law://eu/cjeu/1973/c-177-73/hd_1_1_4@2026-11-17According to the applicant he has a vested right to obtain from the ECSC a resettlement allowance equal to 4 times his former basic salary. At the time of his transfer from the ECSC to the EEC he had preserved his entitlement to a resettlement allowance equal to the abovementioned sum by virtue of Article 99 (3) in conjunction with Article 93 of the transitional provisions annexed to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the ECSC.The fact that the salary scales in force on 31 December 1961 have subsequently doubled cannot be a reason for reducing the amount of the resettlement allowance to a sum of less than half 4 months' basic salary.The doubling of the scales of salary applicable on 31 December 1961 took place simultaneously with a corresponding increase in installation expenses. It would therefore be logical to apply Article 99 (3) of the transitional provisions, taking as the point of departure the applicant's final basic salary.The applicant believes that the attitude of the authors of the provisions in question was conditioned solely by a concern to have regard to vested rights.The applicant stresses that the wording of the provisions in question refers clearly to Article 47 (4) of the Staff Regulations of the ECSC.The applicant takes the view that to discover the exact interpretation of Article 99 (3) it is necessary to take into account the purpose of the remaining transitional provisions, in particular that of Articles 97, 99 (1) and (2), 101 and 102. These provisions also reveal that as regards the expatriation allowance and pension the draftsmen of the Staff Regulations were concerned to preserve intact under the new Staff Regulations rights acquired by the officials in question. The applicant feels that a certain lack of clarity in the wording of Article 99 (3) cannot be interpreted to his disadvantage because, taken as a whole and in conjunction with each other, the transitional provisions in any case give the impression that they are intended to secure and to preserve intact vested rights and claims.The applicant therefore believes that it would be contrary to the principle of execution in good faith to interpret Article 99 (3) as an exceptional provision which must be interpreted in the most restrictive manner rather than as a transitional provision the aim of which is to confirm for the future an already vested right.The applicant's view is that even in the absence of a transitional scheme of the kind envisaged by Article 99 (3), he would have preserved his right to an allowance equal to 4 times his final monthly salary; he has never waived, and cannot be deemed to have waived a promise made to him on the basis of a General Regulation of the Community.According to the defendant the applicant can claim that the resettlement allowance which may eventually be paid to him should in no way be less than the amount which he would have received under Article 12 of the General Regulations of the Community (ECSC).Article 12 fixes this allowance on the basis of 4 months' salary. The amount which would have been payable under Article 12 of the former General Regulations would not in any event have exceeded 4 months' salary, calculated on the basis of the salary scale in force only until 31 December 1961. The defendant interprets the scheme laid down by Article 99 (3) as follows:Although as a general rule the resettlement allowance is equal to only two months' salary calculated according to the salary scale in force at the date of termination of service, nevertheless in a case where 4 months' salary calculated according to the former salary scale could, in respect of an employee employed by an institution of the ECSC before 1 January 1962 who left it after that date, amount to a higher allowance, this latter amount would be for this employee the minimum amount (and at the same time the maximum, in this case) of his entitlement, and this in derogation from the provisions of the new Staff Regulations — a derogation which is itself dictated by a desire to safeguard established rights.In the opposite case, where two months' salary calculated on the basis of the present salary scale, would amount to more than 4 months' salary calculated on the basis of the salary scale in force on 31 December 1961, the general rule would apply and it would be the higher amount (2 months according to the present scale) which would have to be paid to the official.In support of this interpretation the defendant refers to the fact that the actual wording of Article 99 (3) of the 1962 ECSC Regulations is limited to stating that the amount of the allowance due to an official affected by this provision cannot be less than the amount which would have been payable under the former Article 12.If the intention of the draftsmen of the 1962 ECSC Staff Regulations had been that the allowance of four months' salary due to employees referred to in Article 99 (3) should be calculated on the basis of the new salary scale, there would have been no reason for them to have employed the phrase ‘may not be less’ which conjures up an idea of comparison and checking which necessarily has to be carried out.This interpretation of Article 99 (3) has regard to:— The desire shown by the draftsmen of the 1962 Regulations not to prejudice old employees through the amendment of the Regulations reducing by half the number of months taken into account in determining the resettlement allowance.— The balance of the alteration of the salary scale and the stricter definition which they have given to the rules governing resettlement allowance.— The reasonable concern not to grant old employees an additional advantage which would have arisen from the calculation of the allowance on the basis not only of the number of months formerly and still granted but in addition on the basis of the new salary scale.