law://eu/cjeu/1972/c-72-72/hd_1_1_2_1@2026-11-22By Article 226 (i), this Article is only applicable during the transitional period provided for in Article 8 of the EEC Treaty. Although Article 8 (1) provides that the Common Market shall be progressively established during a transitional period of twelve years, it is clear from Article 8 (5) and (7) that this period might be curtailed in certain economic sectors. Regulation No 120/67 of the Council of 13 June 1967 constitutes a measure by which the Common Market, in a certain economic sector, was definitively established. This thesis is corroborated by Article 7 of the Regulation No 120/67, whereby the intervention agencies are obliged to purchase cereals harvested in the Community which are offered to them. It follows from this, that the transitional period for the common market in cereals ended on 1 July 1967, the date of entry into force of this Regulation. The reservations set forth in Articles 28 and 32 of Regulation No 120/67 relate only to some points of procedure and are not of such a nature as to conflict with the thesis developed above.Article 226, then, can no longer form a sufficient legal foundation for adopting a decision authorizing a Member State to take protective measures in the economic sector in question.Baer-Getreide also emphasizes that as the disturbances in the cereals market stemmed from the economic difficulties in France, the sole efficacious remedy is recourse to the procedures provided for in Article 105 of the EEC Treaty. Per contra, since Article 226 is not the appropriate instrument to remedy the causes of the disturbances, it was inapplicable in the present case.
This Decision was founded principally on three arguments:1. French cereals came into Germany at a price well below the intervention price, which situation engendered an abnormal increase in the cereal trade;2. homegrown cereals disappeared almost entirely from the distributive networks in Germany;3. the storage facilities available to the German intervention agencies were already inadequate, when the Decision was adopted, to cope with the quantities tendered for intervention.Regarding the first argument, Baer-Getreide observes that after Regulation No 120/67 came into force, imports of French cereals to Germany increased, a completely normal development in view of the inability of German production to supply its domestic requirements. The second argument is not founded in fact. Lastly, the third argument is not justified. On the basis of data supplied to them by the EVSt, Baer-Getreide submitted that the reserves of storage available to the intervention agency at the beginning of May 1969 amounted to 1500000 metric tons.Total storage capacity at the beginning of May 1969: | 7000000 tQuantity stored towards the end of April 1969: | 5500000 tReserves of storage | 15000000 tThe Commission must submit data to the Court to prove that homegrown cereals had in fact disappeared from normal distribution networks in Germany. To this end, a valid criterion was the information on the quantity of German cereals for which the carry-over payment provided for by Article 9 of Regulation No 120/67, had been claimed at the end of the 1968/69 season. Then, the Commission must submit figures which would make it possible to calculate, on the one hand, the reserves of storage in Germany at the time, and on the other hand, the increase in tenders of cereals of French origin for intervention in the years 1968/69 and 1969/70.Baer-Getreide maintains that the reserves of storage available at the end of May 1969, according to its calculations, were fully adequate, to cope with the quantity likely to be tendered for intervention in the near future. From a comparison of Regulations Nos 120/67, 444/68 of the Council of 9 April 1968 (OJ No L 91/1) prescribing the monthly price increases for cereals and flour, groats and meal of wheat or rye for the season 1969/70, it emerges that tenders for intervention of common wheat and barley from the season 1968/69 would have ceased after 31 May 1969, because from 1 June 1969 the intervention price for the season 1969/70, which was at a lower level than the increased intervention price for the year 1968/69, (9-50 units of account as opposed to 10-45 units of account) had to be applied to intervention purchases. Since the profits from the variations in the rate of exchange of the French franc were not such as to compensate for the reduction of the intervention price, the influx of French cereals would inevitably have come to a halt after 31 May 1969. Consequently, it could not be expected that the reserves of storage in existence when the Decision was adopted would be exhausted by the tenders for intervention of French cereals from the season 1968/69.
By Article 226 (1), the protective measures therein referred to should make it possible ‘to rectify the situation’. The measures provided for by the Decision would only have been appropriate to achieve this aim if imports of common wheat and barley of French origin to Germany had been the cause of the difficulties. According to Baer-Getreide, the scarcity of reserves of storage was caused in the first place by the plentiful harvest in Germany during the season 1968/1969 and in the second place by the neglect of the competent authorities to reduce their stocks in time by denaturing or sale on the world market.The rules relating to the monthly increases in the intervention prices, provided for by Regulations Nos 120/67 and 444/68, meant that, at the end of May 1969, almost all the excess French cereals had already been tendered for intervention. The Decision in question could therefore only have had a very slight effect and was not of such a nature as to eliminate the alleged difficulties.Even supposing that a considerable quantity of French cereals remained on the market, the Decision in question was inefficacious. As they remained free to import French cereals to Germany after 8 May 1969, buyers were always able to supply themselves with French products and replace the homegrown cereals already in stock with French cereals, tendering the former for intervention. A diminution in the quantities tendered for intervention appeared improbable while this means of avoidance was available.In this respect, Baer-Getreide criticises the provisions of Article 2 of the disputed Decision since, they claim, these provisions encouraged German flour mills to use only French cereals imported after 8 May 1969. On the assumption that German flour mills had French cereals in stock when the Decision was adopted, it was to be expected that these stores would remain intact. It was unrealistic to think that traders would replace cereals for which they received on 31 July 1969 the whole carryover payment provided for by Article 9 of Regulation No 120/67, by quantities of new cereals for which this payment was only partial. It must be concluded, then, that the Decision was in any case inefficacious.
