law://eu/cjeu/1966/c-8-66/hd_1_1_3_1@2026-11-20The applicants in Cases 9, 10 and 11/66 have stated first of all that what they seek from a decision of the Court is ‘a definitive ruling on the question whether the contested notice does or does not produce the legal effect intended by the defendant, namely that as from the date of that letter any further implementation of the amended “Noordwijks Cement Accoord” by the parties may be penalized by a fine’. The said applicants consider that in view of Article 173 of the Treaty one of the following alternative propositions must be true in their case: either the contested notices are to be considered as decisions producing legal effects and the applications axe admissible, or these applications are inadmissible and the said notices are not decisions and incapable therefore of producing legal effects.The applicants cite the case-law of the Court (judgments in Joined Cases 1 and 14/57., Rec. 1957, p. 219; Case 42/59 Rec. 1961, p. 142; Joined Cases 16, 17 and 18/59, Rec. 1960, p. 65; and Case 28/63, Rec. 1963, p. 480) and refer to the wording of the notices, especially their penultimate paragraph, and say that the contested measures should have been described in legal terms as decisions because of their content (particularly having regard to the judgment in Case 13/61 according to which agreements are valid until such time as a decision finds to the contrary) and therefore should have been subject to review by the Court under Article 173 (2) of the Treaty. To accept the contrary view would be tantamount to agreeing that Article 15 (6) of Regulation No 17 constitutes an exception to the Treaty, especially Article 189 thereof, and that this provision can put all those concerned in an equivocal position as regards Community law and private national law concerning the validity of agreements.In its statement of detence the defendant has argued first that the notices of 3 January are not decisions within the meaning of Article 189 and the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty; neither the form of these notices — a letter which was neither signed nor transmitted by a member of the Commission — nor their content (that of a measure not producing definitive legal effects and not constituting the final stage of the internal administrative procedure) raises any doubts on this point. The notice under Article 15 (6) of Regulation No 17 leaves ‘open the question whether the Commission will impose a fine should it be decided not to grant an exemption’. The notice does not bind those to whom it is addressed to refrain from carrying out their agreement and it does not therefore impose any legal obligation on them, nor does it conclusively affect any individual interest. It is merely an opinion which the undertakings may freely disregard. They should simply be perfectly clear ‘that if they do not observe this notice then in addition to the risk which they are already running under civil law, they are taking the additional risk of having a fine imposed upon them’.In reality, says the Commission, the prohibition in Article 85 (1) applies until such time as the Commission takes a decision, if any, granting an exemption. The system created by Article 85 and by Regulation No 17 (especially Articles 1, 6, 7, 15 (5) and (6)) proves this. Thus it would be contrary to the Treaty for a cartel to be considered as valid without reservations during the period prior to the Commission's decision. Therefore during the period subsisting between notification and the Commission's decision there is a contingent situation (Schwebe-zustand) in which the agreement is neither entirely valid nor definitively void. This follows from the judgment of 6 April 1962 in Case 13/61 (Bosch [1962] ECR 45) according to which a subsisting agreement notified within due time cannot be regarded as void until the Commission's decision. The validity of such as agreement is not definitive because the agreement would become definitively void, with effect from the entry into force of Regulation No 17, should the Commission refuse to grant an exemption under Article 85 (3). Thus the applicants have advanced a proposition contrary to the legal situation created by the Treaty when they claim that the undertakings concerned must observe agreements restricting competition during the period preceding the Commission's decision on a notification. So far as civil law is concerned the notice does not affect the validity of an agreement notified to the Commission.A comparison between Regulations Nos 17/62 and 99/63 proves that a clear distinction exists between mere ‘notices’ from the Commission and ‘decisions’ made by it concerning cartels.As part of the existing system the provisions of Article 15 (5) and 15 (6) of Regulation No 17 are of special significance. When it appears that an infringement is so serious that an exemption seems out of the question, the Commission should use Article 15 (6). Thus undertakings guilty of particularly serious restrictions on competition are placed in a different situation from those which take part in less serious restrictions, for which the possibility of an exemption remains open. For the latter, Article 15 provides for an exemption based on the likelihood that Article 85 (3) will be applied. In