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In Case 22/70COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, represented by Gérard Olivier, Assistant Director-General of its Legal Department, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of its Legal Adviser, Émile Reuter, 4 boulevard Royal,vCOUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, represented by Ernst Wohlfart, Legal Adviser to the Council and Director-General of its General-Secretariat, acting as Agent, assisted by Jean-Pierre Puissochet, Director of the General Secretariat of the Council, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of J.N. Van den Houten, Director of the Legal Department of the European Investment Bank, 2 place de Metz,THE COURTcomposed of: R. Lecourt, President, A. M. Dormer and A. Trabucchi, Presidents of Chambers, R. Monaco, J. Mertens de Wilmars, P. Pescatore (Rapporteur) and H. Kutscher, Judges,Advocate-General: A. Dutheillet de LamotheRegistrar: A. Van Houttegives the following
Judgment
Issues of fact and of law
I —Summary of the facts
The European Agreement concerning the work of crews of vehicles engaged in international road transport (AETR) was signed at Geneva on 19 January 1962 under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe by five of the six Member States of the EEC and a number of other European States.However, since a sufficient number of ratifications was not obtained, this agreement did not enter into force.In 1967 negotiations for the revision of the said agreement were resumed, initially within the framework of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport in Paris and subsequently under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe at Geneva.Similar work undertaken at Community level with regard to standardizing driving and rest periods of drivers of road transport vehicles resulted in Regulation No 543/69 of the Council of 25 March 1969 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport (OJ L 77 of 29. 3. 1969, p. 49).In the course of its 107th meeting on 20 March 1970 the Council, in view of the meeting of the sub-committee on Road Transport of the Economic Commission for Europe of 1 to 3 April 1970 at Geneva, discussed in particular the attitude to be taken by the six Member States of the EEC in the current negotiations for the conclusion of a new European Agreement on the work of crews of vehicles engaged in international road transport.The Member States conducted and concluded the negotiations in accordance with the proceedings of 20 March 1970.The AETR was made available by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe from 1 July 1970 for signature by the Member States.
II —Procedure
On 19 May 1970 the Commission of the European Communities lodged the present application for the annulment of the proceedings of the Council of 20 March 1970 regarding the negotiation and conclusion of the AETR by the Member States of the EEC.By a document lodged on 21 July 1970 the Council applied to the Court under Article 91(1) of the Rules of Procedure for a decision on a procedural issue to the effect that the Commission's application was inadmissible and that it be dismissed. In the observations which it lodged on 24 September 1970 the Commission requested the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection or at least to reserve its decision for the final judgment.Having heard the report of the Judge-Rapporteur and the views of the Advocate-General, the Court decided, by an order of 14 October 1970, to reserve the decision on the preliminary objection for the final judgment.After the President of the Court had prescribed new time-limits for continuing proceedings, the written procedure followed the normal course.However, the Council refrained from supplementing its defence by a rejoinder.Having heard the report of the Judge-Rapporteur and the views of the Advocate-General, the Court decided to open the oral procedure without any preparatory inquiry.At the request of the Court, however, the Council lodged various documents, including an extract from the minutes of its meeting of 20 March 1970.The oral submissions of the parties were put forward at the hearing on 11 February 1971.The Advocate-General delivered his opinion at the hearing on 10 March 1971.
III —Conclusions of the parties
The Commission claims that the Court should:‘annul with all legal consequences the proceedings of the Council of 20 March 1970 relating to the negotiation and conclusion of the AETR by the Member States.’The Council contends that the Court should:‘declare the Commission's application inadmissible or, alternatively, dismiss it as unfounded.’
