justice. The objective of the implementation of the Council's task of integration could not be achieved otherwise than by giving the said declaration a mandatory nature.4. In its rejoinder the Commission observes, with regard to the interpretation of Article 2 (1) and Article 3 (1) of Regulation No 729/70, that the words ‘in accordance with the Community rules’ would be a merely superfluous and incomprehensible addition if the applicant's interpretation was correct. In that case it would have been sufficient to state that ‘refunds (or intervention)…, granted within the framework of the common organization of the agricultural markets, shall be financed’.The Commission dismisses the idea that the effect of the point of view supported by it would be that any infringement of a given formal provision would effectively mean that the refund or intervention measure would, on that ground, be adopted in infringement of the Community provisions. In its view in this field also a distinction must be drawn between essential and non-essential procedural requirements. It also takes the view that an infringement of the latter cannot mean that the refund or intervention should be denied Community financing. Furthermore, this corresponds with the Commission's practice as is shown by the attitude which it adopted in case No 4 and in Case 15/76, French Government v Commission.The .explanations submitted by the applicant on the origins of Article 8 (2) of Regulation No 729/70 establish, according to the Commission, only that from the very beginning the applicant advocated a different interpretation but that that interpretation was not adopted by the other delegations.The Commission does not believe that the processes leading up to the adoption of that provision enable the conclusion to be drawn that, by modifying the text of the provision, the Council wished to introduce therein an entirely different concept regarding the apportioning of financial charges; if that was indeed the intention of the Council it should at the very least have been expressed in a clear form in the final version.The Commission rejects the applicant's assertion that it was agreed to include administrative matters in the attribution procedure. It is none the less undeniable, in the Commission's view, that all the parties concerned accepted that irregularities on the part of individuals are often coupled with negligent conduct on the part of the national administration; it is that factor which probably led to the introduction of the concept of negligence; however, it is precisely that factor which shows that originally the starting point for the application of that provision was irregularities on the part of third parties.As regards the concept of conduct which is open to criticism the Commission states that the problem is comparable to that arising in the law concerning the liability of the State and its officials: in this field comparative studies show that in practice any conduct on the part of the administration which is contrary to its duties creates a presumption of liability or that the conduct is open to criticism.Similarly, the concept of simple negligence in contrast to that of gross negligence is of little value in the present instance as it was elaborated in the field of civil law with regard to wrongful conduct by individuals. Thus in the field of Community liability under Article 215 of the Treaty the Court of Justice rejected as irrelevant the objection advanced by the Commission to the effect that supervisory organizations cannot, under a general legal principle, be rendered liable, except in the case of gross malfeasance; the Court on the contrary merely referred to the principle that the Commission, like the governments of the Member States, has, in applying Community law, a general duty of care and vigilance (judgment delivered on 14 July 1967 in Joined Cases 5, 7 and 13 to 24/66 Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission [1967] ECR 245 at p. 262). The Commission argues that those considerations are equally valid in relation to the “liability” of the Member States at issue in the present case regarding the apportionment of the financial burden. In the Commission's view, in order to determine the degree of care required account must be taken of the possibility of eliminating that doubt by requesting the Community administration for further details.The Commission does not understand the criticism made by the applicant with regard to requests for further details sent to the Commission. In its view it is absurd to claim that the obligation to request further details in itself leads to unacceptable legal uncertainty in trade or a type of barrier to the application of Community law: on the contrary, such requests for further details have increasingly appeared to be the best means of eliminating continuing legal uncertainty and of contributing to the effective and uniform application of Community law; if nevertheless the national administration is obliged to take decisions which do not allow it the time to make such a request for further details other possibilities for avoiding a conflict exist; however, if, in exceptional circumstances, no such possibility exists the conclusion may perhaps be reached at this stage that the Member State in question is not guilty of conduct which is open to criticism.The Commission emphasizes that the procedure provided for in the statement made at the time of the adoption of Regulation No 283/72 cannot have the effect of leading to the adoption of a decision relating to individual cases. The Commission does not see from what the applicant deduces the legally binding nature of that rule: it is clear from the decided cases of the Court of Justice that even Council resolutions do not have such binding force; the same is true a fortiori for mere statements contained in the minutes. Even if that statement gave rise to an expectation it could have no effect on the question of the apportionment of financial burdens. The protection given against any breach of the principle of the legitimate expectation of the persons concerned can in fact only protect the latter against losses which they may suffer by virtue of steps taken by them on the basis of that expectation.The Commission can certainly not accept the view that differences of opinion concerning the correct application of Community law and raised by the question of the standard of care which the national administrative authorities must show in this field must primarily be regulated by the Council in the context of a compromise between the interests at stake. The present instance specifically concerns not the search for a political compromise but the regulation of individual cases with the aid of legal criteria. In the opinion of the Commission the course to be followed should be the implementation in the context of the EAGGF of all conciliatory procedures in order to settle amicably any differences of opinion. The procedure within the Council would entail the risk that the Member States might be little inclined to accept an amicable settlement by way of a preliminary procedure because they might hope none the less to impose their views by way of a political compromise. The danger would exist therefore that the Council might be blocked on the question of the discharge of the accounts. The risk would also exist that such cases would be regulated not on the basis of the legal criteria defined in the provisions of the regulations on the organization of the markets and the financial regulations but by way of a general political compromise; that would be incompatible with those provisions and consequently contrary to the Treaty.
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