law://eu/cjeu/1964/c-3-64/hd_1_1_1@2026-11-21The facts which form the basis of the dispute may be summarized as follows:Chapter V of Title Three of the ECSC Treaty refers, on prices, to distribution by undertakings engaged in production within the meaning of Article 80 of the Treaty and to the activity of certain distributors.Article 60 prohibits pricing practices contrary to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Treaty. In order to prevent producers from discriminating at the commercial level, Article 63 (2) provides that:“… the High Authority may decide that:(a) undertakings must frame their conditions of sale in such a way that their customers and commission agents acting on their behalf shall be under an obligation to comply with the rules made by the High Authority” in application of the previous Articles (first subparagraph of Article 63 (2)).Furthermore,“The High Authority may … decide that:(b) undertakings shall be held responsible for infringements of this obligation by their direct agents or by commission agents acting on their behalf” (Article 63 (2) (b)).Finally,“In the event of an infringement of this obligation by a purchaser, the High Authority may restrict or … temporarily prohibit dealings with that purchaser by Community undertakings.” (Second subparagraph of Article 63 (2)).Under Article 63 (3)“The High Authority is empowered to make to the Member States concerned any appropriate recommendations to ensure mat the rules laid down for the application of Article 60 (1) are duly observed by all distributive undertakings and agencies in the coal and steel sectors”.These Articles thus provide that the High Authority shall take implementing decisions to clarify and explain the various provisions of these Articles.The first implementing decisions, taken in 1953 and 1954 by the High Authority, are the following:1. Decision No 30/53 of 2 May 1953 amended by Decision No. 1/54 of 7 January 1954;2. Decision No 31/53 of 2 May 1953 supplemented by Decision No 32/53 of 20 May 1953 and amended by Decision No 2/54 of 7 January 1954 and by Decision No 32/56 of 21 November 1956;3. Decision No 37/54 of 29 July 1954 supplemented by Decision No 33/58 of 1 December 1958.The first group of decisions defines the practices prohibited by Article 60 (1) of the Treaty, the second group fixes the forms in which the price lists and conditions of sale in the ordinary steel industry are to be published (Article 60 (2) (a) of the Treaty) and the third fixes the same rules for the specialsteels industry.The following rules arose from these decisions:(a) All distributors were subjected to the same rules, without distinguishing between agents acting on their own behalf and middlemen acting for producer undertakings. Selling agencies were treated on a par with distributor undertakings, but were not defined.(b) Distributor undertakings merely subject to the obligation not to discriminate among their customers remained free to apply whatever conditions they wished provided these were also applied to all comparable transactions. It was therefore possible for the published price lists to differ from those of the producer undertakings whose products the distributor undertakings sold.On20 December 1963, the High Authority published the following Decisions :1. No 19/63 of 11 December 1963 (Official Journal, 1963, p. 2969) amending the text of Decisions Nos 30/53 and 1/54 (practices prohibited by Article 60 (1));2. No 20/63 of 11 December 1963 (Official Journal, 1963, p. 2972) amending the text of Decisions Nos 31/53 supplemented or amended by Decisions Nos 32/53, 2/54, 32/56 (publication of price lists for ordinary steel);3. No 21/63 of 11 December 1963 amending the text of Decision No 37/54 supplemented by Decision No 33/58 (publication of price lists for special steels).These three decisions were taken by the High Authority to fill the gaps in the Decisions of 1953-1954, which in essence arose out of the lack of any distinction between distributors inter se and the distinction between producers and selling agencies.Decision No 19/63 distinguished between selling agencies (risks and profits for the producer, but no freedom of action, taking on a function of the producer) to which should be added the obligations of undertakings (revised Article 7), acting as middlemen on behalf of producers (risks and profits for the producer, but with freedom of action) (new Article 8), and purchasers for resale (independent dealers) with freedom of action and risks and profits for themselves (new Article 9 retaining for purchase for resale alone the rules of the former Article 7).Although on the one hand the position of independent dealers (purchasers for resale) remains unchanged (new Article 9 of Decision No 30/53), the undertakings, on the other hand, must require the middlemen acting on behalf of the producers to apply their price lists and conditions of sale (new Article 8).According to the defendant, the purpose of that provision is to prevent any possible discrimination by means of middlemen. In order to make this provision effective, the undertakings are obliged to put themselves in a position to furnish — and in fact to furnish to the High Authority at its request — information on the activity of these middlemen, in order to enable the High Authority to examine all records facilitating the appraisal of the transactions of the latter.Decisions Nos 31/53 and 37/54 (former Articles 5 and 7) are amended in the same way as Decision No 30/53 by Decisions Nos 20/63 and 21/63.With regard to the sales organizations, the new Article 7 of Decision No 30/53 (Article 2 of Decision No 19/63) provides that the producer undertakings must only sell their products through their selling agencies at the prices and conditions in their own lists. Generally, the three new decisions provide that the obligations also extend to transactions effected by their selling agencies.According to the defendant, this new obligation is intended to make it impossible for producers to discriminate. But since, according to the defendant, it was possible to discriminate because the sales organizations in practice assumed a function normally pertaining to the producer, it was proper to limit the extension of the obligations only to those selling agencies which were in this position. According to the High Authority, that limitation was all the more indispensable since the term “selling agency” takes on many varied forms, both in fact and in law. The Treaty required, however, that the selling agencies referred to by the decisions of December 1963 should be defined as exactly as their diversity of form allowed and as the necessity to cover all situations from which a breach in the system of Article 60 might arise demanded.In fact we are concerned on the one hand with selling agencies common to several producer undertakings and on the other hand selling agencies created by or associated with a particular producer. For the first (Article 65 (2) of the Treaty) there is no problem of criteria. With regard to the latter it was right to take account both of the factual situation and the requirements of the Treaty.Some instances are very simple, for example when a producer holds all the capital of a company engaged in distribution which exclusively sells the products of that producer and does so for all the products of that producer, but other instances are less clear, either when the holding does not represent 100 % of the capital, or the organization does not sell all the products of a producer and does not restrict its business exclusively to those products.The High Authority claims that it has tried to evolve criteria to clarify the connexions rendering a selling agency a distributor which must of necessity be subject to the obligations of Article 60 if the latter is to continue to fulfil its allotted function under the Treaty.According to the defendant, Article 60 must be applied when three factors are present:— dependent management: this presupposes a situation in which the selling agency's policy with regard to conditions of sales, to price and to the market can be determined by the producer because of legal or factual relationships existing between the latter and the selling agency;— a permanent task entrusted to this organization: this excludes any temporary or intermittent arrangements and on the contrary presupposes a long-term task for the selling agency;— a distributive activity essentially based on the products of the undertaking in question: failing this, the situation of the selling agency would approach that of a trading undertaking.
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