Nuclear Security Regulations

Contents

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission makes the annexed Nuclear Security Regulations under subsection 44(1) of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.^note^noteOttawa, June 26, 2025Le président de la Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire,Pierre TremblayPresident of the Canadian Nuclear Safety CommissionHer Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Natural Resources, under subsection 44(1) of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, approves the annexed Nuclear Security Regulations made by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

Definitions

1Definitions#

The following definitions apply in these Regulations.

Act means the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. (Loi)

business day means a day that is not a Saturday or a holiday. (jour ouvrable)

Category I nuclear material means a nuclear substance listed in column 1 of the schedule that is in the form set out in column 2 and the quantity set out in column 3. (matière nucléaire de catégorie I)

Category II nuclear material means a nuclear substance listed in column 1 of the schedule that is in the form set out in column 2 and the quantity set out in column 4. (matière nucléaire de catégorie II)

Category III nuclear material means a nuclear substance listed in column 1 of the schedule that is in the form set out in column 2 and the quantity set out in column 5. (matière nucléaire de catégorie III)

central alarm station operator means a person who holds an authorization referred to in subsection 57(1). (opérateur du poste central d’alarme)

critical security measure means any equipment, process or system the continuous operation of which is necessary to ensure that an effective intervention can be made. (mesure de sécurité essentielle)

design basis threat means all of the threats that are identified in respect of high-security sites by the Commission under subsection 28(1). (menace de référence)

direct visual surveillance means direct and continuous observation of a person or place by a person who is

(a)physically present where the person is located or at the place that is under observation; or

(b)remotely observing that person or place. (surveillance visuelle directe)

Directive on Security Screening means the document entitled Directive on Security Screening, published by the Treasury Board Secretariat, as amended from time to time. (Directive sur le filtrage de sécurité)

D-value means, in respect of a nuclear substance, the D-value set out for that substance in Table 1 to section 2 of the document entitled Dangerous quantities of radioactive material (D-values), published by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended from time to time. (valeur D)

effective intervention means an intervention that is timely and powerful enough to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear substances from a nuclear facility and

(a)in respect of an area within a high-security site where the results of sabotage would be to endanger the health or safety of persons, to prevent sabotage; and

(b)in respect of an area within a high-security site where the results of sabotage would be to impact the health or safety of persons, to prevent or mitigate sabotage. (défense efficace)

enhanced security clearance means a clearance referred to in subsection 45(1). (cote de sécurité approfondie)

explosive substance has the same meaning as in section 2 of the Criminal Code. (substance explosive)

facility-access security clearance means a clearance granted by a licensee, as defined in section 83, that allows a person to enter and remain in a nuclear facility referred to in paragraph 3(c). (cote de sécurité donnant accès à l’installation)

firearm has the same meaning as in section 2 of the Criminal Code. (arme à feu)

high-security site means a nuclear facility at which Category I nuclear material or Category II nuclear material is produced, processed, used or stored. (site à sécurité élevée)

high-security site access clearance means a clearance granted by a licensee, as defined in section 25, that allows a person to enter and remain in a protected area at a high-security site. (cote donnant accès au site à sécurité élevée)

inner area means an area that is within a protected area and is for the processing, production, use or storage of Category I nuclear material. (zone intérieure)

inspector means a person who is designated as an inspector under section 29 of the Act. (inspecteur)

limited access area means a clearly demarcated area of a nuclear facility that is outside of a protected area and to which the licensee, as defined in section 25, controls access. (zone à accès limité)

nuclear security event means an event that has potential or actual implications for nuclear security and that necessitates a response. (événement de sécurité nucléaire)

nuclear security measure means a physical security or cyber security measure that is intended to deter, detect, delay or respond to a threat to a nuclear facility, a nuclear substance or the confidentiality, integrity or availability of sensitive information. (mesure de sécurité nucléaire)

nuclear security officer means a person who holds an authorization referred to in subsection 55(1). (agent de sécurité nucléaire)

nuclear security support person means a person, other than a nuclear security officer or central alarm station operator, whose duties in relation to a high-security site include any of the following:

(a)the design, installation, maintenance or repair of a nuclear security system or a nuclear security measure;

(b)the control, maintenance or repair of firearms and related equipment;

(c)the control, maintenance or repair of access control systems;

(d)the assessment, denial, revocation or granting of authorizations or clearances;

(e)the monitoring of threats that may affect the site; and

(f)training related to any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e). (préposé à la sécurité nucléaire)

nuclear security system means an integrated set of nuclear security measures at a nuclear facility. (système de sécurité nucléaire)

off-site response force means a force that is not stationed at a nuclear facility and that is composed of

(a)members of a local, regional, provincial or federal police force;

(b)members of a Canadian Armed Forces unit;

(c)members, other than those referred to in either paragraph (a) or (b), who

(i)in the case of a high-security site, are capable of making an effective intervention at the site, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment, and

(ii)in the case of any other nuclear facility, are capable of making an effective intervention at the nuclear facility, taking into account the threats identified in the threat and risk assessment; or

(d)any combination of the members referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c). (force d’intervention externe)

on-site nuclear response force means

(a)a team of nuclear security officers who are permanently stationed at a high-security site; or

(b)the members of a local, regional, provincial or federal police force or a Canadian Armed Forces unit, or any combination of those members, whose services the licensee, as defined in section 2, has retained and who are permanently stationed at a high-security site. (force d’intervention nucléaire interne)

physical barrier means a fence, wall or similar impediment that controls access to the area that it encloses and delays unauthorized access to that area. (barrière physique)

protected area means an area that is within a high-security site and is for the production, processing, use or storage of Category I nuclear material or Category II nuclear material. (zone protégée)

sabotage means any deliberate act that

(a)is directed against a nuclear facility or Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material that is in use, storage or transport; and

(b)could directly or indirectly impact the environment or the health or safety of persons as a result of exposure to radiation or the release of a nuclear substance. (sabotage)

security exercise means a test of the elements of a contingency plan and nuclear security measures and, in the case of a security exercise referred to in subsection 101(1), a test of multiple nuclear security measures. (exercice de sécurité)

security guard means a person who carries out duties related to the security of a nuclear facility referred to in paragraph 3(c), such as direct visual surveillance of the facility and the protection of persons and property. (garde de sécurité)

security personnel means the nuclear security officers, nuclear security support persons and central alarm station operators of a nuclear facility and their supervisors. (personnel de sécurité)

sensitive information means information, including the information referred to in section 21 of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations, in any form, including software, whose unauthorized disclosure, modification or destruction or to which denial of access could compromise nuclear security. (renseignements de nature délicate)

threat and risk assessment means an assessment that

(a)identifies sensitive information and the threats to that information;

(b)identifies any threat that could

(i)compromise the security of a nuclear facility or its operations,

(ii)exploit vulnerabilities in a nuclear facility’s nuclear security measures, or

(iii)in the case of the transport of Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material, compromise the security of sensitive information or the nuclear material; and

(c)evaluates the risks posed by those threats and the adequacy and effectiveness of an existing or proposed nuclear security system or nuclear security measure that is designed to protect against those threats. (évaluation de la menace et du risque)

threat item means

(a)an object, other than a match or pocket lighter, that is fabricated with combustible materials and that could be used to inflict burn injuries on persons or cause fire damage to property;

(b)a component of a weapon, an explosive device or an object referred to in paragraph (a); and

(c)any other item that could pose a threat to the security of a nuclear facility. (article dangereux)

vehicle portal means a portal for the passage of land vehicles that has enclosed sides, a movable barrier at either end and is large enough to accommodate a land vehicle. (sas pour véhicule)

vital area means an area that is inside a protected area and that contains equipment, systems, structures, components or nuclear substances the sabotage of which could directly or indirectly impact the environment or the health or safety of persons as a result of exposure to radiation or the release of a nuclear substance. (zone vitale)

weapon has the same meaning as in section 2 of the Criminal Code. (arme)

Part 1 · General Provisions

Definition

2Definition of licensee#

In this Part, licensee means any of the following persons:

(a)a person who, in relation to a high-security site, is licensed under the Act to

(i)carry out an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (e) or (f) of the Act; or

(ii)produce, refine, convert, enrich, process, reprocess, manage, store or dispose of Category I nuclear material or Category II nuclear material;

(b)a person who, in relation to a nuclear facility referred to in paragraph 3(c) of these Regulations, is licensed under the Act to

(i)carry out an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (e) or (f) of the Act; or

(ii)produce, refine, convert, enrich, process, reprocess, manage, store or dispose of a nuclear substance; and

(c)a person who, in respect of Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material, Category III nuclear material or a nuclear substance referred to in paragraph 3(d) of these Regulations, is licensed under the Act to

(i)carry out an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (e) or (f) of the Act, or

(ii)produce, refine, convert, enrich, process, reprocess, manage, store or dispose of a nuclear substance.

