3.Although a reply to the fourth sub-question, on the direct effect of Article 59, is in the Commission's view unnecessary for a decision in the case by reason of the private nature of the first defendant's rules, its theoretical interest is nevertheless fundamental.As regards freedom to provide services in the sphere of sport, the Council has not yet issued directives implementing the general programme of 18 December 1961, which, under Article 54 (2), should however have been done before the end of the transitional period. In a proposal for a directive of 23 December 1969 (OJ C 21 of 19. 2. 1970) the Commission proposed liberalizing a certain number of activities including sport, but this directive has not yet been adopted by the Council.As regards the directly applicable nature of Article 59, the Commission, after having referred to the case-law of the Court on the direct effect of Articles 48 (Case 167/73 Commission v French Republic [1974] ECR 359), 53 (Case 6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585 615) and 52 (Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 651), states that the provisions of Article 59 — as well as the third paragraph of Article 60 — satisfy the requirements laid down by the Court of Justice for directly applicable provisions: (a) the rule is clear and precise; (b) it is not subject to any reservation; and (c) the implementation of the obligation which it contains is not subject to measures being taken by Member States or Community Institutions.First of all, the rule is clear and precise because the restrictions which Article 59 requires to be abolished are all legal provisions or administrative practices which:(a) require the provider of services to have his address or residence in the country in which he wishes to supply the services in question;(b) give rise to different treatment between nationals of the Community who are resident in the territory of the Member State where the service is supplied and others;(c) apply different treatment based on nationality to the provision of services.This same concept of ‘restrictions’ is moreover likewise employed in Article 62, the direct effect of which has never been doubted by anyone, whereas the Court has already decided that the problems which the national court could have in deciding whether a particular case amounted to a restriction do not present an obstacle to the direct application (Case 2/72 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631).The obligation contained in Article 59 is not subject, at the end of the transitional period, to any reservation, nor to any measures being taken by Member States or Community institutions. Although Article 59 provides that liberalization shall take place ‘within the framework of the provisions set out below’, this clause is given expression in Article 63, providing for the drawing up of a general programme, to be implemented by directives. This general programme has been adopted, while Articles 59 and 63 leave the Council no discretion as to the date when these directives had to be issued. Once the limiting date has expired, the Treaty does not subject the abolition of restrictions either to the directives to be issued or already issued or to directives based on Article 57 of the Treaty relating to the coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action concerning the taking up of professions or the mutual recognition of certificates.
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