either case no decision is taken. Instead an opinion is given based on a preliminary examination after a procedure which is faster than that required for a definitive decision to be reached. This rapidity is in the interests of undertakings and renders their legal position more certain.Finally it is argued that ‘since the Commission must issue a notice under Article 15 (6) before imposing a fine for an action taken after notification and before the decision relating to the application of Article 85 (3), the applicants could complain of any defects in this notice before the Court of Justice by contesting the decisions imposing fines on them’. Furthermore, by using such a procedure the applicants could, in reliance upon Article 184, invoke the inapplicability of Article 15 (6) as an incidental plea. In the present proceedings this is impossible since there is no decision but only a notice based on a preliminary examination which may or may not be followed by a fine.In their reply the applicants in Case 8/66 have first of all described the rules laid down by Article 15 of Regulation No 17, and expressed the opinion that when an agreement is duly notified the legal position of this agreement is that it is provisionally valid from the point of view of civil law (judgment in Case 13/61). From the point of view of fines the effects of notification preclude any discussion of the validity of the agreement.In fact if the parties proceed to notification in due and proper form they know as a certainty that they cannot be fined in respect of a period prior to the Commission's decision, even if this decision declares with retroactive effect that the notified agreement is void. They only lay themselves open to a fine if, after the decision has been given, they do not obey its provisions. However this immunity only extends to undertakings acting bon fide as Article 15 (6) makes clear. The certainty of not being under threat of a penalty disappears as soon as the Commission informs the undertakings concerned that after a preliminary examination of the agreement it is of the view that Article 85 (1) of the Treaty is applicable and that Article 85 (3) is not. Nevertheless the Commission can only apply Article 15 (6) in instances of ‘manifest and unmistakable’ infringements of the Treaty. If this is correct there are three periods to consider: a period of total and unassailable immunity running from the date of the agreement to the date when notice is given of the decision taken by the Commission pursuant to Article 15 (6); a period between the provisional decision of the Commission and the final decision, during which there is no longer any immunity; finally there is the period starting when notice of the Commission's final decision is given. During this latter period the immunity has also gone, but the nature of the offence to be penalized is different (during the second period it is the implementation of the agreement in question which can, if the Commission so chooses, be penalized under Article 15 (2) (a); during the third period it is the failure to obey the Commission's decision which is penalized under Article 16).A notice under Article 15 (6) must of its very nature be a measure which can be contested by an application to the Court. For in employing Article 15 (6) the Commission is wielding a power which undertakings have good reason to fear. It deprives the undertaking concerned of the status which had protected it from all fines and imposes on it another status which lays it open to the possibility of being fined. Thus the notice presupposes an unfavourable preliminary opinion. Admittedly a fine does not automatically follow but this does not alter the fact that in order to impose a fine for what has happened prior to the final decision, the Commission must, before doing so, state its views in the manner laid down under Article 15 (6) and state them on the basis of this provision. If the Commission could issue this first judgment without having to justify it, the position of the undertaking to which it is addressed would be seriously affected. For the guarantees attaching to the final decision would foe of no avail because of the intimidating effects of the notice. It would be illogical for the Commission to be able to exercise its powers based on Article 15 (6) without being subject to any supervision by the Court.The case-law shows that when the Commission uses these powers it is taking a decision. For the Court has in fact decided that the test for determining whether a measure can foe contested before it is not a formal one, but is to be found in the legal effects that this measure produces (the relevant cases are cited in the originating applications in Cases 9 to 11/66). The notice does produce definitive legal effects because the change in the legal position of the undertakings concerned is irreversible. The reason for this is that these undertakings suffer a definitive loss of the immunity which they enjoyed prior to the notice, and this weakens their position because that position changes from one of security to insecurity and the undertakings are provisionally held to be in the wrong. It would be an untenable argument to say that the same authority takes a decision when it gives its opinion as regards an infringement