law://eu/cjeu/1966/c-5-66/hd_1_1_3_2_4@2026-11-17The applicants state that they requested import licences on 1 October 1963 for January 1964 in respect of the quantities of maize shown in their applications. Certain of them state in addition that they bought on the French market the quantities of maize also shown in anticipation of the licences requested; the refusal of the said licences following the protective measure of the Federal Government, which was maintained by the Commission, caused them to suffer considerable injury which they distinguish as follows:I — the alleged losses suffered in carrying out the said contracts of purchase (damnum emergens);II — the penalty paid on the repudiation of certain contracts.The defendant disputes the correctness of the calculations set out in the applications and the argument concerning the calculations continues in the reply and the rejoinder. More generally, the defendant raises two points:I — In respect of the losses suffered by the applicants, the losses resulting from the contracts of purchase concluded on 1 October 1963 were due to the improper conduct of the applicants themselves; the excessive quantity for which the import licences were requested on 1 October shows without any possible doubt that the importers knew on that day that a large gap had been opened in the levy system. The applicants acted without due consideration both in making contracts of purchase, in spite of this circumstance, before having received a favourable reply to their requests and in not providing for the possibility of cancellation should the licences, which had not yet been issued, be refused. They should have known that a situation such as that obtaining on 1 October 1963 was capable of giving rise to protective measures and they themselves should therefore bear the losses resulting from the cancellation and repudiation of the contracts of purchase made on 1 October.The defendant refers in this connexion to the judgment in Case 3/65 (Espérance-Longdoz) and the opinions in Joined Cases 9 and 12/60 (Vloeberghs) and in Joined Cases 19 and 20/60 and 2 and 3/61 (Fives-Lille-Cail).In their reply the applicants state on the other hand that the calculation of the levy for 1 October 1963 was correct and in accordance with the provisions applicable in the matter and that, if there had been an incorrect fixing of the free-at-frontier price, it would have been logical to remove this error with effect ex nunc and to fix a new free-at-frontier price. As the zero levy published on 1 October 1963 followed necessarily from the application of the legal provisions in force, no importer had any doubt as to the correctness of this rate of levy.In its rejoinder the defendant repeats that it must have been clear to an concerned that the zero levy had opened a major gap in the whole system, and adds that in any case there was reason to presume improper conduct on the part of the applicants which made contracts of purchase after 2.15 p.m. on 1 October as the EVSt announced at that time by means of a notice that the published levy had been withdrawn.II — In respect of the alleged failure to make a profit, the defendant relies upon the principle claimed to be common to the laws of the Member States according to which no reparation can be claimed for the loss of benefits which are contrary to public policy. As the object of Regulation No 19 is to compensate for the difference between prices ruling in importing countries (see Articles 2, 3 and 10 as well as the fifth and ninth recitals in the preamble), the fact of importing with a zero levy cereals which could be purchased in the exporting country at a price considerably lower than the threshold price of the importing country is incompatible with the principles of the said regulation. It is even less in accordance with the said principles that the importers should obtain from this situation benefits of 11 or 15 DM per metric ton, because these benefits far exceed the margin which Regulation No 19 regards as normal, namely the margin which should be taken into account at the time of fixing of the threshold price in accordance with Article 4 and which amounts in Germany to 3 DM per metric ton.In consequence, the applicants may claim at the most that they failed to obtain for the imports actually made a sum of 3 DM per metric ton, whilst in respect of the quantities not imported only a fraction of this sum may be taken into account.In their reply the applicants express surprise at the statement that by making an import at zero levy they would have obtained an advantage contrary to public policy. The argument that Regulation No 19 fixes a commercial margin of 3 DM per metric ton is totally incorrect.When they complain of levies which are too high to allow a reasonable profit importers still encounter the argument that the levy was calculated in strict application of the legal provisions in force and that the legislature is compelled to accept a certain floating flat-rate solution. In the present case the defendant is obliged to put forward the same considerations; in condemning the margins of profit resulting from a zero levy they allow financial reasons to appear which are completely alien to the neutrality required of them, reasons which caused them to propose and to confirm a protective measure, namely the fallacious view that the Treasury of a Member State is deprived of income from levies to the extent to which external trade might hope for good opportunities for profit which consequently it is necessary to suppress.The applicants in Cases 22 to 24/66 again dispute the existence of the principle relied upon by the defendant by denying that it is common to the law of the Member States. It follows from the defendant's assertion that its decision of 27 September which led to a zero levy was correct that the applicants justifiably made their requests for licences; for so long as he observes the law the importer cannot obtain benefits which may be described as abnormal or contrary to public policy. Such a description might possibly be justified if Regulation No 19 had established a system of fixed prices and profit margins but such is not the case, as the said regulation, in conformity furthermore with the principle of commercial freedom, allows importers to purchase and to sell at the prices which they choose and to ask for the grant of licences at the times they choose. As the importer is free to choose the time of importation in accordance with his evaluation of market trends, the losses which he suffers should be at his own risk as well as the profits which he makes. Consequently these profits are legitimate, even if they be abnormally large, as long as they conform to the rules laid down.In its rejoinder the defendant repeats the argument that, although the zero levy of 1 October was literally in accordance with Regulation No 19, it was nevertheless substantially contrary to the very principles embraced by this regulation which, whilst allowing a certain margin of uncertainty, because of flat-rate solutions (being accepted, is nevertheless opposed to differences such as those obtaining on 1 October 1963.
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.