law://eu/cjeu/1969/c-64-69/hd_1_1_3@2026-11-18The submissions and arguments of the parties as to the admissibility of the application may be summarized as follows: The defendant claims that the application is inadmissible both because of the nature of the contested measures and because they do not concern the applicant individually. Regarding the nature of the provision in the second subparagraph of Article 2 (1) (a) the defendant argues in particular :— that the fixing of the compensatory amounts charged on exports of agricultural products pursuant to Regulation No 1586/69 of the Council is essentially legislative in nature;— that the first paragraph of Article 2 (1) (a) of Regulation No 1660/69 is a provision creating a temporary exception to the general rule concerning the levying of the said compensatory amounts, and as such shares the general and abstract nature of that general rule;— that the second subparagraph of Article 2 (1) (a), for its part, imposes a restriction on that exception and thus it, too, shares the general and abstract nature of the general rule;— that, furthermore, the contested measure applies to objectively determined situations and involves legal consequences for categories of persons viewed in a general and abstract manner.As far as the nature of Article 3 of Regulation No 1660/69 is concerned, the defendant contends that this provision, by virtue of the fact that it determines the application ratione temporis of provisions the nature of which it considers it has sufficiently shown to be that of regulations, has that same legislative nature.Moreover, according to the defendant the applicant cannot claim that the contested measures are of individual concern to it. The defendant points out in this respect that the applicant does not claim to be in the situation to which those measures refer. Even if that were the case the provision in the second subparagraph of Article 2 (1) (a) only affects the applicant's interests in its capacity as a member of a category of dealers viewed in the abstract. The fact that the provision applies to situations in the past is of no significance here because persons who had concluded contracts during that period cannot claim that this fact alone makes them a closed group identifiable in the same way as those to whom a decision is addressed.On the basis that, on the one hand, the same arguments apply in relation to Article 3 and, that on the other, it is unnecessary to decide whether the contested provisions are of direct concern to the applicant, the defendant concludes that the application is inadmissible.The applicant argues in the first place that the contested provisions should be examined to see whether they are of direct and individual concern to it without first stopping to consider the nature of those provisions in abstracto. In this respect it refers to the judgment of the Court in Case 40/64 (Sgarlata and Others v Commission of the EEC [1965] E.C.R. 215 et seq.). The applicant claims in any case that the argument used by the defendant, to the effect that a provision imposing a restriction on an exception to a general rule necessarily shares the nature of a regulation enjoyed by the latter rule, is misconceived.The contested provision does not apply to persons viewed in a general and abstract manner but, on the contrary, to clearly ascertained persons known to the Commission at the time when the relevant regulation was adopted, that is, exporters having concluded export contracts in French francs before 11 August 1969 and who had not taken advantage of the opportunity of fixing the export refund in advance.This is what makes the provision of individual concern to the applicant in view of the fact that it had made a number of contracts under the circumstances indicated above.As regards the second head of its conclusions the applicant notes that in the interlocutory application it is claimed that the arguments used to support the submission that the first head of the conclusions is inadmissible are equally valid for the second. It points out that the head of the conclusions directed against Article 3 is not a subsidiary claim but a principal one, and invokes the same arguments against the submissions in the interlocutory application as it used with regard to the first head of the conclusions, and considers that no further observations are called for.Lastly, the applicant claims that the contested provisions are of direct concern to it by reason of the contracts which it has concluded.In the oral proceedings the defendant alleged that the present case could not be compared with the situation which formed the subject-matter of Joined Cases 106 and 107/63 ([1965] E.C.R. 405 et seq.). Whereas in that case the decision of the Commission actually concerned a determined and known number of dealers defined as such, the present case concerns a provision partaking of the nature of a regulation laying down a transitional rule which affects the applicant only inasmuch as it belongs to the abstractly defined group to which the regulation applies.The applicant claims that, on the contrary, the two cases are perfectly comparable to each other; when the Commission adopted a regulation on 22 August 1968 concerning contracts concluded before 11 August it knew full well that the provision would apply only to a certain restricted number of contracts, arid, therefore, of dealers.At the Court's request the defendant declared its willingness to supply a list of the contracts to which the provision in question applied.
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