Application

3Application of Part#

This Part applies in respect of

(a)Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material and Category III nuclear material;

(b)high-security sites;

(c)the following nuclear facilities, other than those that are high-security sites:

(i)a nuclear fission or fusion reactor or subcritical nuclear assembly,

(ii)a plant for the processing, reprocessing or separation of an isotope of uranium, thorium or plutonium,

(iii)a plant for the manufacture of a product from uranium, thorium or plutonium,

(iv)a plant for the processing or use, in a quantity greater than 10¹⁵ Bq per calendar year, of nuclear substances other than uranium, thorium or plutonium,

(v)a vehicle that is equipped with a nuclear reactor, and

(vi)a facility for the disposal of Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material that is generated at another nuclear facility; and

(d)nuclear substances, other than Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material, that are referred to in any of paragraphs (c), (e) or (f) of the definition nuclear substance in section 2 of the Act, that have an activity greater than or equal to 10 times the D-value for that substance and that is located at a nuclear facility referred to in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section.

Licence Application

4Required information#

An application for a licence in respect of Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material or a nuclear facility, other than a transport licence, must contain, in addition to the information required by section 3 of the Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations or sections 3 to 8 of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations, as applicable,

(a)a nuclear security plan that contains

(i)a description of the proposed nuclear security system, including each nuclear security measure and any characteristics of the design of the nuclear facility that improve its security,

(ii)a list that identifies each nuclear security measure that is a critical security measure and that sets out the compensatory measures that will be implemented in the event that it becomes degraded, inoperative or compromised,

(iii)a description of the areas where Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material or other nuclear substances are to be produced, used, processed, stored or transported and the location of those areas,

(iv)the written arrangements made between the applicant and any off-site response force,

(v)the plan and procedures to assess and respond to nuclear security events at the nuclear facility,

(vi)the process for controlling access to the nuclear facility and verifying the identity of each person who accesses it,

(vii)the processes for determining who, on entering or exiting the nuclear facility, will be searched or screened, and

(viii)the cyber security program consisting of the plans, policies and procedures for the protection of the computer systems and electronic components of the nuclear facility against cyber security threats identified in the threat and risk assessment; and

(b)the threat and risk assessment.

Security Requirements

Nuclear Security Plan

5Review and update#

(1)A licensee must review the nuclear security plan at least once per year and update it to reflect any changes to the information that it is required to contain.

(2)The licensee must provide a copy of the updated nuclear security plan to the Commission before it is implemented.

Threat and Risk Assessment

6Minimum frequency#

(1)A licensee must conduct, at least once every five years, a threat and risk assessment specific to each nuclear facility at which they carry on licensed activities.

(2)The licensee must

(a)review the threat and risk assessment at least once per year and after any nuclear security event at the nuclear facility or after the licensee becomes aware of a change in any threat that is identified in the assessment or of a new vulnerability or threat;

(b)update the threat and risk assessment to implement any changes that were identified in the review as being necessary; and

(c)update the nuclear security plan if the changes referred to in paragraph (b) necessitate changes to the information that the plan is required to contain.

(3)After providing the copy of the updated nuclear security plan under subsection 5(2), the licensee must make the modifications to its nuclear security system that are necessary to counter any vulnerabilities or threats identified in the threat and risk assessment.

(4)For each threat and risk assessment that is conducted, the licensee must keep a record that sets out the results of that threat and risk assessment and each update under paragraph (2)(b).

(5)A licensee must provide to the Commission

(a)any record referred to in subsection (4) on request of the Commission; and

(b)the record of the results of the threat and risk assessment or an update under paragraph (2)(b), as the case may be, within 60 days after the day on which the threat and risk assessment or the update is completed.

7Effective intervention#

A licensee must implement nuclear security measures that ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the threats identified in the threat and risk assessment.

Security Program

8Training program — behaviour of personnel#

A licensee must develop and implement a training program to ensure that its supervisors are trained to recognize and report behaviour of personnel, including contractors, that could pose a threat to security at a nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

9Security culture#

(1)A licensee must implement measures to promote and support security culture.

(2)The licensee must keep a record of the security culture measures that it implements.

10Interfaces of safety, security and safeguards#

(1)A licensee must, to the extent possible, ensure that

(a)nuclear security measures and, if any, nuclear material accountancy activities are designed and implemented so as to avoid and resolve conflicts between them and to detect, prevent and deter the unauthorized removal of any Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material from a nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities;

(b)nuclear security measures do not compromise the environment or the health or safety of persons; and

(c)measures taken to protect the environment or the health or safety of persons do not compromise the security of a nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

(2)The licensee must establish, implement and maintain a process to

(a)avoid and resolve conflicts between nuclear security measures and, if any, nuclear material accountancy activities; and

(b)coordinate nuclear security measures, environmental protection measures and health and safety protection measures.

(3)The licensee must keep a record that sets out the process referred to in subsection (2).

11Compensatory measures#

(1)If a critical security measure for a nuclear facility at which a licensee carries on licensed activities becomes degraded, inoperative or compromised, the licensee must immediately implement compensatory measures that are as effective as that measure was before it became degraded, inoperative or compromised.

(2)A licensee must keep a record that sets out the process for implementing the compensatory measures and a record that sets out each instance in which a compensatory measure is implemented.

12Compromise of critical security measure#

When a licensee becomes aware that a device that is part of a critical security measure is degraded, inoperative or compromised in any way, including by loss, theft or unauthorized transfer, the licensee must

(a)replace the device or restore it to its proper functioning as soon as feasible; and

(b)determine, on the basis of an investigation, how it became degraded, inoperative or compromised.

13Security guards#

(1)A licensee must ensure that each security guard at a nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities is trained and qualified to carry out their assigned duties.

(2)The licensee must keep a record of the training that it provides to each security guard and proof that they are qualified to carry out their assigned duties.

14Arrangements with off-site response force#

(1)A licensee must make written arrangements with an off-site response force that, alone or in conjunction with the on-site nuclear response force, if any, is capable of making, at a nuclear facility at which the licensee carries on licensed activities, an effective intervention against any physical threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

(2)The written arrangements must provide for

(a)a process for determining when and how the off-site response force is to be notified when a nuclear security event occurs at the facility;

(b)annual visits to the nuclear facility by members of the off-site response force to familiarize them with the facility;

(c)the joint development by the licensee and the off-site response force of a contingency plan to facilitate effective interventions by that force;

(d)the roles and responsibilities of the licensee and the off-site response force in responding to nuclear security events; and

(e)the participation of the off-site response force in security exercises.

(3)The licensee must ensure that the written arrangements are signed by the licensee and a person who is authorized to sign on behalf of the off-site response force.

15Alarm-monitoring#

(1)A licensee must have alarm-monitoring capability or make arrangements with an alarm monitoring service.

(2)If the licensee has made arrangements with an alarm-monitoring service, those arrangements must provide for the procedure by which the service will notify the licensee or the off-site response force in the event that an alarm signal is received from the nuclear facility.

Cyber Security and Protection of Information

16Cyber security program#

(1)A licensee must, for each nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities, implement and maintain the cyber security program referred to in subparagraph 4(a)(viii).

(2)The licensee must protect the computer systems and electronic components of the nuclear facility against the cyber security threats that are identified in the threat and risk assessment.

17Protection of sensitive information#

(1)A licensee must protect the sensitive information that is identified in the threat and risk assessment against the threats that are identified in that assessment.

(2)The licensee must implement nuclear security measures that protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the sensitive information referred to in subsection (1) against the threats that are identified in the threat and risk assessment.

(3)The licensee must not permit a person to access sensitive information unless the person requires that access to carry out their duties.

18Identity verification, clearance or authorization#

A licensee must implement measures to protect the following information from loss or theft and unauthorized access, use, disclosure, duplication, alteration or destruction:

(a)information that is collected, used, retained or disclosed for the purposes of identity verification; and

(b)information that is collected, used, retained or disclosed in relation to a clearance or authorization.