IV —Submissions and arguments of the parties
The submissions and arguments of the parties may be summarized as follows:
A —Admissibility
The Council maintains that its proceedings of 20 March 1970 do not constitute an act, within the meaning of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, against which proceedings may be instituted.(a) After first reviewing the essential characteristics of the case-law of the Court with regard to admissibility, asserting that in proceedings between institutions admissibility must be strictly appraised, the defendant maintains that even if the proceedings in dispute were to be considered as one of the measures referred to in Article 189 they do not constitute, whether with regard to their form, objective or content, a regulation, decision or directive and thus are not an act, within the meaning of Article 173, against which proceedings may be brought; on any view they have not conferred any right, imposed any obligation or altered any legal situation; since they have no binding legal effect no action may be brought in respect of them.(b) Although matters of form are not conclusive it must be observed that the present case mainly involves proceedings of the Council leading to the emergence of an agreed position, accompanied by declarations of intent having political rather than legal significance.Moreover, these proceedings were neither published nor notified to the Member States, as would have been required under Article 191 if the Council had intended to adopt a decision or directive binding on the Member States and empowering or requiring them to take action.(c) With regard to the subject matter and purport of the disputed proceedings, at its meeting of 20 March 1970 the Council confined itself, after an exchange of views, to taking note of the cooperation established between the Member States in the course of negotiations on the AETR and expressing its political aproval of this agreement. The contested proceedings thus merely represent the finding that the endeavours of the Member States to adopt a common position had a specific outcome, which was duly noted as such.(d) Whatever authority is competent under the Treaty to negotiate and conclude the AETR, the contested proceedings could neither have empowered nor required the Member States to take any action in this connexion. In fact:— if the States are competent, the Council has no authority to ‘restore’ to the States a power conferred on the Community by the Treaty;— If the Community is competent only where the agreement to be negotiated and concluded might involve modification of a Community regulation already in force, the situation must be analysed on the basis of one of the two foregoing hypotheses.(e) Analysis of the effects which might be produced by the annulment of the proceedings of the Council of 20 March 1970 confirms that they have no legal effect. Such an annulment would invalidate the proceedings, that is to say the finding as to the coordination between the States, but not the actual fact of that coordination; it therefore seems neither necessary nor sufficient for the attainment of the real objective desired by the Commission, namely to have the negotiation of the AETR by the Member States declared incompatible with the Treaty.(f) If the Commission considered that the hypothesis attributing authority to the Community was well founded, it ought to have taken the measures necessary for the exercise of this authority; by allowing the negotiations to proceed without bringing the matter before the Court until those negotiations were concluded the Commission is largely responsible for the situation thus created.(g) Alternatively, if it is conceded that the disputed proceedings constitute a decision against which an action may be brought, the Council pleads that the present application is out of time; the contested proceedings merely repeat principles accepted at least since 1969 with regard to the negotiation and conclusion of the AETR.With regard to the objections of inadmissibility raised by the Council, the Commission submits essentially the following arguments:(a) There is no justification for the assertion that the admissibility of an action brought by an institution must be more strictly appraised than that of one brought by an individual.Moreover, the case-law of the Court provides no decisive ground for instituting a strict parallel between two classifications—that of the first paragraph of Article 173 and that of Article 189 — which are concerned with different matters.(b) Matters of form may not be considered as decisive in determining the nature of an act.There is no merit in the argument relating to the absence of publication or of notification: no measure of national law was necessary to give effect to the contested proceedings, and in any event the absence of publication or of notification of an act have no direct bearing on its classification.(c) As to the subject-matter and purport of the contested act, it is clear both from the minutes of the Council meeting and from the documents annexed (press release dated 21 March 1970, summary of decisions taken by the Council at its meeting on 20 March, and report of 7 April 1970 concerning the negotiations leading to the AETR) that the Council settled decisively a question of international negotiations which manifestly had to be resolved and which had been specially considered.The Council did not confine itself to recognizing the coordination existing between the Member States; it adopted an attitude which, as a matter of law, must at the very least be regarded as amounting to approval. Furthermore, actual directives on the negotiations were issued to the Member States. The results of the Council's decision, moreover, were not slow in making themselves felt—namely, the lack of any Community involvement in the formulation and conclusion of the AETR and the participation in this agreement of the Member States alone.The disputed proceedings cannot be treated as merely an exchange of views pursuant to Articles 6 and 145 of the EEC Treaty. In any event, the fact that there was an exchange of views does not exclude the possibility that this led to the adoption of a decision.According to the Court's case-law there is a decision against which an action for annulment may be brought whenever an institution determines unambiguously the attitude it will henceforth take when certain conditions are fulfilled. This is just such a case.