It follows from the fact that, for the season 1968/69, the effects of the Decision could only cover the period until 31 May 1969, that the protective measures were unnecessary for the year 1968/69.The same conclusion is valid for the season 1969/70, if account is taken of the fact that the Decision was not of such a nature as to eliminate the causes of the difficulties in the cereals market.Finally, Baer-Getreide claims that the Commission took a false step in suspending the intervention purchase of French cereals. Such a measure was a direct infringement of the intervention, mechanism, the foundation of the common organization of the cereals market, and caused a discrimination against French cereals. On the other hand, Regulation No 120/67 has provided instruments suited to eliminating these difficulties while leaving the organization of the market intact, viz grants of denaturing premiums and the increase of refunds for exports to third countries. A third instrument, corresponding to the principles of the organisation of the market, was recourse to intervention B, referred to in Article 8 of Regulation No 120/67, which could encourage those concerned to put excess cereals in store on their own account. It is clear that from 1 August 1969 these three methods have been put in operation, and not without effect.It emerges from these findings that the Commission ought to have availed itself of these methods, which disturb the functioning of the common market in cereals less than a suspension of intervention purchases. The Decision is thus invalid due to infringement of Article 226 (3).
The Commission oudined the origins of the influx of cereals into Germany, and disclosed that in comparison with the preceding season the import of French cereals had tripled during the year 1968/69; imports of common wheat had increased to 1292789 t as against 326112 t during the year 1967/68, and of barley to 953466 t as against 598092 t.As the German market was only partially able to absorb these exorbitant quantities, most of the imported cereals would have had to be purchased by intervention, which would have led to the rapid exhaustion of the reserves of storage, which were already considerably reduced.The Commission emphasized also that due to the difference in price between German cereals and imported cereals, the former had been almost entirely replaced in the usual distribution networks, subjecting the reserves of storage to additional stress.
As tender for intervention was the sole way by which German farmers could dispose of their products, which were dearer than French cereals, due to fluctuations in the real parity of the French franc, it was most important to keep this route open. Due to exceptional tenders of French cereals for intervention the reserves of storage at the disposal of German intervention agencies had been in danger of exhaustion, at the latest by the end of the season 1969/70. In support of this thesis the Commission referred to the figures made available to it by the German Government:Total storage capacity during the year 1969/70 | 5600000 tQuantity expected to be in storage on 31 July 1969 | 4600000 tAnticipated intervention purchase during the year 1969/70 | 2300000 tDeficit of reserves | 1300000 tFaced with the serious consequences, for the German producers, of an imminent deficit of reserves of storage, it was essential to ensure that these last reserves were not used up by an unusual influx of French cereals.
At the time of the adoption of the decision there was no prospect of disposing of the cereals in storage on the world market in the near future. For that reason it was necessary to choose between the two following options: a considerable extension of storage capacity or else a freeze of the influx of French cereals for intervention. At first, efforts were made to increase the storage capacity, but it became rapidly apparent that the measures were inefficacious and too expensive.The following measures would have been necessary:1. Removal of a quantity of 1330000 t in order to make the most efficient use of the existing reserves of storage. The costs of such an operation amounted to a figure of 21000000 DM.2. The preservation of supplementary reserves of storage would have been difficult and burdensome given the general lack of storage capacity in Germany. The gravity of the situation was illustrated by the fact that considerable quantities of cereals were stored in barges and even in Army tents.3. Certain quantities were transported to the Netherlands and Belgium, which practice was rapidly stopped because of the high transport costs. The notion of having the German surplus transported to France was rejected, as it was considered unacceptable to support with Community funds, and thus at the expense of the Community taxpayers, the costs of a purposeless traffic solely to enable certain merchants to enrich themselves without risk.4. The effects of intervention B would have been insufficient to remedy the lack of storage capacity. Furthermore the use of this method is extremely onerous (the costs of intervention B in Germany amounted to approximately 132000000 DM).In these circumstances the only reasonable solution was to check the influx of French cereals for intervention. To this end two possibilities presented themselves, viz to reduce French exports to a tolerable level or to restrict intervention measures in Germany to the existing storage capacity.Since the first possibility involved measures limiting the freedom of intra-Community trade, such as the prohibition or quota restriction of imports to Germany or the operation of a system of compensatory levies, the Commission chose the second solution, which scarcely effected the functioning of the common market in cereals. Thus only the deflection of trade, caused by the fluctuation in the parity of the French franc, were eliminated. The Commission submits that its Decision of 8 May 1969 satisfied both the formal and the substantive requirements of Article 226.
The Commission, referring to the judgment of 11 February 1971 in the case of Rewe-Zentrale, Case 37/70, Rec. 1971, page 23, points out that there is no doubt that Article 226 provides a legal basis for protective measures within the framework of the organization of the agricultural markets. The thesis defended by Baer-Getreide in the main action, according to which Article 8 of Regulation No 120/67 constituted a lex specialis replacing on this matter the lex generalis of Article 226, is wrong, since it fails to recognize the principle whereby a rule of secondary Community law cannot suspend a provision of primary Community law.The Commission further points out that the Decision was adopted at the request of the German Government during the transitional period, and it was revoked prior to the end of that period, so that the formal requirements of Article 226 had been satisfied.The Commission claims in the first place that it possesses a wide power of appraisal with regard to the substantive requirements for the application of Article 226. The fact that the application of this Article is based on an appraisal of economic factors, on the one hand, and the necessities of economic policy on the other, lead to this conclusion; moreover, this is borne out by Article 226 (2), which provides that the Commission shall ‘determine … the protective measures which it considers necessary’. The Court's supervision of the legality of the disputed Decision should thus be restricted to a peripheral examination of the Commission's appraisal of the factors concentrating in particular on the three following points:(a) Was the Commission's appraisal founded on facts which were substantially correct?(b) Was the appraisal of the factors correct?(c) Was the adoption of a measure manifestly less at variance with the rules of the Common Market excluded?According to the Commission, an examination of these three points established that its Decision of 8 May 1969 was well-founded.
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