law://eu/cjeu/1965/c-56-65/hd_1_1_2_3@2026-11-21According to the Commission, the possibility of an agreement being automatically void as provided for by Article 85 (2) is a matter which only requires consideration of the expression ‘agreements’ in order to be understood.In referring to legal writing, it asserts that the expression ‘agreement’ covers not only clauses which restrict competition and affect trade between Member States but also ‘other stipulations which do not matter from the point of view of competition’. It is further asserted that this interpretation is reinforced by the use of the word ‘agreement’ in Regulation No 19/65 of the Council, the terminology used by the parties, by the Advocate-General, by the Cour d'Appel, Paris, in the present proceedings, by the practice used for notifications, the practice of the Commission and the case-law of the Court (Judgment in Case 66/63).It follows from this interpretation that in principle it is the agreement itself which is prohibited ‘when either in the agreement as a whole’ or in certain of its provisions the elements mentioned in Article 85 (1) are found'. In setting out the consequences which follow in civil law when an agreement is prohibited, Article 85 (2) guards against a diversity of solutions resulting from the various ‘more or less absolute’ concepts of nullity in national law. ‘The nullity imposed by Article 85 (2) constitutes a Community concept’.The Commission further submits that, since Article 85 (1) does not state that the nullity must be governed by the rules which are to be followed for applying the prohibition, in determining the extent of the civil sanction laid down by Article 85 (2) one must refer to the purpose of the rules on competition on the basis of an interpretation founded on the objectives of Community law. In ensuring that these objectives are pursued and that Articles 85 (1) and 85 (3) are observed, it is not necessary for the sanctions of civil law to strike out those parts of the agreement which are not contrary to the said Article. It is for the appropriate national law to decide what may subsist. No undesirable consequence for Community law results from this because ‘after the nullity imposed by Community law has struck out the contractual terms which run counter to the functioning of the Common Market, there is nothing unusual in leaving the national legal system to decide the fate of the rest of the agreement’. Furthermore the national legal systems treat the rest of the agreement in much the same way. Finally the system under which that part of an agreement which is contrary to Community rules is void is a Community system, and this is what matters.In short the Commission proposes that ‘in an agreement containing a clause which is contrary to Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty this clause is necessarily automatically void under Article 85 (2)’ but that ‘the validity of the other provisions of the agreement are to be determined in accordance with the rules of the national law applicable to the particular case’.M.B.U. recalls that it has argued before the Cour d'Appel, Paris, that the contract at issue escapes the application of Article 85 (1) and (2) and that in addition, although the Cour d'Appel, Paris, has asked the Court of Justice of the European Communities to rule on the scope of Article 85 (2), it cannot have asked the Court to apply this provision.As an alternative argument M.B.U. asserts that in any event the nullity can only apply to the clause in the agreement containing the undertaking that the dealership is to be exclusive. It is said that cases on Article 1172 of the French Civil Code have decided that the nullity of a clause in an agreement only renders the agreement itself void if this clause is one which is decisive for agreement between the parties.Thus the Court's task is not to decide whether the clause at issue is a fundamental or an ancillary term of the agreement, but to decide whether or not it is compatible with the Common Market.M.B.U. states that possible nullity might not only be governed by the national legal order, but, where applicable, by the Community legal order itself. In this latter case one must have recourse to the uniform legal principles of the Member States, the legislation and the case-law of which accept the possibility of maintaining agreements when this result is in accordance with the presumed intentions of the parties or with what is fair and reasonable when the interests of the parties are weighed up. The recognition of these uniform legal principles by the Court binds the courts and tribunals of the Member States.Thus in the case contemplated by the question referred, the agreement at issue would become a non-exclusive agreement for the supply of goods.T.M. argues that since the agreement at issue has not been notified it should be regarded as prohibited by Article 85 (1) and automatically void under Article 85 (2), because of Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 17.It is asserted that the judgment in Case 13/61 supports this line of reasoning, and that in accordance with this reasoning the agreement should be declared void as from 13 March 1962.T.M. considers that the wording of Article 85 (2) is clear and precise and that the whole agreement is void, as such nullity is a penalty the efficacy of which requires that it be not limited in its effects. Further one might wonder what would be left of an exclusive dealing agreement if the clauses containing its objectives were struck out.T.M. remarks finally that in general terms the question whether or not a prohibited clause renders the whole agreement void, depending on whether the clause is a fundamental and decisive term of the agreement, hinges on the intention of the parties the evaluation of which is solely for the courts having jurisdiction.
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