(d) The Council's attempt to define the nature of the contested act by a posteriori reasoning based on a distinction between the two possible hypotheses—authority exercised by the State or the Community—seems quite artificial and simply begs the question.The argument that the Council's proceedings could have no legal effect because it had no power to authorize the Member States to negotiate and conclude an agreement such as the AETR implies that there can never be annulment on the ground of lack of authority.It does not matter that the Council had no intention of ‘restoring’ to the Member States a power reserved to the Community; the nature of an act cannot depend on an investigation into the purity of its authors' intentions in relation to the Treaty.(e) The inadmissibility of the application cannot be deduced from the consequences which would follow from the Court's annulment of the contested act.Rather than indulge in possibly hazardous conjecture as to the results of a possible annulment, consideration should be given to the act itself and the consequences which have in fact followed from it. Here the Council again begs the question: the premise of its argument is that the only purpose of its deliberation was to recognize the coordination between the States, the conclusion being that annulment of that deliberation would not affect the reality of such coordination. To assert that the annulment of the contested act cannot affect the behaviour of Member States amounts to an assumption that the States would abide by a judgment of the Court but would not regard a decision of annulment as having the authority of res judicata.(f) The objection that the Commission is largely responsible for the situation complained of is inaccurate in fact and irrelevant in law. Various steps taken by the Commission left no doubt as to the purport and effect of the decision which it requested the Council to take.Even if the objection were well-founded, it provides no basis for arguing either that no act of the Council existed or that the application is inadmissible.(g) The objection that the application is out of time ignores the consequences of the adoption of Regulation No 543/69 and disregards the very idea of a progressive establishment of the common transport policy in the course of the transitional period. Moreover, it is contrary to the facts, since the Commission did in fact request the Council to involve the Community in the negotiation of the AETR.
B —Substance
Arguments relating to the infringement of the EEC TreatyThe Commission submits that the negotiation and conclusion of the AETR, involving as it did a matter arising out of the common transport policy and governed by Community law within the territory of the six Member States since Regulation No 543/69 came into force, could only be carried out by the Community.
1. Infringement of Articles 75 and 228
The Commission is of opinion that the legal basis of an agreement such as the AETR is to be found in Article 75 (1) of the Treaty and that the procedure to be followed for its negotiation and conclusion is defined by Article 228.(a) Article 75 (1) provides, within the framework of the common transport policy, the legal foundation for Community action with respect to third countries. Doubtless the Community must respect the limits and conditions imposed by Articles 74 to 84; but Article 75 (1) (c) provides that, for the purpose of implementing the objectives of the Treaty regarding the common transport policy, there shall be laid down ‘any other appropriate provisions’. The very general wording of the provision as a whole leave room for the exercise by the Community of treaty-making powers; and express provision would be needed to limit Community action to unilateral measures.(b) This interpretation of Article 75 (1) of the Treaty is in accordance with common sense, with the ratio legis and with the principle that provisions should be given their full effect. It would have been unreasonable to provide for a common policy in a field as extensive as transport without conferring on the Community the means of taking appropriate action in respect of external relations, particularly since transport by its very nature frequently involves an international aspect transcending the framework of the Community alone.(c) The Commission states that the Council itself recognized this state of affairs in providing, in Article 4 (2) of Regulation No 117/66 of 28 July 1966, on the introduction of common rules for the international carriage of passengers by coach and bus (OJ No 147, p. 2688), and Article 3 of Regulation No 543/69, which is in question and was adopted on the sole basis of Article 75, that ‘the Community shall enter into any negotiations with third countries which may prove necessary for the purpose of implementing this regulation’.