Security Obligations Relating to Nuclear Substances

19Category I nuclear material#

A licensee must only produce, process, use or store Category I nuclear material in an inner area.

20Category II nuclear material#

A licensee must only produce, process, use or store Category II nuclear material in a protected area.

21Category III nuclear material#

A licensee must only produce, process, use or store Category III nuclear material in

(a)a protected area; or

(b)any other area that is equipped with detection, delay and response measures and that is designed and constructed to prevent unauthorized access to the material.

22Other nuclear substances#

(1)A licensee may only produce, process, use or store a nuclear substance, other than Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material, that has an activity that is greater than or equal to 10 times the D-value for that substance in an area within a nuclear facility that is designed and constructed to prevent unauthorized access to the nuclear substance.

(2)In respect of the area referred to in subsection (1), the licensee must

(a)maintain a list of the persons who are authorized to access the area;

(b)permit only authorized persons to access the area; and

(c)implement measures to detect, and assess the necessary response to,

(i)any unauthorized access to a nuclear substance in the area, and

(ii)any tampering or attempted tampering that could compromise or degrade a nuclear security measure or render it inoperative or ineffective.

23Removal of nuclear substances#

A licensee must ensure that nuclear substances are not removed from a nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities except in accordance with a licence.

24Detection of unauthorized removal#

(1)If a licensee detects the unauthorized removal of nuclear substances from a nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities, it must

(a)determine the reason for the unauthorized removal; and

(b)assess and immediately respond to the unauthorized removal.

(2)The licensee must keep a record that sets out the process by which it will ensure that any unauthorized removal of nuclear substances from the facility is dealt with in accordance with subsection (1).

Part 2 · High-Security Sites

Definition

25Definition of licensee#

In this Part, licensee means a person who, in relation to a high-security site, is licensed under the Act to carry out any of the following activities:

(a)carry out an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (e) or (f) of the Act; or

(b)produce, refine, convert, enrich, process, reprocess, manage, store or dispose of Category I nuclear material or Category II nuclear material.

Application

26Application of Part#

This Part applies in respect of high-security sites.

Licence Application

27Additional information and documents#

The nuclear security plan contained in an application for a licence in respect of a high-security site must contain, in addition to the information and documents required under paragraph 4(a), the following information and documents:

(a)in the description of the proposed nuclear security system, a description of the central alarm station, the backup alarm station and the physical barriers, structures, devices and nuclear security measures in respect of each protected area, vital area and inner area in the site;

(b)a description of the protected areas, vital areas and inner areas in the site and the potential targets of sabotage and the location of those areas and targets in the site;

(c)information about the organizational structure, duties and training of nuclear security officers, the procedures those officers must follow and the minimum number of nuclear security officers and other personnel who will carry out duties related to security at the site;

(d)a description of the nuclear security measures that will be implemented by the licensee to ensure that an effective intervention can be made at that site, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment;

(e)a description of the on-site and off-site communications equipment, systems and procedures;

(f)the tactical deployment plans developed with the off-site response force and, if any, the on-site nuclear response force, including an analysis of potential pathways for adversaries and security response times; and

(g)for each physical barrier and nuclear security measure that is intended to delay adversaries who are described in the design basis threat or the threat and risk assessment, an analysis of the delay time provided by that barrier or measure and the data supporting that analysis.

Design Basis Threat

28Commission to identify threats#

(1)The Commission must identify any threat involving a person or group that may have the capability, motivation and intent to attempt

(a)the sabotage of a high-security site; or

(b)the unauthorized removal of Category I nuclear material or Category II nuclear material from a high-security site.

(2)The Commission must inform each licensee of the design basis threat.

29Nuclear security system#

(1)A licensee must design a nuclear security system taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment, evaluate the ability of the system to respond to those threats and make modifications to the system as necessary.

(2)The licensee must implement nuclear security measures that ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

(3)The licensee must keep a record that sets out the processes it has implemented to design and make modifications to the nuclear security system.

Security Requirements

Nuclear Security Officers

30Number and duties#

(1)A licensee must have, at all times, a sufficient number of nuclear security officers available at a high-security site to carry out the following duties:

(a)conducting patrols of the site, including in the limited access area, if any;

(b)controlling and monitoring the movement of persons, property, Category I nuclear materials, Category II nuclear materials, Category III nuclear materials and vehicles at the site, including in the limited access area, if any;

(c)conducting searches of persons and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, when they enter or exit a protected area or inner area;

(d)assessing and responding to nuclear security events;

(e)apprehending and detaining intruders;

(f)observing and reporting on the movements of intruders;

(g)assisting in making effective interventions against intruders;

(h)operating nuclear security systems and devices; and

(i)carrying out any other duties that nuclear security officers are required to carry out under these Regulations.

(2)The licensee must keep a record that sets out the duties of its nuclear security officers and give a copy of it to each officer.

31Provision of equipment#

A licensee must provide each of its nuclear security officers with the equipment, devices and apparel that are necessary to carry out their duties.

32Training, knowledge, skill and qualifications#

(1)A licensee must ensure that a nuclear security officer does not carry out a duty unless

(a)they have the training, knowledge and skill that is necessary to allow them to carry out that duty; and

(b)they are qualified to carry out that duty.

(2)The licensee must ensure that each of its nuclear security officers participates in a continuing training program that includes training regarding

(a)their duties and responsibilities when responding to nuclear security events, including the use of force;

(b)the security procedures and nuclear security measures that are relevant to their duties;

(c)the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment that is relevant to their duties; and

(d)the licensee’s obligations under the Act and its regulations that are relevant to their duties.

(3)The licensee must keep a record of the training received by each of its nuclear security officers.

33Record to be kept — firearms#

A licensee must keep a record that sets out the following information in respect of each of its nuclear security officers whose duties require them to carry a firearm:

(a)the officer’s name;

(b)information that demonstrates that the officer is authorized to carry firearms in Canada and is trained and qualified to use them; and

(c)whether or not the officer is a member of the on-site nuclear response force.

Response Forces

34On-site nuclear response force required#

(1)Subject to subsection (2), a licensee must maintain an on-site nuclear response force that, in combination with the off-site response force and the nuclear security measures for the high-security site, is capable of making an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

(2)The licensee is not required to maintain an on-site nuclear response force if

(a)it implements nuclear security measures that are capable of ensuring that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment; and

(b)at least 90 days before the first day on which the high-security site will operate without an on-site nuclear response force, it provides to the Commission notice in writing of its intent not to maintain one, a description of the measures referred to in paragraph (a) and information that demonstrates how implementation of those measures will ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

(3)The licensee must ensure that every nuclear security officer who is a member of its on-site nuclear response force is authorized to carry firearms in Canada and is trained and qualified to use them.

(4)The licensee must provide nuclear security officers who are members of the on-site nuclear response force with the equipment, devices and apparel that are necessary to make an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

35Arrangements with off-site response force#

In addition to meeting the requirements of section 14, the written arrangements made between the licensee and the off-site response force in respect of a high-security site must provide for

(a)the means by which an immediate and continuous communication capability is to be established between the central alarm station, the backup alarm station, nuclear security officers and the off-site response force;

(b)the means by which the off-site response force, if requested by the licensee, is to assist the on-site nuclear response force, if any, in making an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any threat set out in the threat and risk assessment;

(c)the duties of the on-site nuclear response force, if any, when responding to nuclear security events and how the on-site nuclear response force will integrate their response with that of the off-site response force;

(d)if an on-site nuclear response force is not maintained at the site, the availability of a sufficient number of off-site response force members who are trained and equipped to make an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any threat set out in the threat and risk assessment; and

(e)an annual consultation between the licensee and the off-site response force regarding site familiarization and continuing training.

Contingency Plan

36Plan required#

A licensee must develop and maintain a contingency plan to ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

Security Drill and Security Exercise Program

37Program elements#

(1)A licensee must implement a security drill and security exercise program that, by means of physical drills, cyber security drills and security exercises, verifies and evaluates

(a)the readiness of security personnel; and

(b)the effectiveness of all elements of the contingency plan and the nuclear security system, including the nuclear security measures for the transport of nuclear substances.

(2)The licensee must update the program after each security drill or security exercise if the results of that drill or exercise indicate that an update is necessary.

38Security drills#

(1)A licensee must conduct a security drill at least once every 30 days to test the readiness of its security personnel and the operation of one or more nuclear security measures or one or more elements of the contingency plan.

