law://eu/cjeu/1973/c-121-73/hd_1_1_2_4@2026-11-16On an overall analysis of the Treaty provisions applicable in respect of aid, the German Government observes that the prohibition in Article 92 (1) does not apply to all grants of aid but only to those which affect trade between Member States and distort competition. That is why the prohibition is addressed solely to Member States and has no direct effect. The importance attached to safeguarding the interests of Member States is also evident from the power conferred on the Council by Article 93 (2), third indent, to grant exemptions in exceptional circumstances.The German Government submits that the answer to the first question should be in the negative. According to Article 93 (3), the control exercised over aid schemes makes use of a twofold procedure. The compulsory notification by a Member State of its proposals to grant aid is to enable the Commission to give its opinion, either that there is no objection to the introduction of the proposed scheme, or that since some objections do appear a formal scrutiny has been commenced. The latter indicates that the notification procedure has given way to the investigation procedure. During the notification procedure no step may be taken towards implementing the proposals for aid, since the first sentence of Article 93 (3) states that notification must allow the Commission time to make its comments. It would in any event be contrary to logic and the system of preventive control for a Member State to be able to adopt during the initial period measures which might later be prohibited under the investigation procedure.Neither the wording nor the purpose of Article 93 (3) requires the Commission to give a final decision at the end of the notification procedure. Since the prohibition in Article 92 does not have direct effect, it would be sufficient for the Commission to make known by informal means that it has no objection to the proposed aid. Even where the Commission terminates the notification procedure by initiating the investigatory procedure mentioned in the second sentence of Article 93 (3), a formal decision would not be necessary, since it would be incompatible with the purely informative nature of the initial procedure to appeal against any such decision.This interpretation, confirmed by the practice followed by the Commission, accords with the draft regulation submitted to the Council by the Commission in 1966, on the application of some of the provisions in Article 93. Indeed Article 1 allows Member States to implement the plans notified as soon as the Commission shows, expressly or by lapse of a certain period, that it has no objection to make.The requirements of legal certainty mentioned by the court of reference in support of the requirement of a final decision, would be as well assured, as regards matters affecting only Member States and institutions, by certifying as to compatibility or by notification that a formal inquiry had been initiated.As to the consequences of the Commission's failure to act after the necessary period for reaching an opinion on the aid proposals notified has elapsed (question two), the opinion of the German Government is that the restriction based on the first sentence of Article 93 (3) subsists only for a certain period which varies according to the particular case and that when that period has elapsed, the aid plan, if properly notified, may be implemented.This was the result envisaged by the Commission in its draft regulation on the application of some of the provisions in Article 93. Moreover, the same view was maintained by Mr Advocate-General Mayras in Case No 70/72 (Commission v Federal Republic of Germany). The period within which the Commission must make known any objections must be gauged, in each case, in-the light of the urgency of the aid proposed and the needs of the Commission regarding information.If the Commission has given a favourable opinion, any subsequent reservations it may have only entitle it to initiate a procedure under Article 93 (2), which does not have suspensory effect. If the Commission has allowed the period for consideration to elapse, the position is no different. It might be different in the event of the procedure having been initated after the consideration period but prior to the implementing of the proposals. But that is not the case before the Court.To the third question, the German Government would reply that a ptocedure initiated against a system of aid introduced after expiry of the consideration period could only be based on Article 93 (2) and thus be effective only as to the future.As to the fourth question, the German Government considers that infringement of the prohibition contained in Article 93 (3), last sentence, cannot have the consequence of invalidating the national law in question but can make it inapplicable while no final decision has been given by the Commission. It is evident from the reasoning of the Court in Case 34/67 (Judgment of 4 April 1968, Luck, Rec. 1968, p. 370) that where Community regulations having direct effect are concerned, the national courts may adopt measures which guarantee the precedence of Community law, without necessarily having to declare the national law void.Furthermore, the national law adopted in breach of the prohibition expressed in the last sentence of Article 93 (3) is not deprived of effect permanently, but only subject to the final decision of the Commission on its compatibility with the common market.In reply to the fifth question, the German Government is wholly in accord with the Judgment of the Court of Justice given on 15 July 1964 (Case 6/64 Costa v Enel, Rec. 1964, p. 1162), which states that the third sentence of Article 93 (3) confers direct rights on private parties. The inapplicability of the law in question, given the precedence of Community law, must be automatically considered.The report for the hearing reproduced above was followed by oral proceedings.
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