(d) The Commission does not seek to deny that Community powers have been conferred restrictively and that the institutions only have such powers as have been conferred on them. But this restriction, as far as external agreements are concerned, does not arise from Article 228 of the Treaty; the latter was designed to lay down general rules, mainly of a procedural nature, on the conclusion and effects of international agreements entered into by the Community. It is Article 75 which, in the sphere of transport, provides the basis and defines the limits of Community powers in relation to external agreements.Nor does the Commission claim by virtue of Article 75 of the Treaty exclusive competence on the part of the Community regarding all agreements which might be entered into with third countries in the sphere of transport. The same principles which govern unilateral measures of the countries when the latter have an immediate and direct impact on the content or scope of provisions applicable within the Community. Member States retain their powers only so long as the Community has not exercised its own, that is, has not in fact adopted common provisions. Conversely, where and to the extent to which the Community actually laid down such regulations, Member States lose their authority to legislate at the same level, and can only be called upon to take such measures as may be necessary to implement the Community provisions.Thus, as Community rules enter into force Community powers on the topics thereby dealt with become, progressively, exclusive.(e) There is a direct and far-reaching conflict between Regulation No 543/69 and the AETR. The regulation is based on the principle of territoriality and the AETR on that of nationality; the AETR could therefore be applied in the Community only by restricting the scope of Regulation No 543/69, jeopardizing the general principle of territoriality, and abandoning the uniformity of arrangements within the Community. Furthermore, as regards their substantive content, several provisions of the AETR are at variance with the corresponding provisions of the regulation.(f) Since Article 75 (1) (c) authorizes the Community institutions to lay down any ‘appropriate provisions’ for the purpose of implementing the common transport policy, it is doubtless for the Council to consider in each case whether it is desirable to enter into an agreement with third countries, but the Council's discretion does not extend to deciding whether to proceed through inter-governmental or Community channels.(g) To concede that Member States are still empowered to enter into the AETR would, as regards the exercise of Community powers, have the following principal consequences:— Since the AETR involves a restriction in the scope of Regulation No 543/69, the competent Community institutions would have to choose between denying Member States the facilities for applying the agreement, or acknowledging the restriction imposed by the agreement on the scope of the Community regulation.— Even assuming that the Community regulation and the AETR were in harmony to begin with, such harmony could only be maintained by making any modification of the Community system dependent on the agreement of the Member States; any development of the Community system would thus, in violation of a fundamental rule governing the working of the Community institutions, be dependent on the unanimous agreement of the Member States.— Within the Community, identical provisions covering comparable situations would be interpreted by different authorities: the Court of Justice of the Communities for Community regulations, and national authorities—if not Ministers of Foreign Affairs—for agreements with third countries.The Council contends that Article 75 (1) does not confer on the Community exclusive authority to conclude agreements in the sphere of transport.(a) By providing that the Council shall ‘lay down’ certain ‘provisions’, that article quite clearly refers to the formulation of unilateral measures, and does not include the conclusion of international agreements.The Commission's argument that an express provision would have been needed to restrict Community action to unilateral measures cannot be accepted. The EEC Treaty does not confer on the Community treaty-making powers precisely co-extensive with its internal authority; because certain matters arise out of the Treaty it does not follow that authority to deal with their external aspects has changed hands. The power of the Community to promulgate legal measures was deliberately confined to unilateral measures except where unequivocal provisions such as Articles 111, 113 and 238 has conferred authority on the Community to enter into international agreements.(b) Article 75 (1), especially subparagraph (c), still has ‘full effect’, even if that only involves authority to adopt rules by means of a unilateral legal measure. The sphere of transport may well involve international aspects, but this is no argument against its being regulated by unilateral national or Community provisions.(c) Article 4 (2) of Regulation No 117/66 and Article 3 of Regulation No 543/69 cannot be interpreted as recognizing a general authority on the part of the Community, based on Arti cle 75, to enter into international agreements.(d) The fact that Community rules exist which have the same subject matter as the AETR does not necessarily require that this agreement must be entered into by the Community itself.Even if it is conceded that Article 75 (1) (c) may confer on the Community authority to enter into international agreements, such authority cannot be general and exclusive, but at the most incidental. It is thus indispensable that in each case the Council should decide whether the matter is to be dealt with by unilateral measures or by treaty, and, in the latter case, whether the international agreement should be concluded by the Community or by the Member States.(e) If the Commission was of the opinion that it held directly from the Treaty the authority to undertake negotiations in the name of the Community, it was, to say the least, inconsistent in not making use of that authority and submitting a proposal. Inasmuch as no decision based on Article 75 has established authority on the part of the Community, the Member States must, on any view of the matter, still retain their powers.