of the Treaty and when it fixes the amount of the fine, but that it does not take a decision when pursuant to a mere preliminary examination it declares that the infringement is ‘manifest, unmistakable and indisputable’.The applicants have also stated that a consideration of the wording of the legal provisions concerned lead to the same conclusions. If the notice provided for by Article 15 were not a decision the wording of this Article should have said so, having regard to the general description given by Article 9 of Regulation No 17 (‘decision’) to any resolutions of the Commission concerning the application of Article 85. The use of terms such as ‘preliminary examination’ and ‘of the opinion’ do not mean that there is no decision. An interim decision in judicial proceedings, which is typically provisional in nature, can be appealed against when it puts a party at a disadvantage, and the expression ‘to be of the opinion’ may very well refer to an expression of intention. The fact that the Advisory Committee need not be consulted before the Commission applies Article 15 (6) is of no consequence because certain measures which are undeniably decisions (Articles 11 (5) and 14 (3) of Regulation No 17) can also be taken without this committee's being consulted. Finally, the reference to Regulation No 99/63 is not relevant. Thus the legal provisions cited in the statement of defence do not contain anything which supports the Commission's arguments. On the other hand the legal provisions which the Commission does not mention strongly contradict its arguments. Thus, for example, Article 3 (3) of Regulation No 17 envisages the use of recommendations. Since there is no measure which is halfway between a recommendation and a decision, the measure of which notice was given under Article 15 (6) can only be a decision. What makes this particularly obvious is that even the measures by which the Commission may require an undertaking to furnish information or to submit itself to an investigation — measures which do not anticipate the final decision in any way — are decisions which can be contested before the Court. However, such measures are less likely to aggravate the situation of the undertakings concerned than is a notice under Article 15 (6).In the present case, the wording of the letter of 3 January 1966, in particular the penultimate paragraph thereof, proves that the subject-matter of the decision, which is in fact what it is, takes effect immediately and that the administration does not in any way reserve to itself the possibility of reconsidering its position.The applicants in Case 9 and 10/66 have advanced very similar arguments to those put forward by the applicants in Case 8/66. They fill out and add detail to the arguments in their applications, and stress that the contested measure adversely affects them because it introduces a new element in legal relationships which places them in a less favourable legal position than before. They say that the Commission is no longer free to take a decision as regards the legal position thus created, since it could only restore the previous situation by withdrawing the measure and therefore this measure contains all the substantial characteristics of a decision.The applicants have stressed the fact that in a subsequent action no reliance could be placed on Article 184 of the Treaty as regards the notices because Article 184 only applies to regulations and not to decisions. They point out that the fact that the notice could be subjected to review later — supposing a fine were to be imposed, a possibility envisaged by the defendant itself — does not necessarily prove that the present application is premature.As regards the infringements of procedural requirements the applicants have alleged that Articles 2 and 11 of the Commission's Regulation of 9 January 1963 have been infringed.The applicant in Case 11/66 have stated that they share the opinions put forward and supported in the replies in Cases 8 to 10/66.They have emphasized in particular the system of legal protection established by the Treaty and have complained that the Commission has not explained itself on this subject. They have argued that the Commission is claiming the right to take measures other than those mentioned in Article 189, and is simultaneously relying on the second paragraph of Article 173, the effect of which is that no measures which do not constitute decisions within the meaning of Article 189 (and in particular ‘notices’ under Article 15 (6) of Regulation No 17), may be contested before the Court. Thus the Commission is infringing the elementary principle according to which the use of a procedure for which the law does not provide cannot have the effect of reducing the protection available from the Court for those concerned. In reality the Commission is merely trying to exclude any review of the legality of its action by the Court. In asserting that it will only make use of the possibilities available to it under Article 15 (6) in particularly serious cases, it is setting itself up as alts own judge of how far the limits on its powers are to be respected, and this is another way of dispensing with all legal guarantees.When the quasi-penal nature or the provisions of the law on cartels concerning fines is