(2)The licensee must ensure that, at least once in each quarter of a given year, every nuclear security officer whose duties include the implementation of the contingency plan participates in a security drill.

39Security exercise#

(1)A licensee must, in cooperation with the off-site response force, at least once every two years, conduct a security exercise that tests

(a)the ability of all elements of the contingency plan and the nuclear security measures to ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment; and

(b)the readiness of its security personnel and the off-site response force to respond to the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

(2)The licensee must notify the Commission in writing of its intent to conduct a security exercise at least four months before the day on which the exercise is to be held.

40Records to be kept#

(1)A licensee must, for each security drill and security exercise that it conducts, keep a record that contains

(a)an outline of the scenario for that drill or exercise;

(b)an evaluation of the readiness of its security personnel and the off-site response force;

(c)an evaluation of the effectiveness of the elements of the contingency plan and the nuclear security measures that were tested; and

(d)a description of any corrective actions that, taking the results of those evaluations into account, are necessary.

(2)The licensee must, within 180 days after the day on which a security exercise is completed, provide to the Commission a copy of the record for that exercise.

41Corrective action plan#

(1)If a corrective action referred to in paragraph 40(1)(d) is to be implemented using a phased approach, the licensee must create a corrective action plan that sets out

(a)the reasons for the corrective action;

(b)the rationale for the phased approach; and

(c)a timetable that sets out when each phase of the plan will be completed.

(2)The licensee must implement the corrective actions and, if they are to be implemented using a phased approach, each phase must be completed in accordance with the timetable set out in the corrective action plan.

(3)The licensee must, within 90 days after the day on which the related security drill or security exercise is completed, provide a copy of the corrective action plan, if any, to the Commission.

Central Alarm Station

42Central alarm station#

(1)A licensee must ensure that the nuclear security measures referred to in subparagraphs 61(2)(a)(i) and (ii) and 68(1)(a)(i) and (ii) are monitored from a central alarm station.

(2)The central alarm station must be

(a)located outside any vital area or inner area;

(b)designed, constructed and located so as to resist forced entry, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment;

(c)attended at all times by at least one central alarm station operator;

(d)designed or operated so as to prevent a solitary central alarm station operator from tampering with or compromising a nuclear security measure or disabling it without the licensee’s authorization;

(e)equipped so as to enable a central alarm station operator inside the central alarm station to receive, assess and acknowledge the alarms referred to in subparagraphs 61(2)(a)(iii) and (b)(ii) and 68(1)(a)(iii) and (b)(ii); and

(f)equipped with devices that

(i)enable and record secure communication with nuclear security officers, nuclear security support persons and the off-site response force, and

(ii)are designed and installed such that the failure of one of the devices does not prevent that communication.

(3)The licensee must not permit a person to enter the central alarm station unless they are security personnel or otherwise authorized to enter by the licensee and they require entry to carry out their duties.

(4)The licensee must implement processes that ensure that the central alarm station maintains operational readiness.

Backup Alarm Station

43Station requirements#

(1)A licensee must establish a backup alarm station that is

(a)independent from the central alarm station; and

(b)designed and equipped such that, in the event that the central alarm station is inoperative or cannot be used, it can carry out the same functions as the central alarm station.

(2)The licensee must ensure that the backup alarm station is operated only by security personnel who have received training on its operation.

(3)The licensee must not permit a person to enter the backup alarm station unless they are security personnel or otherwise authorized to enter by the licensee and they require entry in order to carry out their duties.

(4)The licensee must implement processes that ensure that the backup alarm station maintains operational readiness.

(5)The licensee must test the functions of the backup alarm station at least once every five years.

Clearances and Authorizations

Clearances

High-security Site Access Clearance

44Conditions#

(1)A licensee may grant a high-security site access clearance to a person if

(a)it determines, after verifying the information and documents set out in subsection (2) and taking the factors referred to in subsection (3) into consideration, that the person does not pose an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of persons or the security of the high-security site; or

(b)it verifies that the person holds

(i)a valid high-security site access clearance or enhanced security clearance granted by another licensee, or

(ii)a valid secret or top secret clearance granted under the Directive on Security Screening.

(2)For the purpose of paragraph (1)(a), the licensee must verify the following information and documents in respect of the person who is seeking the high-security site access clearance:

(a)the information and documents referred to in subsection 85(2); and

(b)a security assessment carried out by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

(3)For the purpose of making the determination referred to in paragraph (1)(a), the licensee must take the following factors into consideration:

(a)the relevance of the information and documents referred to in subsection (2), including the circumstances of any convictions, their seriousness, number and frequency, the date of the last conviction and any sentence or other disposition;

(b)whether it is known or there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person

(i)is or has been involved in — or contributes or has contributed to — criminal offences or acts of violence against persons or property,

(ii)is or has been involved in — or contributes or has contributed to — activities that constitute threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act,

(iii)is or has been a member of a terrorist group as defined in subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code or is or has been involved in — or contributes or has contributed to — the activities of such a group,

(iv)is or has been a member of a criminal organization as defined in subsection 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code or has been involved in — or contributes or has contributed to — the activities of such an organization, or

(v)is or has been associated with anyone who is known to be involved in or to contribute to — or in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in or contribution to — activities referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii), or who is a member of a group or organization referred to in subparagraph (iii) or (iv);

(c)whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is in a position in which there is a risk that they could be induced to commit an act or to assist or abet any person to commit an act that might constitute an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of persons or the security of the high-security site;

(d)whether a clearance issued in respect of the person has previously been revoked because the person provided false or misleading information to obtain the clearance;

(e)any other relevant information that enables the licensee to assess the risk.

(4)The high-security site access clearance may be granted for a period of no more than 10 years and must be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the high-security site.

(5)A licensee that grants a high-security site clearance under paragraph (1)(b) must keep a record indicating how it verified that the person holds the clearance referred to in that paragraph.

Enhanced Security Clearance

45Conditions#

(1)A licensee may grant an enhanced security clearance to a person if

(a)it determines, after verifying the information and documents set out in subsection (2) and taking the factors referred to in subsection 44(3) into consideration, that the person does not pose an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of persons or the security of the high-security site; or

(b)it verifies that the person holds

(i)a valid enhanced security clearance granted by another licensee, or

(ii)a valid secret or top secret clearance granted under the Directive on Security Screening.

(2)For the purpose of paragraph (1)(a), the licensee must verify the following information and documents in respect of the person who is seeking the enhanced security clearance:

(a)the information and documents referred to in subsection 44(2); and

(b)the results of a credit check.

(3)An enhanced security clearance may be granted for a period of no more than five years and must be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the high-security site.

Record

46List of persons#

(1)A licensee must keep an up-to-date list of each person to whom a clearance has been granted under section 44 or 45 and that identifies their clearance.

(2)The licensee must, on request, provide a copy of the list to the Commission or an inspector.

Revocation

47Conditions#

(1)A licensee must revoke a person’s high-security site access clearance or enhanced security clearance if

(a)the licensee concludes, based on an investigation, that the person poses or could pose an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of persons or the security of the high-security site;

(b)the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

(c)the person’s duties have been completed, suspended or otherwise terminated;

(d)the person no longer requires the clearance to carry out their duties; or

(e)the person provided false or misleading information to obtain the clearance.

(2)The licensee must notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under paragraph (1)(a) or (e) within five business days after the day on which the revocation is made.

Authorizations

Exceptions

48Inspectors#

(1)Subsection 49(1) and sections 50 and 51 do not apply to an inspector who is designated to carry out inspections at high-security sites or to a person who is chosen by the inspector to accompany them under section 33 of the Act.

(2)Despite subsection 49(1) and sections 50 and 51, a member of the off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of an emergency service who requires access to a protected area, vital area or inner area for the purpose of carrying out their duties may enter and remain in the area without having been granted a high-security site access clearance or enhanced security clearance and, in the event of an emergency in that area, without an authorization referred to in paragraph 49(1)(b) or section 52.

Access to Protected Area

49Requirements to enter and remain#

(1)A person must not enter or remain in a protected area unless

(a)the licensee has granted the person a high-security site access clearance under section 44 or an enhanced security clearance under section 45;

(b)the licensee has granted the person an authorization to enter and remain in the protected area granted under subsection (2) or (3) or an authorization to enter and remain in an inner area granted under section 52; and

(c)if the authorization referred to in paragraph (b) is one referred to in subsection (3) or subsection 52(2), they are escorted in accordance with that authorization.

