law://eu/cjeu/1966/c-5-66/hd_1_1_3_2_1_2@2026-11-20The defendant alleges that the subjective condition which is indispensable for liability of a public body, that is to say, the existence of a wrongful act or omission, is not fulfilled in the present case. In its case-law on Article 40 of the ECSC Treaty, the Court has recognized that behaviour which is illegal when viewed objectively does not by itself provide the basis for an action for a civil wrong, but that it is necessary to add negligence thereto (judgments in Case 23/59 (Feram), Joined Cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26 and 27/60 and 1/61 (Meroni), Joined Cases 19 and 21/60 and 2 and 3/61, (Fives-Lille-Cail), Case 33/59 (Chasse), Joined Cases 46 and 47/59 (Meroni) and Joined Cases 29, 31, 36, 39 to 47, 50 and 51/63 (Providence) and the opinions of the Advocates-General in the Cases of Feram, Vloeberghs, Chasse and Plaumann (25/621.The reply to the questions of the existence of a wrongful act or omission and the degree of blame necessary to provide the basis of a right to reparation depends on the nature of the public activity in question and the circumstances in which the activity is carried on.In this connexion the defendant states:— that it interpreted Article 22 of Regulation No 19 as meaning that there is a serious disturbance of the market caused by imports and likely to endanger the objectives laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty when there is a danger that the imports may cause prices to fall to the level of the intervention price, so that the intervention agencies must purchase substantial quantities of indigenous cereals; this interpretation is based on both the opinion of the Advocate-General and the judgment of the Court in Joined Cases 106 and 107/63 (Toepfer), but even if it appears that such interpretation is mistaken, there is still no wrongful act. According to German legal theory, an interpretation is not wrongful unless it infringes a clear provision which is precise and perfectly evident or if it is contrary to the established case-law of a higher court; if, on the other hand, the provisions allow doubts on their interpretation or obscure passages to exist and if the opinion which has been reached at the end of a careful examination may be regarded as legally defensible (vertretbar), the mere fact that this opinion is subsequently disapproved cannot be regarded retroactively as a wrongful act; a similar attitude is found in Joined Cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26 and 27/60 and 1/61 (Meroni);— that action under Article 22 of Regulation No 19 is complicated by the fact that a decision must be taken within not more than four working days of the notification of the protective measure, during which time the Member States must be consulted, the agreement of the various departments of the Commission must fee obtained, a collective decision must be taken and that decision of the Commission must be notified to the Member State concerned, and that under these conditions mistakes likely to give rise to public liability must show a marked degree of seriousness;— that in putting forward the argument already advanced in Joined Cases 106 and 107/63 (Toepfer) the defendant claims that its attitude was legally defensible and that it could have regarded the German market as being threatened by a serious disturbance in the sense mentioned above;— that it was not alone in considering that the conditions for applying Article 2 were fulfilled, that the Federal Government and the representatives of the Member States in the Management Committee for Cereals were of the same opinion and that, because of this, it is not possible to complain of negligence on the part of the defendant capable of amounting to a wrongful act or omission:— that, if the Court considers, however, that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, the latter relies upon the fact that under the terms of Article 22 as regards the Member States it carries out only a duty of supervision; thus the Advocates-General have stated time and again that carrying out such duty does not result in public liability except in case of ‘gross malfeasance’.The foregoing explanations show sufficiently that in the present case it is not possible to complain that the defendant is guilty of such a wrongful act.In their reply the applicants state:— that it is in no way proved that the defendant was motivated by the arguments which it relies upon after the event and that, in its statement of reasons, the decision of 3 October 1963 does not include any of the said arguments; on the contrary, there is reason to suppose that the Commission did not make an exhaustive examination of the facts by its own departments, but that it simply adopted the fears of the German administration;— that, apart from this, by taking that decision of 3 October 1963, the defendant committed an extremely grave wrongful act or omission; by requiring a Member State which takes protective measures to notify them to the Commission not later than the date of their entry into force, Article 22 shows that such measures cannot enter into force before the time of their notification; the Federal Republic adopted the protective measure during the afternoon of 1 October 1963, with retroactive effect for the whole day of 1 October; as it was informed of this during the night of 1 to 2 October the Commission was therefore obliged to approve the protective measure only with effect from 2 October and to annul it for 1 October 1963; by approving it for 1 October the Commission by this very fact infringed perfectly clear provisions, presenting no difficulty of interpretation; all the applicants which made their requests on 1 October before the afternoon were prejudiced by this fact;— that, in addition, in the present case