— The principle illustrated by Article 102 (5) of the Regulations at present in force, which entails that rights acquired under the system of the former Regulations may not lead, by a combination of the old and new provisions, to the grant of excessive advantages, which could not arise either under the old system or under the current one.Article 99 (3) of the ECSC Regulations, which is the only context in which the old Article. 12 survives, is a provision concerning, not the conditions for entitlement to resettlement allowance, but the payment of the amount of this allowance. As regards the minimum distance from the place of his former employment at which the official must resettle to be able to claim the resettlement allowance, it is clear that this distance must be 70 km under Article 6 (4), Annex VII of. the new Regulations and not 25 km under Article 12 (e) of the former General Regulations.Under Article 6, Annex VII, which does not readopt the provisions, of the former Article 12 (f) under which ‘the declaration of resettlement must be notified in writing within one. year of termination of service’, this formality is no longer required of former ECSC officials, even those recruited before 1 January 1962.In the case where the official dies the allowance may be paid to his widow or ‘to the dependants within the meaning of Article 2’ of Annex VII, whereas under the former Article 12 (c) the resettlement allowance was provided for the widow, or if there was none, ‘to dependent children’ only.For these reasons the defendant considers that Article 6 of Annex VII of the present Regulations has complete authority as regards the conditions of entitlement to resettlement allowance. There is no provision in Article 99 (3) referring to the former Article 12 (f) and keeping it in force.Since it is a question only of the payment of the allowance, the defendant considers that Article 99 (3) of the 1962 ECSC Regulations has introduced simply a relative and not an absolute derogation from the provisions of Article 6 of Annex VII to the present Regulations. If today there is still cause to refer to the former Article 12, having regard to Article 99 (3) of the 1962 ECSC Regulations, still in force, it is only insofar as Article 12 establishes the rules for paying the allowance. It is thus basically a question of Article 12 (a), which provides that the allowance is four months for an official who is head of household and two months for an official who is not so. The former rule applies only insofar as it derogates from the present general rule.Not having survived as such in the present rule, the former Article 12 (d) does not, properly speaking, establish vested rights in favour of former ECSC officials who took up duties before 1 January 1962 and who are currently leaving the service. At present they have the same right to have their allowance paid on the basis of the last salary which was paid to them; they have this right however not as vested right but solely under the wording of Article 6 (3) of Annex VII to the present Regulations which is included in a system under the Regulations which lays down differently the conditions of payment of the allowance.The derogation in Article 6 (1) of Annex VII to the Regulations provided for in Article 99 (3) must in any case be interpreted strictly: it can only be limited to referring to the conditions of payment of the allowance such as they were in force before 1 January 1962. These were necessarily determined in relation to a particular salary scale.The restrictive interpretation has the merit of doing the less violence to the principle of equality of treatment within the same body, which is a firm principle and applies strictly to an administration save express and unequivocal derogation.In order that there should be a vested right on the basis of the former Regulations to pecuniary benefits arising from the termination of service, it is necessary for all the facts giving rise to the right to have occurred while the former rules were in force. The official cannot on principle be entitled at the time of his resettlement to have the amount of his benefit calculated solely on the basis of rules which were previously in force but which have ceased to be so.According to the Commission, writers and national case law agree on this point, and as Mr Advocate-General Roemer has stressed in his Opinion in Boursin v High Authority (Case 102/63, Rec. 1964, p. 1394) it is right to refer to the national laws relating to public office and their principles for the solution of actual legal problems relating to the Staff Regulations of the Communities.There is no entitlement to the benefits recognized by the Regulations except insofar as all the facts giving rise to the right occurred while the Regulations were in force. ‘This argument … is the logical consequence of the notion that the official is not in a contractual position but in one governed by Regulations, for the Staff Regulations are true Regulations which can always be amended by the competent authority’ Mr Advocate-General Gand in Pasetti v Commission (Case 20/68, Rec. 1969, p. 251).A transitional provision issued on transition to a less generous system does not normally aim to give employees more extensive rights than those they had under the system which is revoked: Mr Advocate-General Gand in Chuffart and others v Commission (Cases 60 and 62/69, Rec. 1970, p. 641).If it were accepted Article 99 (3) allowed the grant of an allowance equal to four months' salary on the basis of the current salary scale, the result would be to ‘give employees more extensive rights than those they had under the system which is revoked’, which limited the allowance to four months' salary on the basis of the old salary scale.There was no oral procedure since the parties declined to be heard orally.The Advocate-General delivered his opinion on 4 July 1974.
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