(2)The licensee may grant an authorization to a person to enter and remain in a protected area without an escort if

(a)it has, in respect of the high-security site, granted the person a high-security site access clearance or an enhanced security access clearance; and

(b)it prepares an identification report that contains the following information and documents in respect of the person:

(i)their name and date and place of birth,

(ii)documentary proof of their lawful presence in Canada,

(iii)the address of their principal residence,

(iv)a photograph that depicts a frontal view of their face,

(v)their occupation,

(vi)documentary proof that the licensee has granted them a high-security site access clearance, and

(vii)the documents verified by the licensee before granting them a high-security site access clearance.

(3)The licensee may grant an authorization to a person to enter and remain in a protected area with an escort if

(a)the person presents to the licensee

(i)in the case of a person who is 18 years of age or over, two pieces of valid government-issued identification, one of which must be photo identification, and

(ii)in the case of a person who is under the age of 18, documentary proof of their name and address; and

(b)the licensee makes the authorization subject to the condition that the person is, while within the protected area, escorted at all times by a person who, in respect of the high-security site, has been granted a high-security site access clearance or enhanced security clearance.

(4)An authorization referred to in subsection (2) may be granted for a period of no more than 10 years.

(5)An authorization granted under subsection (2) or (3) must be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the high-security site.

(6)If requested by the person referred to in subsection (1), the licensee must provide them with a copy of all information and documents relating to the authorization that are in the licensee’s possession and that were provided to the licensee by or on behalf of that person.

Access to Vital Area and Inner Area

50Vital area#

A person must not enter or remain in a vital area unless the licensee has granted the person an authorization for the area under subsection 52(1) or (2) and, if the authorization is one referred to in subsection 52(2), the person is escorted in accordance with that authorization.

51Inner area#

A person must not enter or remain in an inner area unless

(a)the licensee has granted the person an authorization for the area under subsection 52(1) and they are accompanied by another person who has been granted an authorization referred to in that subsection; or

(b)the licensee has granted the person an authorization for the area under subsection 52(2) and they are escorted at all times by two other persons who have been granted an authorization referred to in subsection 52(1).

52Authorization — without escort#

(1)A licensee may grant an authorization to a person to enter and remain without an escort in a vital area or inner area, as the case may be, if

(a)it has granted an enhanced security clearance to the person for the high-security site; and

(b)the person requires access to the area to carry out a duty required by the licensee.

(2)The licensee may grant an authorization to a person to enter and remain with an escort in a vital area or inner area, as the case may be, if

(a)the person requires access to the area to carry out a duty required by the licensee;

(b)it obtains the following information and documents in respect of the person:

(i)their name,

(ii)the address of their principal residence,

(iii)the name and business address of their employer, and

(iv)documentary proof of their lawful presence in Canada;

(c)it makes, in the case of an authorization to enter and remain in a vital area, the authorization subject to the condition that the person is, while within the area, escorted at all times by a person who is authorized to enter and remain in the area and is equipped with a device that permits them to immediately communicate with the central alarm station; and

(d)it makes, in the case of an authorization to enter and remain in an inner area, the authorization subject to the condition that the person is, while within the area, escorted at all times by two persons who are authorized to enter and remain in the area, each of whom is equipped with a device that permits them to immediately communicate with the central alarm station.

(3)An authorization referred to in subsection (1) may be granted for a period of no more than five years.

(4)An authorization granted under subsection (1) or (2) must be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the high-security site.

(5)If requested by the person referred to in subsection (2), the licensee must provide them with a copy of all information and documents relating to the authorization that are in the licensee’s possession and that were provided to the licensee by or on behalf of that person.

Records

53Record to be kept#

(1)A licensee must, for each person to whom an authorization has been granted under section 49 or 52, keep a record that sets out their name, their authorization and the day on which their authorization ends.

(2)The record must be retained until one year after the day on which the person’s authorization ends or is revoked.

(3)The licensee must, on request, provide a copy of the record to the Commission or an inspector.

(4)The licensee must make a copy of the record available to its nuclear security officers.

Security Personnel

54Clearance required#

A licensee must not permit an employee, or any other person who is under contract to the licensee, to carry out the duties of security personnel or those related to nuclear security intelligence unless it has granted the person an enhanced security clearance.

Nuclear Security Officers

55Written authorization#

(1)A person must not act as a nuclear security officer unless the licensee grants them written authorization to do so.

(2)Before granting the authorization, the licensee must

(a)ensure that it has granted the person an enhanced security clearance;

(b)ensure that the person has received training on, and that their knowledge and skill has been evaluated with respect to, the following topics as they relate to the duties of nuclear security officers at the high-security site:

(i)first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation,

(ii)their duties when responding to nuclear security events, including the use of force,

(iii)security procedures and nuclear security measures at the high-security site,

(iv)threats to nuclear security, including sabotage and the unauthorized removal of nuclear substances, and

(v)the licensee’s obligations under the Act and its regulations that are relevant to their duties;

(c)ensure that, if the person has previously been granted high-security site access clearance, the person has participated in continuing training related to the topics referred to paragraph (b); and

(d)obtain the following documents from the person:

(i)documentary proof that the person is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,

(ii)a certificate, signed by a qualified medical practitioner, certifying that the person does not have a medical condition that would prevent them from performing the tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee,

(iii)a certificate, signed by a fitness consultant who is recognized by the Canadian Society for Exercise Physiology or a person with equivalent or higher qualifications, certifying that the person is physically able to perform the tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee, and

(iv)a certificate, signed by a qualified psychologist, certifying that the person is psychologically able to perform the tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee.

(3)Before granting the authorization to a person, the licensee must assess the person’s knowledge of the security procedures and nuclear security measures that are relevant to their duties and their ability to carry them out.

(4)The authorization may be granted for a period of no more than five years and must be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the high-security site.

Nuclear Security Support Person

56Written authorization#

(1)A person must not act as a nuclear security support person unless the licensee has granted the person written authorization to do so and, if the authorization is one referred to in subsection (3), they are escorted in accordance with subsection (4).

(2)The licensee may grant an authorization to a person to act as a nuclear security support person without an escort if it has granted the person an enhanced security clearance for the high-security site.

(3)The licensee may grant an authorization to a person to act as a nuclear security support person with an escort if it has obtained the following information and documents in respect of the person:

(a)their name;

(b)the address of their principal residence;

(c)the name and business address of their employer; and

(d)a copy of two pieces of valid government-issued identification, one of which must be photo identification.

(4)An authorization granted under subsection (3) must be made subject to the following conditions:

(a)that the person enters or remains in the protected area or inner area only for the purpose of carrying out duties required by the licensee;

(b)that, when the person is in a protected area, they are escorted at all times by a person who is authorized under subsection (2);

(c)that, when the person is in a vital area, they are escorted at all times by a person who is authorized under subsection (2); and

(d)that, when the person is in an inner area, they are escorted at all times by a person who is authorized under subsection (2) and two other persons who are authorized to enter and remain in the inner area with an escort.

(5)An authorization referred to in subsection (2) may be granted for a period of no more than five years.

(6)An authorization granted under subsection (2) or (3) must be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the high-security site.

(7)If requested by the person referred to in subsection (2), the licensee must provide them with a copy of all information and documents relating to the authorization that are in the licensee’s possession and that were provided to the licensee by or on behalf of that person.

Central Alarm Station Operator

57Written authorization#

(1)A person must not act as a central alarm station operator unless the licensee grants them written authorization to do so.

(2)Before granting the authorization, the licensee must

(a)ensure that it has granted the person an enhanced security clearance;

(b)ensure that the person has received training on the following topics:

(i)the operation of the central alarm station,

(ii)their duties when responding to nuclear security events,

(iii)security procedures and nuclear security measures at the high-security site,

(iv)threats to nuclear security, including sabotage and the unauthorized removal of nuclear substances, and

(v)the licensee’s obligations under the Act and its regulations that are relevant to their duties; and

(c)obtain the following documents from the person:

(i)documentary proof that the person is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,

(iii)a certificate, signed by a qualified psychologist, certifying that the person is psychologically able to perform the tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee.

(3)The authorization may be granted for a period of no more than five years and must be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the high-security site.

(4)If requested by the person referred to in subsection (2), the licensee must provide them with a copy of all information and documents relating to the authorization that are in the licensee’s possession and that were provided to the licensee by or on behalf of that person.