considered, the argument that review by the Court should only start after sanctions have been imposed is contrary to the laws of all the Member States. It is also contrary to Article 7 (1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, which forbids a penal law to be put into effect retroactively. This means that an act can. only be subjected to a penalty if the penalty was laid down at the time of the offence. If the Commission's system were followed it would raise the objective doubt whether there is the risk of a fine or not. The case-law of the Court of Justice (Judgment in Case 13/61 [1962] E.C.R. 45) takes the view that the principle of legal certainty is a rule of law to be respected in the application of the Treaty.As regards the definitive nature of the contested measure, the Commission's line of reasoning requires acceptance of the concept that measures are only decisions when they are the culmination of an administrative procedure taken as a whole. In that case, say the applicants, in accordance with the general principles which apply to interim measures in the laws of the Member States (‘einstweilige Verfügungen oder einstweilige Anordnungen’), it must at least be admitted that the contested notices, which brought to a close the administrative procedure concerning the preliminary examination, constituted a definitive expression of intention.As regards the applicability of Article 85 (1) until the Commission's decision, the applicants have pointed out that the defendant ascribes to them a view which they have never propounded and they go on to say that according to the unequivocal wording of Article 15 (5) agreements notified within due time and in due form cannot be subjected to the fines mentioned in Article 15 (2), and the reason for this is the very fact of notification.The applicants have mentioned the consequences in civil law which notices similar to the ones which they have received might have; they have also mentioned the conflicts which such notices could create between public law and private law.The applicants have shown, with examples, that the alternatives open to the Commission in addition to notices under Article 15 (6) of Regulation No 17, for the purpose of preventing abuses of the exemption from fines, are all subject to review by the Court. This is as it should foe, as is proved by comparative law and by the spirit of the Community system as already expressed to a certain degree in the case-law of the Court.Finally the applicants have taken up the points in the statement of defence relating to the procedure under Article 184, and have argued that the objective of the present application is not an abstract test of legality, but is an application based on the second paragraph of Article 173, and is brought against the notices at issue. They are not using Article 184 as a basis for a method of recourse running parallel with the one under Article 173 but are claiming that the legal provision under which the contested measures were made is inapplicable and proving that the Council could not allow the Commission to use Article 15 (6) as a basis for going outside the framework of the Treaty and, in particular, of Article 189 thereof.The defendant, in its rejoinder to certain new arguments of the applicants, has given more detailed particulars of certain aspects of its arguments.It has recalled that while the Court of Justice sometimes uses different forms of words to define the test of what a decision is, it cannot be concluded from this that any administrative measure which produces any legal effects must be considered as a decision. In the three judgments of 5 December 1963 the Court denied that the contested measures were decisions because ‘in spite of their apparently peremptory nature’ they did not lay the foundations of an obligation, on the part of the persons to whom they were addressed to make payments. The judgments cited by the applicants in Cases 9 and 10/66 only regarded as decisions those administrative measures which confer rights or impose duties on those to whom they are addressed. This interpretation is confirmed by examples cited by the applicants in Case 11/66. On the other hand it would neither be in accordance with the Treaty nor with the case-law of the Court of Justice (in particular the judgment in Case 54/65 of 16 June 1966) to consider any administrative measure as a decision because it produces legal effects. The interpretation of the concept of a decision espoused by the applicants does not follow from the legal order of the Community nor from the system of legal protection set up by the Treaty which limits rights of action ratione materiae et personae. Similar systems operate in certain Member States.As regards the nature of the notices of 3 January 1966, the defendant has maintained its point of view according to which the said notices do not satisfy the test laid down by the case-law of the Court for decisions. First, these notices do not produce any legal effect within the meaning of the case-law and secondly they do not consist of measures denoting the culmination of an internal procedure and are not a definitive expression of intention on the part of (the Commission. The defendant has stated that it has never claimed that Article 15 (6) confers upon it