the Commission should have observed the principle of proportionality and limited its intervention to the absolutely indispensable minimum; if it had done so, the injury would have been reduced or even completely avoided;— that the defendant cannot rely upon the agreement of the Management Committee; this agreement is not capable of absolving it from liability;— further, that all the attempts to grade wrongful acts or omissions according to their seriousness are contrary to the general principles common to the Member States in the sphere of public liability;— furthermore, that it is wrong to classify the tasks which Article 22 entrusts to the Commission as a mere duty of supervision; it is not a matter of a wrongful act or omission arising out of non-intervention; the defendant found itself in a position where it had to decide independently and to carry out its own administrative duties.In addition, the applicants counter the arguments of the defendant that its assessment of the state of the German market was perfectly justifiable with contrary arguments similar to those put forward in Joined Cases 106 and 107/63 (Toepfer).The applicant in Case 13/66 also adds:— that the defendant cannot rely on the shortness of the period given to it by Article 22 because in the present case it did not even take advantage of that period, but came to a decision as early as 3 October 1963— that this fact amounts on the contrary to an indication that the defendant arrived at its decision in a precipitate manner and without considering the matter deeply, so as to fill the breach which appeared in the application of Regulation No 19.These arguments are supplemented in the reply of the applicants in Cases 22 to 24/66, which state:— that the wrongful act or omission of the Commission cannot be explained by the alleged complexity of the interpretation of Article 22 of Regulation No 19, but was caused by the fact that, in considering whether the importation of 125800 metric tons of maize would lead to a serious disturbance of the German market, the Commission took into consideration only the development of prices and not the influence which these imports were capable of exercising on the objectives laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty, as the wording of Article 22 requires; thus the Commission neglected an essential condition of fact for the application of Article 22 (2) and committed an act of gross malfeasance;— that, by virtue of Article 215 of the Treaty and in accordance with the general principles common to the law of the Member States concerning liability, the defendant must also make good the damage resulting from slight negligence; in denying the existence of the said principle the defendant wrongly relies on the case-law of the Court; this applies only to Article 40 of the ECSC Treaty and furthermore does not apply to duties of mere supervision; in the present case the wrongful act or omission of the Commission does not lie in the mere fact of not having intervened but in that of having acted and of having expressly approved the German protective measure.The defendant in its rejoinder emphasizes once more the difficulties of making an evaluation of the state of the market and those caused by the shortness of the period of time given by Article 22 of Regulation No 19.The applicant in Case 13/66 complains that the defendant did not utilize the period of four days, to which the defendant replies that in order to establish a clear and precise situation and to require the Federal Government to abolish the protective measures as soon as possible it considered that it had to react with the maximum speed. It also defends itself against the allegation of the same applicant that the decision was motivated by reasons foreign to the objective of Article 22 and maintains that its assessment of the market situation was perfectly defensible; in this respect it mentions again the agreement of the Management Committee, and in particular that of the French representative, which may be a not unimportant factor in support of its assessment; returning to the special nature of the duty of supervision which is conferred on it by Article 22, it alleges that according to general principles it is the party under supervision which is responsible in the first instance and that the relationship between the superviser and the party under supervision is not based only upon the effects of their internal relationships but, since it is a matter of law, erga omnes; lastly, it rejects the allegations that it unlawfully gave the protective measures retroactive effect and disregarded the principle of proportionality by relying on arguments already put forward in Joined Cases 106 and 107/63.In its rejoinder in Cases 22 to 24/66 the defendant denies having neglected a condition of fact essential to the application of Article 22, that is to say, the evaluation of the influence of the imports envisaged upon the objectives laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty, which on the contrary it claims to have taken into account. The shortness of the four-day period granted by Article 22 of Regulation No 19 complicated the preparation of the decision, particularly in the present case, as the Commission, in the absence of a precedent, had no experience in respect of the supervision of protective measures. The decision of 3 October 1963 was motivated by the reasons set out in its defence; furthermore in Joined Cases 106 and 107/63 neither the Advocate-General nor the Court found an infringement of essential procedural requirements. It denies having received only information of a general nature from the German authorities and quotes in this connexion the detailed statement of the German representative on the Management Committee.
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