Record

58List of persons#

(1)A licensee must keep an up-to-date list of each person to whom an authorization has been granted under section 55, 56 or 57 and that identifies the authorization.

(2)The licensee must, on request, provide a copy of the list to the Commission or an inspector.

Revocation

59Conditions#

(1)A licensee must revoke an authorization granted to a person under this Part if

(a)the licensee concludes, based on an investigation, that the person poses or could pose an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of persons or the security of the high-security site;

(b)the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

(c)the duties or functions of the person have been completed, suspended or otherwise terminated;

(d)the person no longer requires the authorization to carry out their duties; or

(e)the person provided false or misleading information to obtain the authorization.

(2)The licensee must notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under paragraph (1)(a) or (e) within five business days after the day on which the revocation is made.

Nuclear Security Measures

Power Supply

60Uninterrupted power supply#

A high-security site must be equipped with devices that, in the event of the loss of the power supply, maintain an uninterrupted power supply for a period of time that is sufficient to allow for an alternate continuous power supply to be implemented for all critical security measures that require a power supply and that are described in the nuclear security plan.

Protected Area

61Perimeter enclosed by physical barrier#

(1)A protected area must be enclosed by a physical barrier that is located at its perimeter.

(2)The perimeter of the protected area must be

(a)protected by the following nuclear security measures:

(i)two or more independent nuclear security measures that detect intrusion or attempted intrusion and that are designed and installed such that the failure of one measure does not prevent the intrusion or attempted intrusion from being detected and an alarm from being triggered,

(ii)a nuclear security measure that detects any tampering or attempted tampering that may cause any of the measures referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

(iii)a nuclear security measure that, when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, triggers a continuous alarm that is audible and visible in the central alarm station and that can only be shut off from inside the station by a central alarm station operator, and

(iv)two or more independent nuclear security measures that facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm by a central alarm station operator; or

(b)kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with

(i)a device that enables communication with the central alarm station, and

(ii)a device that can trigger a continuous alarm that is audible and visible in the central alarm station and that can only be shut off from inside the station by a central alarm station operator.

(3)The physical barrier must be designed and constructed and the other nuclear security measures must be designed and implemented such that together they

(a)provide sufficient time for the off-site response force or, if any, the on-site nuclear response force to respond to any intrusion into the protected area; and

(b)reduce the risk of forced entry into the protected area by any vehicle.

(4)Permanent security facilities such as guard posts and vehicle portals may join with the physical barrier if a continuous barrier is maintained.

(5)Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the physical barrier must be

(a)constructed so that it can be closed and securely locked to resist unauthorized entry; and

(b)kept closed and securely locked except when persons or land vehicles are entering or exiting the protected area under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer.

62Unobstructed areas#

(1)Both sides of the physical barrier referred to in subsection 61(1) must be bordered by an unobstructed area that is free from any structures, equipment or other obstructions and is large enough to allow for the unrestricted observation of the movement of any person or object within the area.

(2)An unobstructed area must be continuously and uniformly illuminated at an intensity that allows the presence of any person or object within the area to be clearly observed and assessed.

63Vehicle and vessel barriers#

The perimeter of a protected area must be protected by a nuclear security measure that is designed to protect against the forced entry of land vehicles — and, if the protected area is adjacent to a body of water, vessels — into the protected area.

Vital Areas

64Identification process#

A licensee must establish a process to identify vital areas and keep a record that sets out that process.

65Nuclear security measures#

(1)A vital area must be protected by nuclear security measures that

(a)are in addition to those used to protect the protected area;

(b)control access to the vital area;

(c)detect unauthorized access to the vital area;

(d)delay adversaries who are described in the design basis threat or the threat and risk assessment long enough to ensure that an effective intervention can be made;

(e)triggers a continuous alarm that is audible and visible in the central alarm station in the event that an unattended point of entry or exit is opened and that can only be shut off from inside the station by a central alarm station operator; and

(f)are monitored to ensure that any tampering or attempted tampering with the measures is detected and assessed.

(2)Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in a vital area must be securely locked when it is unattended.

66List of persons#

A licensee must keep an up-to-date list of all persons who have access to keys, keycards or any other system, including a computer system, that controls access to a vital area.

Inner Area

67Enclosed structure#

(1)An inner area must be within an enclosed structure that is

(a)located at least 5 m away from every point in the physical barrier that encloses the protected area; and

(b)designed and constructed to prevent a person who has gained unauthorized access to Category I nuclear material from removing the material from the inner area before an effective intervention can be made.

(2)Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the enclosed structure must be kept closed and securely locked with a device that can only be unlocked from outside the structure by two persons who are authorized under subsection 52(1), with each of them simultaneously using a means of access control.

68Nuclear security measures#

(1)An inner area must be

(a)protected by the following nuclear security measures that are in addition to those used to protect the protected area:

(i)two or more independent nuclear security measures that detect intrusion into, and unauthorized movement within and out of, the inner area,

(ii)a nuclear security measure that detects any tampering or attempted tampering that may cause any of the measures referred to in subparagraph (i) or (v) to malfunction or cease to function,

(iii)a nuclear security measure that, when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, triggers the following continuous and independent alarms:

(A)an alarm that is audible and visible in the central alarm station and that can only be shut off from inside the station by a central alarm station operator, and

(B)an alarm that is audible and visible in at least one other attended place outside the inner area and that can only be shut off from that place by a person who is authorized under subsection 52(1),

(iv)two or more independent nuclear security measures that facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm, and

(v)a nuclear security measure that detects the unauthorized removal of Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material from the inner area; or

(b)kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with

(i)a device that enables communication with the central alarm station, and

(ii)a device that can trigger a continuous alarm that is audible and visible in the central alarm station and in at least one other attended place outside of the inner area and that can only be shut off from inside the station by a central alarm station operator or from that other place by a person who is authorized under subsection 52(1).

(2)An inner area must be protected by nuclear security measures that

(a)control access to the area;

(b)record each attempt to access the area and verify the identity of each authorized person who enters the area; and

(c)are monitored to ensure that any tampering or attempted tampering with the measures is detected and assessed.

Access Control

Prohibitions

69Unauthorized persons#

(1)A licensee must not permit an unauthorized person to enter or remain in

(a)a protected area;

(b)a vital area; or

(c)an inner area.

(2)The licensee must not permit a person who has been granted an authorization to enter or remain in a protected area, vital area or inner area with escort to enter or remain in that area unless they are escorted in accordance with that authorization.

70Reporting unauthorized person#

If a person observes anyone in a protected area, vital area or inner area whom they believe on reasonable grounds is not authorized to be in that area, they must immediately report that fact to a nuclear security officer.

71Weapons, explosive substances and threat items#

A licensee must ensure that

(a)weapons are not taken into a protected area or inner area unless they are under the control of a peace officer, nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or off-site response force who requires access to the area for the purpose of carrying out their duties;

(b)explosive substances are not taken into a protected area or inner area unless

(i)they are under the control of a peace officer, nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or off-site response force who requires access to the area for the purpose of carrying out their duties; or

(ii)they are necessary for an operational requirement and are under the control of a person who is authorized by the licensee and escorted at all times by a nuclear security officer; and

(c)threat items are not taken into a protected area or inner area unless they are necessary for an operational requirement.

72Removal of nuclear material#

(1)A licensee must ensure that Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material is not removed from a protected area or inner area except in accordance with a licence.

(2)A licensee must ensure that Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material is not removed from a vital area without its authorization.

73Prohibited activities#

A person must not

(a)take any weapons into a protected area or inner area unless they are under the control of a peace officer, nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force who requires access to the area for the purpose of carrying out their duties;

(b)take any explosive substance into a protected area or an inner area unless

(i)they are a peace officer, nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or off-site response force who requires access to the area for the purpose of carrying out their duties, or

(ii)they are authorized to do so by the licensee and escorted at all times by a nuclear security officer and the explosive substance is necessary for an operational requirement;

(c)take threat items into a protected area or inner area unless they are necessary for an operational requirement; or

(d)remove any Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material from a protected area, vital area or inner area without the authorization of the licensee.

Identity Verification

74Protected area#

Before a person who has been granted an authorization under section 49 enters a protected area, the licensee must verify their identity by two separate personnel identity verification systems, one of which must use biometric information.

75Vital area#

The licensee must verify and record the identity of every person who enters a vital area.

Vehicle Access

76Land vehicles#

A licensee must not permit a land vehicle to enter a protected area, vital area or inner area unless there is an operational requirement for it to be in that area.