2. Other submissions (infringement of Article 235; failure to state reasons)
As an alternative, the Commission points out that even if Article 75 is not considered an adequate legal basis for the Community's external powers with regard to the AETR, the conditions envisaged by Article 235 are satisfied.For this provision to be applicable, first, it must appear that action by the Community is necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community, and secondly, the Treaty must have failed to provide for the necessary powers.The second conditions must be satisfied if it is accepted that Article 75 (and indeed Article 113) cannot be taken into consideration.The necessity for action by the Community follows from the existence of Community rules covering the same ground as the AETR.The Council thus had power to adopt ‘the appropriate measures’; it is generally accepted that this provision, by reason of its wording, permits the creation of new powers in the sphere of treaty relations with third countries. Article 235 leaves no room for a policy decision as to whether it is better to act through intergovernmental or Community channels. If, within the framework of the Treaty, action should prove really necessary to ‘attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community’, it must be taken through Community channels.In this connexion it is not sufficient that the Member States should jointly enter into the AETR and concert their activities with the Community institutions. Such ‘concerted action’ does not comply with the provisions in the Treaty governing the institutions, and joint action by Member States cannot be regarded as equivalent to action by the Community. Difficulties might arise if there were no lasting guarantee of identical behaviour by Member States; no prior review by the Court of Justice could be made to the compatibility of the projected agreement with the provisions of the Treaty; nor could uniformity of interpretation of the provisions within the Community be ensured.The Council points out that before any agreement can be entered into by the Community on the basis of Article 235, the procedure laid down by the said article has to be observed. Until a proposal has been submitted by the Commission, the Assembly has been consulted and the Council has acted, the conclusion of international agreements remains within the powers of the Member States.The fact that Community rules exist having the same subject-matter as the AETR does not necessitate that this agreement be concluded by the Community itself. To avoid any differences of content between the two sets of rules it is sufficient that the Member States should enter into this agreement jointly and should in this connexion act in concert with the Community institutions which exercise, by virtue of Article 75, internal powers in the same sphere.The Commission points out that the contested measure gives no indication of its legal basis, and contains no statement of reasons explaining, in particular, what relationship the Council considered its decision bore to the Treaty.The Council is of opinion that, since the contested proceedings amounted to nothing more than a recognition of the coordination existing between Member States, there was no need either to give an express indication of its legal basis or formally to set out its reasons. Moreover, the minutes of the meeting of 20 March 1970, which are the formal instrument of the contested proceedings, contain numerous points providing a sufficient explanation of the grounds and objective of the common action by the Member States.
Grounds of judgment
1— The initial question
2— Admissibility of the application
(a)Submission relating to the nature of the proceedings of 20 March 1970
(b)Alternative submissions on admissibility
3— Substance
(a)Submission relating to infringement of Articles 75 and 228.
(b)Other submissions put forward by the Commission (Article 235; failure to state reasons)
4— Costs
Operative part
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