a power to carry out legal measures not provided for by Article 189 of the Treaty. It has merely asserted that the notice does not satisfy the test for a decision.The notice is in fact an opinion — which is not binding — within the meaning of Article 189. The notices do not require the applicants to behave in any particular way. Article 9 (1) of Regulation No 17 does not say anything about the legal nature of the notices. The main point of the notices is to prevent undertakings from infringing the prohibition laid down by Article 85 (1) through inadvertence and to draw their attention to the risks which may be incurred under the civil law as regards restrictions on competition. The Commission has stated that if sanctions are imposed later, the notices can then be subjected, together with the preliminary procedure as a whole, to review by the Court, acting with unlimited jurisdiction, at the same time as can the decision to impose a sanction. The obligations of undertakings arise under Article 85 (1), and are based on this provision, not on the notices. It makes no difference to the existence of these obligations that their observance is further assessed by the threat of a fine. A correct reading of Article 15 (5) of Regulation No 17 shows that it is an error to maintain that the notice alone gives rise to the threat of a fine, or that there is an infringement of the principle nulla poena sine lege, or that the said Article 15 (5) divests the prohibition set out in Article 85 (1) of its status as a legal obligation. In Case 13/61, the Court of Justice did not declare that a retroactive coming into force of the prohibition and thus the possibility of running the risk of a fine was improper as constituting an unacceptable consequence. Rather, the Court took the view that it was an unacceptable consequence that in the first place certain agreements had been void for several years without any authority's ever having found them to be so, and that later this nullity might be removed retroactively. Even if it had to be admitted that the notices bring about legal effects, the other requisites of a decision are not met. The external form of the notices alone is enough to prove that the defendant did not intend to adopt a decision.Referring to the wording of Regulations Nos 17/62 and 99/63 the defendant has emphasized that as regards the exemption provided for by Article 85 (3), the French and Dutch texts of Regulation No 17 use words corresponding to the German word ‘Entscheidung’ (decision). The fact that the German text uses the word ‘Erklärung’ (declaration) can apparently be explained on the grounds that this wording was closely modelled on the wording of Article 85 (3).Referring to the consequences of the interpretation suggested by the applicants for the application of the rules on competition, the defendant has reminded the Court that to apply those rules of procedure which are in force for decisions to notices under Article 15 (6) would inevitably lead to a state of affairs in which such a notice could scarcely be given sooner than a decision bringing a procedure to a final close. This would particularly be so where undertakings delay the conclusions of this procedure. Furthermore, the defendant has argued that, contrary to the opinion of the applicants, when Regulation No 17 came into force the Commission was not required to desist from applying its provisions to already-existing restrictions on competition, for amongst these might be found particularly harmful agreements from the point of view of the Common Market. The reply in Case 11/66 proves that, if Article 15 (6) be left aside, Regulation No 17 does not confer any sort of power whereby quick action can be taken to deal with restrictions on competition which are duly notified but which constitute flagrant infringements of the Treaty. Furthermore experience proves that it is not too difficult to make a restriction on competition seem relatively innocuous when it is notified. According to the defendant, the interpretation of the applicants would lead to a state of affairs in which the Court of Justice would have to examine the legality of an opinion of the Commission, based on a preliminary examination, at a time when the Commission had still not taken a definitive decision on the application of Article 85 (1) and (3) or on the imposition of a fine.As regards the application or Article 184 of the Treaty, the defendant has reminded the Court that this provision does not open up any additional avenue for bringing an action if an action based on the second paragraph of Article 173 is inadmissible. The present case shows that the applicants' fears as regards the consequences of the threat of being fined are exaggerated. For the applicants have not in fact ceased to impose restraints on competition. In such a case, a decision refusing to grant an exemption could foe contested before the Court of Justice toy the undertakings in accordance with the general provisions of the Treaty. If, however, the Commission decided to grant an exemption or if the Court of Justice annulled any decision refusing so to do, the undertakings could bring an action for damages against the Community under Articles 178 and 215 of the Treaty.
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