77Vehicle access#

(1)A licensee must ensure that land vehicles only enter into or exit from a protected area through a vehicle portal or, if necessary for an operational requirement, through an opening with two moveable barriers.

(2)Both moveable barriers of a vehicle portal or opening must not be open at the same time except in the event of an emergency or if it is necessary to do so for an operational requirement.

(3)When both moveable barriers of a vehicle portal or opening are open at the same time, the vehicle portal or opening, as the case may be, must be

(a)attended by at least one nuclear security officer who is equipped with a land vehicle; or

(b)protected by other nuclear security measures that prevent unauthorized access to the protected area.

Inner Area Access

78Means of entry or exit#

(1)A licensee must not permit a gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure that encloses an inner area to be unlocked, opened or kept open except for the period of time necessary to allow for the passage of persons or items into or out of the area or for the completion of an operational requirement.

(2)While the means of entry or exit is unlocked, opened or kept open, the licensee must ensure that it is under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is dedicated exclusively to that task.

(3)A licensee must not permit a gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure that encloses an inner area to be unlocked from the outside unless it is unlocked by two persons who are authorized to enter the inner area, at least one of whom is a nuclear security officer.

79Person must be accompanied#

A person who is authorized under subsection 52(1) to enter and remain in an inner area must not enter the area unless they are accompanied by another person who is authorized to do so under that subsection and they remain in visual contact with that other person.

Searches

80Signage for high-security site#

(1)A licensee must post, in close proximity to the location at which the search of persons is conducted, signage that is visible to any person who is about to enter a high-security site that states, in English and French, that all persons entering and exiting the site and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, are

(a)on entering the site, subject to search by a nuclear security officer — using any necessary screening and detection devices — for weapons, explosive substances, threat items and, in the case of a land vehicle, unauthorized persons; and

(b)on exiting the site, subject to search by a nuclear security officer for Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material and Category III nuclear material using devices capable of detecting that material.

(2)A licensee must post, in close proximity to the location at which the search of persons is conducted, signage that is visible to any person who is about to enter a protected area or inner area that states, in English and French, that all persons entering and exiting the area and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, are

(a)on entering the area, subject to search by a nuclear security officer — using any necessary screening and detection devices — for weapons, explosive substances, threat items and, in the case of a land vehicle, unauthorized persons; and

(b)on exiting the area, subject to search by a nuclear security officer for Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material and Category III nuclear material using devices capable of detecting that material.

81Search on entry#

(1)Subject to subsection (3), a licensee must not permit any person to enter a protected area or inner area unless the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, are searched by a nuclear security officer — using any necessary detection and screening devices — for weapons, explosive substances, threat items and, in the case of a land vehicle, unauthorized persons.

(2)Subject to subsection (3), a licensee must ensure that all persons exiting a protected area or inner area and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, are searched by a nuclear safety officer for Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material and Category III nuclear material using devices capable of detecting that material.

(3)The following persons are not subject to a search under subsection (1) or (2):

(a)a nuclear security officer whose identity has been verified in accordance with section 74 and who requires access to or egress from the protected area or inner area for the purposes of carrying out their duties; and

(b)a person who, if they were granted an authorization to enter the area with an escort, is or was escorted in accordance with that authorization and who establishes to a nuclear security officer — by presentation of identification or other evidence — that they are a member of the off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of an emergency service who requires access to or egress from the protected area or inner area for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

(4)If the licensee has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person who is in a protected area or inner area has any of the following items in their possession, the licensee must not permit the person to remain in that area unless the person and everything in their possession, including a land vehicle, is searched for those items:

(a)weapons or explosive substances that are not under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or off-site response force;

(b)threat items that are not necessary for an operational requirement; or

(c)Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material that is being removed from the area without the authorization of the licensee.

(5)A search of a person that is conducted under this section must be

(a)a non-intrusive search carried out by means of a hand-held scanner, a walk-through scanner equipped with a metal detector or any similar device; or

(b)a frisk search carried out by a person of the same sex as the person being searched and extending from head to foot, down the front and rear of the body, around the legs and inside clothing folds, pockets and footwear, if a nuclear security officer determines that it is necessary in order to maintain security.

(6)If the high-security site is equipped with a vehicle portal, a search of a land vehicle that is conducted under this section must take place in the vehicle portal.

82Prohibition#

A person who refuses to submit to a search to which they are subject under section 81 must not enter a protected area or inner area.

Part 3 · Other Nuclear Facilities

Definition

83Definition of licensee#

In this Part, licensee means a person who, in relation to a nuclear facility referred to in paragraph 3(c) of these Regulations, is licensed under the Act to

(a)carry out an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (e) or (f) of the Act; or

(b)produce, refine, convert, enrich, process, reprocess, manage, store or dispose of a nuclear substance.

Application

84Application of Part#

This Part applies in respect of the nuclear facilities referred to in paragraph 3(c).

Facility-access Security Clearance

85Conditions#

(1)A licensee may grant a facility-access security clearance to a person if

(a)it determines, after verifying the information and documents referred to in subsection (2), that the person does not pose an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of persons or the security of the nuclear facility; or

(b)it verifies that the person holds

(i)a valid facility-access security clearance, a high-security site access clearance or an enhanced security clearance granted by another licensee, or

(ii)a valid reliability status or a secret or top secret clearance granted under the Directive on Security Screening.

(2)For the purpose of paragraph (1)(a), the licensee must verify the following information and documents in respect of the person who is seeking the facility-access security clearance:

(a)two pieces of valid government-issued identification, one of which must be photo identification;

(b)a record that sets out the results of any criminal record check, such as a check that is fingerprint-based; and

(c)their personal history for the last five years, composed of their educational history, professional qualifications, employment history and character references, but if their history cannot be established for that period, information relating to their trustworthiness, including, if available, the results of a criminal record check from each country in which they have resided for one or more years in the last five years.

(3)A facility-access security clearance may be granted for a term not exceeding 10 years and must be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the nuclear facility.

(4)A licensee that grants a facility-access security clearance under paragraph (1)(b) must keep a record indicating how it verified that the person holds a status or clearance, as the case may be, referred to in that paragraph.

86List of persons#

(1)A licensee must keep an up-to-date list of the persons to whom a facility-access security clearance has been granted.

(2)The licensee must, on request, provide a copy of the list to the Commission or an inspector.

87Revocation#

(1)A licensee must revoke a person’s facility-access security clearance if

(a)the licensee concludes, based on an investigation, that the person poses or could pose an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of persons or the security of the nuclear facility;

(b)the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

(c)the person’s duties have been completed, suspended or otherwise terminated;

(d)the person no longer requires the clearance to carry out their duties; or

(e)the person provided false or misleading information to obtain the clearance.

(2)The licensee must notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under paragraph (1)(a) or (e) within five business days after the day on which the revocation is made.

Access Control

Access to Nuclear Facility

88Entering or remaining in nuclear facility#

(1)A person must not enter or remain in a nuclear facility at which a licensee carries out licensed activities unless they

(a)have a facility-access security clearance that is granted in respect of that facility by the licensee;

(b)are escorted at all times by a person who has such a clearance; or

(c)are an inspector who is designated to carry out inspections at nuclear facilities or a person who is chosen by the inspector to accompany them under section 33 of the Act.

(2)Despite paragraph (1)(b), a member of the off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of an emergency service is not required to be escorted if there is an emergency at the facility and they require access to it for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

89Licensee’s obligation#

(1)A licensee must ensure that every person who enters or remains in a nuclear facility at which it carries on licensed activities is permitted to do so under subsection 88(1).

(2)The licensee must establish and implement a process that controls access to the nuclear facility and that ensures that the identity of each person who enters the facility, other than one referred to in paragraph 88(1)(c), is verified by,

(a)in the case of a person who has a facility-access security clearance for that facility, presentation of proof of their clearance and use of a device that is capable of verifying their identity;

(b)in the case of any other person who is 18 years of age or over, presentation of two pieces of valid government-issued identification, one of which must be photo identification; and

(c)in the case of a person who is under the age of 18, presentation of documentary proof of their name and address.

90Weapons, explosive substances and threat items#

A licensee must ensure that

(a)weapons are not taken into a nuclear facility unless they are under the control of a peace officer or member of the off-site response force who requires access to the nuclear facility for the purpose of carrying out their duties;

(b)explosive substances are not taken into a nuclear facility unless

(i)they are under the control of a peace officer or member of the off-site response force who requires access to the nuclear facility for the purpose of carrying out their duties; or

(ii)they are necessary for an operational requirement and they are under the control of a person who is authorized by the licensee and kept under the direct visual surveillance of a person authorized by the licensee; and

(c)threat items are not taken into a nuclear facility unless they are necessary for an operational requirement.

91Prohibited activities#

A person must not

(a)take any weapon into a nuclear facility unless they are a peace officer or a member of the off-site response force who requires access to the nuclear facility for the purpose of carrying out their duties;

(b)take any explosive substance into a nuclear facility unless

(i)they are a peace officer or a member of the off-site response force who requires access to the nuclear facility for the purpose of carrying out their duties, or

(ii)they are authorized to do so by the licensee and placed under the direct visual surveillance of a person authorized by the licensee and the explosive substance is necessary for an operational requirement;

(c)take any threat item into a nuclear facility unless it is necessary for an operational requirement; or

(d)remove any nuclear substance from a nuclear facility without the authorization of the licensee.

92Entry of land vehicles#

(1)A licensee must not permit a land vehicle to enter a nuclear facility at which the licensee carries on a licensed activity unless

(a)the land vehicle is searched for explosive substances, weapons, threat items and unauthorized persons; and

(b)there is an operational requirement for the vehicle to be there or it is used by a member of the off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of an emergency service for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

(2)Despite paragraph (1)(a), a vehicle that is used by a security guard, a member of the off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of an emergency service is not required to be searched if there is an emergency at the nuclear facility and the use of the vehicle is necessary to carry out their duties.

Searches and Screening

93Signage#

A licensee must post, in close proximity to the location at which the search and screening of persons is conducted, signage that is visible to any person who is about to enter the nuclear facility that states, in English and French, that

(a)persons entering and exiting the facility may be subject to search or screening for explosive substances, weapons, threat items or nuclear substances; and

(b)the licensee must not allow any person who has been selected for search or screening to enter the facility unless that person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, is searched or screened.

94Processes for search or screening#

(1)A licensee must implement processes that, using a risk-based approach, provide for the manner of selecting the persons who are to be searched or screened, respectively,

(a)on entering a nuclear facility, for explosive substances, weapons and threat items; and

(b)on exiting a nuclear facility, for nuclear substances.

(2)The licensee must not permit any person who is selected for search or screening to enter the nuclear facility unless the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, is searched or screened.

95Conduct of search or screening#

A search or screening referred to in section 94 must be carried out by a person who is authorized to do so by the licensee and must be

(a)a non-intrusive search or screening that is carried out by means of a hand-held scanner, a walk-through scanner equipped with a metal detector or any similar device; or

(b)a frisk search carried out by a person of the same sex as the person being searched and extending from head to foot, down the front and rear of the body, around the legs and inside clothing folds, pockets and footwear, if a security guard or other person authorized by the licensee determines that it is necessary in order to maintain security.

Security Exercise

96Security exercise#

(1)A licensee must, in cooperation with the off-site response force, at least once every five years, conduct a security exercise that tests

(a)the ability of selected elements of the contingency plan and selected nuclear security measures to ensure that an effective intervention can be made against, taking into account the threats identified in the threat and risk assessment; and

(b)the readiness of the off-site response force and any security guards to respond to those threats.

(2)The licensee must notify the Commission in writing of its intent to conduct a security exercise at least four months before the day on which the exercise is to be held.

(3)The licensee must, for each security exercise that it conducts, keep a record that contains

(a)an outline of the exercise scenario;

(b)an evaluation of the effectiveness of the elements of the contingency plan and the nuclear security measures that were tested and the readiness of the off-site response force and, if any, the security guards; and

(c)a description of any corrective actions that, taking the evaluation into account, are necessary.

(4)If a corrective action referred to in paragraph (3)(c) is to be implemented using a phased approach, the licensee must create a corrective action plan that sets out

(a)the reasons for the corrective action;

(b)a rationale for the phased approach; and

(c)a timetable that sets out when each phase of the plan will be completed.

(5)The licensee must implement the corrective actions and, if they are to be implemented using a phased approach, each phase must be completed in accordance with the timetable set out in the corrective action plan.

(6)The licensee must, within 90 days after the day on which the security exercise is completed, provide to the Commission a copy of the record referred to in subsection (3) and, if any, a copy of the corrective action plan referred to in subsection (4).

Part 4 · Licence to Transport

97Definition of licensee#

In this Part, licensee means a person who is licensed to transport Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material.

98Application#

This Part applies in respect of the transport of Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material.

99Exemption#

(1)A person may, without a licence to carry on that activity, transport Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material within an area in which the material is required by sections 19 to 21 to be produced, processed, used or stored.

(2)For greater certainty, the exemption established under subsection (1) relates only to the activity specified in that subsection and does affect the licence requirement imposed by section 26 of the Act in relation to other activities.

100Transport security plan#

An application for a licence to transport Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material or Category III nuclear material must contain, in addition to the information required under section 7 of the Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations, 2015, a transport security plan that includes

(a)the name, quantity, radiation level in Gy/h, chemical and physical characteristics and isotopic composition of the nuclear material;

(b)a threat and risk assessment;

(c)a description of the conveyance and, if any, the escort arrangements;

(d)the proposed security measures;

(e)a description of how the applicant will evaluate and improve the security measures, including the proposed scheduling of security exercises;

(f)the planned route and at least one alternate route;

(g)the tracking and communication arrangements made among the applicant, the operator of the land vehicle transporting the nuclear material, the recipient of the material and any off-site response force throughout the transport; and

(h)the arrangements made between the applicant and any off-site response force throughout the transport.

101Security exercise#

(1)The licensee must conduct a security exercise in respect of the transport of Category I nuclear material, Category II nuclear material and Category III nuclear material at least once every five years.

(2)The licensee must, for each security exercise that it conducts, keep a record that contains

(a)an outline of the exercise scenario;

(b)an evaluation of the effectiveness of the security measures that were tested; and

(c)a description of any corrective actions that, taking the evaluation into account, are necessary.

(3)If a corrective action referred to in paragraph (2)(c) is to be implemented using a phased approach, the licensee must create a corrective action plan that sets out

(a)the reasons for the corrective action;

(b)a rationale for the phased approach; and

(c)a timetable that sets out when each phase of the plan will be completed.

(4)The licensee must implement the corrective actions and, if they are to be implemented using a phased approach, each phase must be completed in accordance with the timetable set out in the corrective action plan.

(5)The licensee must, within 90 days after the day on which the security exercise is completed, provide to the Commission a copy of the record referred to in subsection (2) and, if any, a copy of the corrective action plan referred to in subsection (3).

Part 5 · Consequential Amendments, Transitional Provisions, Repeal and Coming into Force

Consequential Amendments

Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations

102 #

[Amendments]

Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations

103 #

[Amendments]

Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission)

104 #

[Amendments]

Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations, 2015

105 #

[Amendments]

106 #

[Amendments]

Transitional Provisions

107Definition of former Regulations#

(1)For the purposes of this section, former Regulations means the Nuclear Security Regulations as they read immediately before the day on which these Regulations come into force.

(2)Unless the context otherwise requires, words and expressions used in this section have the same meaning as in section 1.

(3)The former Regulations and Part 9 of the schedule to Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission), as they read immediately before the day on which these Regulations come into force, continue to apply for two years after that day to a nuclear facility for which, on the day on which these Regulations come into force, a licence issued under the Act is in force.

(4)If a person has been granted a clearance or issued an authorization under the former Regulations, that clearance or authorization remains valid until the expiry of the term for which it was granted or issued, and during that term the person may continue to access any area or information and carry out any duties and responsibilities that the clearance or authorization permitted them to access or carry out under the former Regulations.

(5)If a person has been granted a site access security clearance under the former Regulations that is valid on the day on which these Regulations come into force and that, to maintain the person’s access to the nuclear facility, must be replaced by a facility-access security clearance granted under section 85, the licensee that granted the clearance may, before the term of the clearance expires, extend the term of the clearance to any term not exceeding 10 years.

Repeal

108 #

The Nuclear Security Regulations are repealed.

Coming into Force

109Registration#

These Regulations come into force on the day on which they are registered.

(Section 1)

Federal laws of Canada reproduced under the Reproduction of Federal Law Order (SI/97-5); not the official version. Source: Justice Laws Website.